Fighting the Chotoo gang
A GROUP of notorious gangsters has apparently brought the Punjab police to its knees. A 2,200-strong police force has retreated after losing several men since the operation against the Chotoo gang in the southern Punjab district of Rajanpur began earlier this month. The army is now being dragged into yet another law and order issue that the civilian agencies should have been able to deal with.
For years, the riverine area straddling three provinces has become a haven for criminals outside the government’s writ. Now, hundreds of troops backed by helicopter gunships are in pursuit of the outlaws in these ‘badlands’. The Chotoo gang saga that has dominated the media over the past week, overshadowing even the ‘Panamagate’ scandal, is not just about the failure of the civilian law-enforcement agencies; it highlights the much greater predicament of shrinking governance space that goes beyond the lawless tribal regions.
There are many badlands across the country where the authority of the state is either non-existent or has become irrelevant, allowing criminal gangs and militant outfits to operate with impunity. Army operations do not provide a long-term solution to this growing problem. The issue is not just the elimination of one criminal gang or militant outfit from a particular region, but how to restore the government’s authority. There is certainly no clear thinking on this critical issue.
There are many badlands across the country where the authority of the state is non-existent.
For long, the Punjab government has been in a state of denial over lawlessness and the rising influence of sectarian and militant groups in south Punjab. The Chotoo gang has not emerged overnight. It seems highly improbable that a former police informer who heads a consortium of criminal gangs would be operating without the patronage of some local ‘influential’, which is quite common in such cases.
Interestingly, all police actions in the past ended in a deal with the gangs, thereby allowing the criminals greater space. In 2013, the gang attacked a police check post and abducted eight police officers. They were set free eight days later after the government released Chotoo’s detained relatives and agreed to give them safe passage.
It is quite intriguing how the criminals got access to sophisticated weapons that were used against the police this time, resulting in losses for the force. The gang is now engaging troops in fierce gun battles. It may be true that the heavily forested terrain has made the task of the police and the local administration much more difficult, but that cannot be used as an excuse for their failure. There are numerous other criminal gangs operating in south Punjab defying the claims of ‘all is well’ in the country’s most powerful province.
Apparently, it was pressure from the military that finally pushed the provincial administration into action. But there is no indication yet of any crackdown on religious extremist groups, many of whom are believed to be closely connected with criminal gangs. There is a close nexus between crime and militancy and the problem of shrinking government authority cannot be effectively resolved without a coherent strategy. But neither the Punjab provincial administration nor the federal government is willing to come out from its state of denial to confront the problem effectively.
Over the past year, the issue of cracking down on extremist groups has been a major source of tension between the civil and military leadership. The tension mounted further following last month’s bombing of a public park in Lahore that killed dozens of people, mostly women and children. The military’s seemingly unilateral decision to launch a province-wide crackdown on extremist groups brought tensions to a head.
Apparently, the situation has been defused after the provincial government agreed to the army’s demand, but the issue remains a major irritant. The provincial government claims that it is civilian agencies that are leading the actions with the backing of the army. But the decision to call in the army in Rajanpur exposes the limited capacity of civil law-enforcement agencies in dealing even with criminal groups, let alone organised militant and extremist outfits.
The army should be able to take out the Chotoo gang from the riverine area, but it would not be the end of the problem. With shrinking governance, some other gang may emerge once the army withdraws. Moreover, the problem is not limited to Rajanpur.
The absence of effective governance has created a vacuum that is often filled by militant groups. The most recent example is of Jamaatud Dawa holding so-called Sharia courts in Lahore and other parts of Punjab. The group, which is also on the terror watch list, is said to have now suspended those courts, but it is an example that could be emulated by other extremist groups if the slide continues.
Governance issues in other provinces — particularly in Sindh and Balochistan — seem far worse. As a result, the role of the army in internal security matters in those provinces has become more significant. The Rangers are virtually running Karachi as civilian law-enforcement agencies have receded. Many parts of Pakistan’s biggest city and economic jugular had become no-go areas before the Rangers-led operation brought back some degree of normality.
While fully backing the Rangers’ operation in Karachi, the federal government is reluctant to give the same powers to paramilitary forces in Punjab. But with the army now fully engaged in the operation against the Chotoo gang, it will be extremely difficult for both the federal and Punjab governments to resist pressure from the military.
The operation against the Chotoo gang has laid bare the slide in the capacity of the civilian law-enforcement agencies to deal with armed outlaws. It has increased the dependence of the civil administration on the army. That may further stretch the army, which is already engaged in fighting insurgency in the northwest and Balochistan.
The writer is an author and journalist.
Published in Dawn, April 20th, 2016