“The Americans developed a two-pronged strategy to destroy the Taliban government in Afghanistan. On one front they launched a media war through subversive propaganda of Taliban being uneducated, uncivilised and cruel … and are being trained for war at religious schools in Pakistan. And the school on the top of the list was the Darul Uloom Haqqania at Akora Khattak, led by me — Samiul Haq.”

This most definitely called for a response from the Afghan Taliban and from maulana Samiul Haq, who boasts of being a Taliban mentor, but maintains that the link between his madressah and the jihad being waged by its former students is only coincidental.

This boast receives more notice than his disclaimer. Pakistani and Western media have regularly approached the maulana for his take on events, his own philosophy and that of the Taliban. These ‘standard’ responses have been compiled in this book, Afghan Taliban: War of Ideology, Struggle for Peace, which has been translated into English by Canada-based Azmat Abbas, and serves as clarification on the activities of the militants the maulana has been so closely involved with over the years.

The story, as is always the case with Afghanistan post-Soviet invasion, begins with the indifference and utter inefficiency shown by the world in dealing with the problem there and then. Then there is mention of the ineptness and greed of the local warlords, which created greater room and justification for intervention by the Taliban.

Despite some interesting first-hand accounts, maulana Samiul Haq reveals little about Taliban thought — whether of the past or that of the future

“The government of Pakistan and religious scholars having influence on the region tried to broker peace but failed. I blame it on the intervention by CIA, and the warlords who wanted more power than their due share. ... The turning point came in the summer of 1995 when a number of students of religious institutions decided to unite under the flag of Mullah Omar. ... In a short span of time the Taliban fighters restored law and order in the state which was no less than a miracle. Once peace was restored, the Taliban fighters decided to install an Islamic government and enforce Sharia, which came as [a] surprise to the world.”

The world, it seems, has since been unable to understand the Taliban phenomenon. That is, when the world is not deliberately putting vicious spins on the wards of the maulana at the Darul Uloom Haqqania. “It is fact that nearly 90 per cent of Taliban leadership graduated from Darul Uloom Haqqania.”

This is a plea not different, in its innocent tone and simple logic, from the ones offered by men claiming a lesser tradition than that of the maulana, who talks proudly of his forefathers who fought (both ideologically and by sword) to establish the social order they so favoured in their neighbourhood. This is the logic that is, and has been for a long time, put forward by the Pakistani man in the street — more out of distrust and anger at the West than necessarily out of love for the Taliban.

If a serious reader hoped for something more profound than this, he would struggle over a large part of the book. Argument over argument, responses piled upon responses to the West’s objections, the writer reveals precious little insight into the evolution of Taliban thought in the past — and more significantly — in the future.

Nor does the writer give his old students any tips on how they can appeal to the people of the world. He chooses simply to defend them by and large, through rhetoric mixed with a calculated dose of sweet and convivial overtures for good measure. “A necessary clarification is needed before you read the main body of the book. Wherever I have criticised America, United Kingdom or other Western countries, it only implies to the governments in power in those countries and not the public at large.”

In the book’s introduction the maulana innocently attempts to convince those on the other side with this simple ‘request’: “[The] United States of America and the West are misguided by the interests of Jews. They must consider Muslims as their brothers and must not transgress or discriminate against the Muslims. They are requested to extend full help in spreading the knowledge of peace all over the world to bring harmony.”

And then he ‘advises’: “My advice to the US is to hire noble people throughout the world as members of their think tanks and those making the current policies should be sent retirement.”

Elsewhere, he seeks to ride the popular appeal of the game of cricket in order to establish a pro-Taliban bias and project an image of the militants as people looking to align with the world and its ‘acceptable pleasures’: “[The] Afghan government of Taliban sent its cricket team to Pakistan and applied for registration on the international level. But this application was rejected on the recommendation of some international organisations.”

It is somewhat of a surprise to learn that the maulana has only been the chancellor of the madressah since 1988. Given his overall impact, particularly his presence in material discussing the Taliban, generated both by the militants and by the world they are confronted with, the maulana appears to have been around forever — as the ‘father of the Taliban’.

There are, then, interesting bits in the book for people who are not all that familiar with the history of Darul Uloom Haqqania, which has evolved over time — just as the vision of the ideologues managing it has expanded, its current mission statement reads: “My dream is the resending of knowledge to an area from where it had come down [from] in the first place, ie the land of Bukhara and Samarqand. The homeland of Imam Ismail Bukhari the compiler of the famous book of Hadith the Sahih Bukhari, the most authentic book on earth after Quran. Allah may extend more strength to this Darul Uloom to spread this knowledge of peace, the knowledge of Allah.”

It is somewhat of a surprise to learn that the maulana has only been the chancellor of the madressah since 1988. Given his overall impact, particularly his presence in material discussing the Taliban, generated both by the militants and by the world they are confronted with, the maulana appears to have been around forever — as the ‘father of the Taliban’.

“We have no special relation or secret links with the Taliban,” he says, “although we have a spiritual, student-teacher relationship, which is a natural phenomenon and this relationship is similar to the one your students have with their teachers at Harvard and Oxford University.”

As is the case anywhere, graduates of the Haqqania are free to go down their own path. They are under no obligation to follow any predestined route, explains the maulana matter-of-factly. “No Taliban of Pakistani madaris were asked or ordered to go for Jihad to Afghanistan in support of Mullah Omar. According to my knowledge there is no example or proof of any non-Afghan Taliban who fought in support of Taliban.”

The Haqqania head insists that it is only a coincidence that 90pc of the Afghan Taliban, and so many prominent militant commanders, have had links with his madressah. Maulvi Younis Khalis, Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani and many others are Haqqania alumni. It is not the Haqqania chancellor’s fault that after the “Taliban got religious education from Darul Uloom … they went back to Afghanistan, [and] learnt the skill of using weapons from their ancestors. The West has to admit that religious schools are not military training camps.”

According to the version of events presented in this book, the mujahideen leaders were compelled to unite for peace due to those “fighting amongst each other on petty issues”. “Taliban leaders tried their best to bring the warring factions on the table but to no avail. As a last resort the Taliban leadership united under one flag of Mullah Omar and started making efforts to restore peace.”

The book is replete with such basic explanations. For instance, on the destruction of the statues of Buddha, it states: “Statues were destroyed due to two reasons. The US was busy in stopping the food supplies for children and innocent people, who were dying due to hunger. Thus being aggrieved some people who may or may not be Taliban destroyed these statues. This was not the order of the Taliban government. The Taliban government never favoured this act. In Islam making statues of a personality is prohibited. Moreover, these were not the property of any government or kept in a worship place. Actually idol-making is prohibited even in Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity. So the objections of the West were illogical.”

On music and television, he says: “In Islamic teachings, music is prohibited/ discouraged. We should remember that the laws of Islam are given by Allah himself and implemented by our Holy Prophet (PBUH). Therefore, Taliban cannot be accused for that. Watching TV for good intentions is never prohibited in Islam except showing … scenes which are not liked even in any decent society, however the positive use or for education is not prohibited.”

On Al Qaeda and retired Gen Pervez Musharraf, the book states: “We do not have any information about so-called organisation of Osama bin Laden as propagated by the West. I think it is a cover-name and in my sincere opinion there is no such organisation. The only truth is that Bin Laden had a long list of his mujahideen which the US had also encouraged and favoured in the enmity of USSR. After the Afghan defeated the Russians, the US turned against them and named mujahideen as Al Qaeda. … Instead of explicitly naming Islamic government they took Bin Laden as a ruse. Otherwise had Bin Laden been the only threat then there would have been no need of attack. … The US is working on its plans to de-Islamise and de-link Pakistan Army from the people, so that the people may lose confidence in the army. I think Mr Musharraf completed the US mission while in Afghanistan the US was unable to achieve these aims.”

The maulana also predicts the breaking up of Pakistan: “ … the provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa might be tempted to take the side of the Afghani Pakhtuns leading to the division of Pakistan. Only the province of Punjab will be left as Pakistan. Then the US will ask India to attack Punjab. In my opinion the fate of Pakistan is linked to the fate of Afghanistan … This alliance with the US will never be beneficial. It will turn Pakistan into a mercenary for the US. I can foresee that the next target for the US will be nuclear Pakistan.”

On the subject of oil, he remarks:“In my opinion, as Bin Laden had also opined that, the whole of the West is seeking oil reserves and other resources of the Muslim world and wants to keep the Muslim countries weak and entangled in crises.”

The maulana’s apparent desire for overall modesty is overcome by a tendency to claim credit whenever he proudly discusses his own services rendered as an advocate for the Taliban. “ … I proved as an extraordinary wise and vigilant personality to counter the Western aims. I informed the world about the true facts and took measures to counter the anti-Islam plans of the West.”

“I encouraged and favoured the religious education, training and organisation of Taliban. The movement of Jihad-i-Afghanistan is considered as a golden deed by me and the sacrifices I have made for flying high the flag of dignity of Islam are now part of the [sic] history … I also made the facilities of Jamia Darul Uloom Haqqania available for Taliban and Afghanistan. So all the analysts are of the view that the Darul Uloom Haqqania is the creator of Taliban. I as the founder principal am the man behind the Taliban movement.”

“I am [a] good instructor, good human being, good friend, good orator, good politician and a good writer. I am a literary personality and produced a literary master piece, Islam aur Asre Hazir, (Islam and present time) … ”

Another moment where he asserts his calibre is in his account of the last attempt made for a negotiated settlement between the Pakistan government and the Taliban — who had made it abundantly clear in the run-up to 2013 elections that they would only allow two parties to contest the results, targeting other parties (such as the Awami National Party, the PPP and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement) as ‘secular’ outfits.

“Our understanding was that both Mian Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan would keep the matter of terrorism as top priority since both the parties had promised peace to the public during their election campaigns. A few months into power, the federal government staged a drama in the name of peace dialogue and befooled the people of Pakistan for over a month. Later it was revealed that it was all a drama and during that period Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan’s Amir Hakimullah Mahsud was killed in a drone attack and the so-called process of peace talks came to an end.”

The maulana writes that, “several leaders of religious and political parties became active to take credit for the initiative but had no idea that it was progressing because of my influence alone. The delegation I sent to Miran Shah [sic] briefed me on the success on Jan 2, 2014, but further communication to the government did not receive any response. … On June 15, 2014, the government launched the military operation and all hopes for a peaceful solution to the conflict ended with the end of the talks.”

Fresh insight is generally lacking in excerpts from this book, and the craving for new information on the subject of jihad by the Taliban remains unsatiated. He carries this same approach throughout the book; his penchant for keeping it basic and narrow perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the treatment he prescribes for women.

Not surprisingly, his logic casts the man — who has to go out to face the big bad world — as the ‘oppressed’ against the ‘privileged position’ enjoyed by the woman. “Islam absolves women of all responsibilities of earning for the family and hence saves them from all the hard work outside the security of the house. Her primary duty in Allah’s eyes is to raise the children and to be a source of comfort and solace for her husband. … Women can seek job if the situation demands … [but] she cannot be asked to go out of the house for any job.”

It remains quite clear that despite the maulana’s manifold declarations about the need for unity in the world — with the necessary exclusion of Jews — he remains unable to compromise on too many issues. Or if he is actually willing to have meaningful dialogue for coexistence with the rest of the world, the message does not quite get through. That will require a franker, more honest debate than the one possible under the parameters that are set by this book. We can only wait and see.

The reviewer is a Dawn member of staff.

Afghan Taliban: War of Ideology, Struggle for Peace
(POLITICS)
By Samiul Haq
Emel Publications, Pakistan
ISBN 978-9699556142
204pp.