Mark Twain reportedly once said that a banker is someone who lends you his umbrella when the sun is shining, but wants it back the minute it begins to rain. Some of Gen Pervez Musharraf’s more ardent supporters have described his economic wizard and companion in good times, Shaukat Aziz, who held the reins of Pakistan’s finance ministry from 1999-2007, and was the prime minister from 2004-7, as worthy of this description. Indeed, since he left the premiership of the country in 2007, Aziz has been in relative obscurity, while Musharraf remained in the eye of the political storm for much longer. However, the banker-turned-politician now makes a comeback of sorts with his book, From Banking to the Thorny World of Politics, wherein he talks about his eight years in office, and simultaneously tries to make astute observations about the world’s contemporary security and political scenario.

Co-authored with The Sunday Times journalist, Anna Mikhailova, the book, comprising 17 chapters, is interspersed with Aziz’s interactions during his career as a banker, then a cabinet member, and later, with global political heavyweights such as Atal Bihari Vajpayee, George W. Bush, Kofi Annan, Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, and Mahathir Mohamad.

Following no particular chronological order, the book begins with Nawaz Sharif’s extradition from Pakistan in 1999, and the alleged role played by US and Saudi Arabia in ensuring that the two-time prime minister was not executed. In particular, Aziz mentions that during Bill Clinton’s visit to Islamabad soon after Sharif’s dismissal, the American president refused to be photographed shaking hands with Mr Musharraf, not wanting to be seen as endorsing the latter’s coup. This reminds us of how times may have changed, given that Western governments today certainly appear more amenable to photo-ops with Pakistan’s military leadership. Within the same chapter, the author narrates how he was approached by Mr Musharraf to assume the portfolio of finance minister and, later, premiership in 2004.

Shaukat Aziz chronicles his high-profile career in a volume that lacks an in-depth voice

Here, one may find it odd that for someone so accustomed to the professionalism of the corporate world, Aziz did not appear to flinch at the ethical contradiction between literally being offered the prime ministry on a plate, versus the adherence to rules and discipline which he claims to support otherwise.

While talking about the country’s security situation in the second chapter — which he experienced all too personally as a survivor of a failed suicide attack in 2004 — Aziz largely regurgitates information already in the public domain, offering little more in terms of substance or insight; perhaps something to be expected from the country’s top leader in the early years post-9/11, when the scourge of terrorism was in its formative stages. His views on the subject will probably appeal to a Western audience looking for a panoramic snapshot of security in Pakistan, similar to accounts written by international journalists. To give an example, he says that madressahs should be brought within a formal education structure by the state, but fails to explain why his government was unable to do this during its tenure. It could be that he tried but encountered opposition; but then why not talk about that?

The next two chapters discuss Pakistan’s relations with the US, followed by one on Afghanistan. It is here — and in chapter eight, which discusses Indo-Pak relations in detail — that Aziz reveals somewhat hawkish tendencies, which is rather surprising, given his international exposure as a banker. For instance, in chapter five, he rebukes India for consolidating its presence in Afghanistan, but makes no mention of glaring flaws in Pakistan’s own Afghanistan policy over the decades. His tendency to view foreign relations through the classic ‘honour brigade’ lens (for want of a better expression) is further apparent from his finding of the terms of the 2009 Kerry Lugar Bill (KLB) “unacceptable”. He stops short, though, of telling his readers why the KLB was unacceptable: was it because the terms of the bill were too intrusive, thereby undermining Pakistan’s sovereignty; or was it because it caused consternation within some circles of the state? In doing so, and by maintaining a parochial stance on issues like Indo-Pak relations and defence budgets, Aziz is clearly ensuring he does not ruffle any feathers of the powers-that-be with his book. For example, in his chapter on India, Aziz justifies the existence of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as a guarantor of peace in South Asia, using the oft-repeated Cold War analogy that nukes prevented USA and Russia from using armies against each other between 1945 and 1989. He overlooks the discourse, which has come out since the Cold War ended, that decries the futility of nuclear weapons in preventing proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan. What is most alarming is his insinuation that a short-range nuclear response could be launched by Pakistan if faced with an attack. Coming from a technocrat who has lived much of his adult life in Western countries with a strong tradition of promoting nuclear disarmament, this seems particularly unsettling.

“Tactical nuclear weapons were a large part of Nato’s arsenal during the Cold War. They were based in Germany and intended to stop a core thrust to the West by the Soviet Union. Their primary role was to send a political message to the adversary, signalling resolve. There is another potential reason for developing tactical capability. These weapons could allow Pakistan to, if faced with an attack by India, launch a short-range tactical nuclear response to Indian troops on its soil ... This would amount to defensive ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons within Pakistan — without risking total international retaliation.” — Excerpt from the book

In chapter seven, Aziz attempts to utilise his experiences of Pakistan for a broader commentary on terrorism afflicting the contemporary world. But even here, his analysis hardly adds anything new. For example, his observation that Muslims in the UK should be better integrated within British society is not groundbreaking. Furthermore, he criticises external intervention by the West in the developing countries, but supports the role of international donors in resolving ongoing global humanitarian crises. This seems somewhat simplistic, because why would foreign governments be keen to pump funds into the Third World for reconstructive efforts if they are barred from pursuing their geopolitical interests by way of foreign intervention?

That Banking to Politics is pitched towards Western audiences is apparent from the ordering of the chapters, which prioritises security and terrorism over more drab domestic politics and economics. Thus, while the first half of the book talks largely about Pakistan’s security issues, US-Pak relations, and the fight against global terrorism, the author’s primary achievement — the remarkable turnaround of Pakistan’s economy during his tenure — is relegated to a distant 10th chapter. Here, Aziz stresses that the three cornerstones of his economic policy were deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation. He also mentions the need for restructuring the world’s financial architecture, including an uphaul of the IMF’s review board.

However, it is felt that his economic analysis is severely watered down, perhaps purposefully, to make sense to a wider readership. This is a pity, because details of his economic reform agenda would undoubtedly have been of interest to more serious readers in policymaking circles. Here also, he toes the ‘honour brigade’ line, stressing that defence is a top priority which must be spent generously on. He barely mentions trade with India, vaguely proclaiming that inter-regional connectivity is a must. Surely a banker, having worked for most of his life in Western economies, would have been expected to be a bigger proponent of trade liberalisation with the huge economy next-door.

The next three chapters offer a crash course in international relations. Chapter 12 sees the author shower praise on Saudi Arabia, while chapter 13 covers US-Iran rapprochement. On China, chapter 14 stresses obliquely that “other countries” should not feel threatened by China’s growing economic and military might, nor by the strength of Sino-Pak relations, which are independent from either nation’s relations with other countries. This is debatable.

In chapter 15, Aziz talks about Benazir Bhutto’s return to Pakistan in 2007: another chapter perhaps unfairly relegated near the end of the book. He contends that Bhutto was intent on retiring from politics after she went into exile in the early 2000s, and Western governments and diplomats had given up on her, refusing to meet with her when she visited London and Washington from Dubai. But as Mr Musharraf’s domestic popularity waned, her acceptability as an alternative to Mr Musharraf became clearer, and the NRO was subsequently worked out. He ends this chapter on the note that foreign governments’ interference, even if well-intended, is adverse for developing countries in the long run. The last two chapters offer the author’s thoughts and reflections on effective leadership and good governance.

Aziz adopts a bold, unequivocal stance on a few select issues. For example, he claims to have been a proponent of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline from the very beginning, and hopes the current thaw in US-Iran relations will allow the project to gain momentum. He also voices support for the Kalabagh Dam and is an unabashed advocate of privatisation. He endorses a presidential, rather than parliamentary, system of government for Pakistan, believing the former to be better suited to Pakistan’s needs and state of development. On most other subjects, however, he shies away from controversy. While many of the topics are arguably covered in scant detail, several important incidents which took place in the years 1999 to 2007, such as the Red Mosque siege, Nawab Akbar Bugti’s death, and the Dr A.Q. Khan episode are not mentioned at all.

Some other points also gall the reader. There are far too many trite observations, one being that the international community should play a role in resolving the ongoing migration crisis in Europe. At many points, Aziz stops short of offering concrete solutions. His hawkish tone also diminishes the worth of his argument at times, especially where he leaves out some glaring crucial details in his support for one side. For example, he says that he found the Indian establishment under the Congress government (2004-2014) to be uncooperative in finding a settlement to Indo-Pak disputes. But he does not mention Pakistani lobbies that oppose resumption of dialogue with India, such as certain religious right-wing groups. In making it sound like all the opposition to the normalisation of ties with India is from the Indian side, he unrealistically discounts the importance of domestic opposition. Some chapters, such as those on Libya and Russia, add nothing to the reader’s information. Chapter 11 is largely autobiographical, mentioning his early Citibank days and the bank’s internal dynamics. Adding this chapter to a book otherwise written about current affairs seems peculiar.

The period between 1999 and 2007 was a crucial time in Pakistan’s recent history.Not only did the country enjoy remarkably high rates of economic growth, but it also re-entered the international community after facing relative isolation following the nuclear tests of 1998, and became an important partner in the West’s fight against terrorism — a deeply dividing decision, the implications of which we arguably continue to face today. As finance minister, and later, as prime minister of Pakistan, the author would surely have been privy to much of the important deliberations and discussions taking place within the corridors of power during this time. Unfortunately, he chooses to divulge little, proffering instead mostly what it seems Western audiences would like to hear from him.

And herein, perhaps, lies the book’s biggest weakness: it may not be wholly incorrect to say that Banking to Politics has come out 10 years too late. In the ephemeral world of Pakistani politics, Aziz’s premiership seems ages ago, with the country set to witness a fifth successor to his post in 2018. For Western audiences also, with the emergence of multiple global crises, Pakistan is less important as a current affairs topic than it was a decade back. This may therefore impact the extent to which the book penetrates bookshops in Western markets.

The reviewer is a political economist, and has taught social sciences at various academic institutions in Karachi.

From Banking to the Thorny World of Politics
(POLITICS)
By Shaukat Aziz with Anna Mikhailova
Quartet Books, UK
ISBN: 978-0704373990
323pp.

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, August 21st, 2016