When talking about the discipline of ‘political Islam’ (or Islamism), many of us in Pakistan are prone to use the terms ‘Wahabi’ism’ and ‘Deobandi’ism’ interchangeably, believing them both to be one and the same for most practical purposes. Tariq Hasan, author of Colonialism and the Call to Jihad in British India, disagrees with this notion vehemently, taking pains to draw a distinction between the two ideologies in his book — of which he holds the latter school of thought in utmost regard. In fact, he strongly believes that true Deobandi’ism, along with Shia and Barelvi Islam, will act as a bulwark against the growth of Islamic extremism in India.

In his book, Hasan uses family sources, along with translated and Urdu works, unpublished material, and a large number of books written by subcontinental and Western writers to present two core theses: firstly, that the services of Indian Muslim nationalists inspired by the Deobandi movement deserve due recognition for winning independence from Britain; and secondly, that Deobandi nationalism in India under the Raj was a completely different phenomenon from modern-day violent Islamism practiced by groups such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and the militant Islamic State (IS) group.

The author picks seven historical figures: Syed Ahmad Barelvi, Ahmadullah Shah, Mahmud al-Hasan, Ubaidullah Sindhi, Barkatullah Khan, Hussain Ahmad Madani and Raja Mahendra Pratap, believing each of them to have played a crucial role in the independence movement, while not receiving sufficient acknowledgment in return (despite not being a Muslim, Pratap worked very closely with Deoband revolutionaries to rid India of the British ). It may be noted that the attempts of all seven failed, but Hasan believes their efforts were nonetheless indispensable in putting the wheels of independence in motion.

Tariq Hasan studies the Deobandi and independence movements in British India, attempting to distinguish the former from a more ‘violent’ Wahabi movement

Starting with Syed Ahmed Barelvi’s campaign against Ranjit Singh (an ally of the British), he discusses the Muhammadiya Movement led by the former, which he believes to be a precursor to the establishment of the Deoband seminary. He then moves on to Ahmadullah Shah, who strove to defend the state of Oudh against the British in the aftermath of the 1857 War of Independence. The following two chapters describe the setting up of the Deoband seminary in 1867, and its influence on the Khilafat Movement, the Christmas Day Plot and the Silk Conspiracy Case; pan-Islamist attempts to consolidate opposition against the British Empire. It is here that the remaining five figures played pivotal roles. The stance of the Muslim clergy in the 10 years preceding Partition is discussed next. He ends by talking about contemporary (violent) Islamist movements around the world, and how they differ vastly from the struggles of the 20th-century Indian Muslim revolutionaries. Throughout the book, he extols the inter-religious harmony that defined these early revolutionary attempts — using this to build his case that true Deobandi’ism is a harmonious, tolerant ideology.

In particular Hasan thinks very highly of the Deoband seminary, crediting it with inculcating a spirit of inclusiveness and respect for non-Muslims and Sufi saints in its students — concepts we do not normally associate the Pakistani brand of Deobandi’ism with. He describes Wahabi’ism in turn as an intolerant ideology, which he believes has taken root in Pakistan and Afghanistan ever since the jihad against the Soviets. Thus, according to Hasan, Deobandi’ism in Pakistan is no longer true Deobandi’ism — it is Wahabi’ism.

“The late 19th century witnessed the birth of two other religious schools of thought in northern India.  The Ahl-i-Hadith, a Sunni sub-sect was in a very limited sense similar to the Deoband school.  Unlike the Deobandis, they were opposed to the system of Islamic law as propounded by the different Islamic schools of thought.  They propagated a line similar to the Deobandis in as much as they sought a return to the basics of Islamic thought, that is, the Quran and the Hadith.  They too wanted a purge of certain practices which had crept into the lives of Muslims in India, such as worshipping at tombs of saints.” — Excerpt from the book

Hasan’s scorn for Muslim separatism in undivided India is apparent throughout the book. He claims Muslim mass opinion was, by and large, in favour of the Congress, while the Muslim League was only supported by Muslim elites in states where they were a minority. He also believes the League had the backing of the British in its demand for a separate country. His heroes — the Deoband ulema — remained staunchly opposed to Partition until the very end, throwing their lot in with the Congress.

However, some of the author’s arguments are open to question. For instance, he believes Christian missionaries’ aggressive proselytizing of Hindus and Muslims was the main reason behind the 1857 revolt. This is a claim that he makes again and again in various parts of the book. However, the causes of the revolt were numerous; while early British administrators had urged socially controversial reforms such as the banning of sati (the practice of burning widows), modern historians believe other factors held more weight in galvanising the sepoys to rebel. Similarly, his cookie-cutter approach to Islamic denominations (Wahabi: destructive; Deobandi: progressive) is also debatable, when one thinks about some of the more controversial stances that the Indian Deobandi clergymen have adopted in domestic law cases.

Also problematic are some of the generalisations made in different parts of the book. These include the belief that peace is more unlikely in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, since US drone attacks kill innocent civilians; that the present-day notion of jihad is based on hatred, while the pre-Partition one was more ‘noble’; and that the Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha were “two sides of the same coin”. Hasan’s writing style is also quite subjective; he describes the Islamic code of conduct during war to be a model for armies even today, a view that may not be shared by everyone. While he uses the example of religious extremism in Pakistan to underscore the futility of Partition, he fails to explain why Muslim clergymen who stayed behind in India have failed to elevate the status of Indian Muslims into a prosperous, socially well-integrated community. His tone when talking about the British in India or Christian missionaries tends to get quite accusatory, which compromises objectivity. This makes the book appear less of an academic study, and more of a collection of the author’s musings.

But perhaps most bothersome is the poor editing of the book, with several examples of spelling mistakes, missing words and botched punctuation. The author is also not consistent in the spellings or names of the characters he refers to, sometimes referring to their first names, and other times their surname.

Hasan’s book provides an interesting, if not entirely plausible, way of viewing the birth of Muslim nationalism in colonial India. While he succeeds in fulfilling one of his objectives — bringing to the forefront the struggles of early Muslim reformers — he fails to build a foolproof case for why Deobandi’ism should be considered the progressive, tolerant ideology that he thinks will lead Indian Muslims into a more successful future.

The reviewer is a political economist, and has taught social sciences at various academic institutions in Karachi.

Colonialism and the Call to Jihad in British India
(HISTORY)
By Tariq Hasan
SAGE Publications Pvt. Ltd, India
ISBN 978-9351502616
232pp.