“If New Delhi continues to turn to Washington, Moscow may get closer to China, and Pakistan.” — Christophe Jaffrelot

With interest in the political economy of South-Asia, French political scientist, Christophe Jaffrelot has written on Pakistan (in French) since 2000. More recently, he has authored The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience and edited a volume of essays, Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures. The following is an extract of an interview with Jaffrelot:

Pakistan Paradox was premised on three contradictions that Pakistan was caught up in. Has anything changed?

Two of the three contradictions have remained the same: first, there is still a structural tension between the unitary definition of the nation state by the centre and the demand for more federalism by the provinces — that may change only when the 18th Amendment is fully implemented. Second, there is still an existential tension about Pakistan’s religious identity between those who are prepared to recognise minorities’ rights, not only on paper but in practical terms, and those who wish to transform Pakistan into a theocracy — be they part of the public sphere (as part of religious parties for instance) or underground (like the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan); there is a continuum there.

The tension that has somewhat been reduced over the last few months is the one regarding military-civilian relations. My book suggests this opposition does not coincide with a dichotomy between autocrats and democrats, because civilian rulers have not always been good democrats and many of them have compromised their credentials by striking deals with the army — when they were not their creatures.

In the late 1990s, for instance, Nawaz Sharif was not a great democrat (remember his attacks against the judiciary and the media), but he wanted to contain the role of then-COAS General Pervez Musharraf anyway (he even tried to remove him), and this tension resulted in a military coup. Today, the situation is different: Nawaz Sharif has been democratically elected, but he’s much less powerful and determined (or able) to oppose the COAS; General Raheel Sharif is the strong man of Pakistan. Then, military courts are also gaining momentum at the expense of the judiciary. Apparently, the civilians are resigning themselves to this new balance of power that is rather popular in the public opinion and this is why the traditional tension between the civilian and military authorities is transforming itself into a new equilibrium.

Pakistan at the Crossroads, is a compilation of essays, each examining the country through a different lens. Should any concern come before in order of priority?

This book explores what should be the main concern of Pakistan: an excessive extraversion. As explained in the introduction, no state in the league to which Pakistan belongs (more than 200 million people, nuclear weapons, etc) depends so heavily on foreign countries. The US has been the first ‘boss’, but the Saudis have exerted an increasingly important influence from the 1970s onwards, and today China is taking the lead. As a result, Pakistan is an ‘interface state’: some of its policies are over-determined by external factors. Foreign policy is a case in point. But other policies have been affected, like education (a domain where Saudi-backed madressahs play a role) and finance, since the very low tax-to-GDP ratio that we find in Pakistan is largely because the state is used to getting its money from outside.

You cite Jean Francoise Medard’s definition of a client state that says the patron is at an advantage in such situations. How does this apply to the US or China vis-a-vis Pakistan?

In a clientelistic arrangement, the patron dictates terms to its client to get things fixed. The US was the first patron of Pakistan since Washington wanted to use Islamabad to contain the communist influence in Asia. This arrangement peaked during the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. But, of course, the client needs incentives: Pakistan helped the US in return for money and weapons. This arrangement means the patron and the client also need to share compatible objectives: in the 1980s, the US and Pakistan had common enemies in Afghanistan; but it was not so clear in the 2000s.

What do you make of the feasibility of the $46 billion investment for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor — a component of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project — that China has promised?

This is a major question. First, the figure that is repeated ad nauseam — $46 billion — does not only include investments (the share of loans is very large). Second, yes, the feasibility of the project is questionable: even if the OBOR project skips most of Balochistan, where a forgotten war is continuing for more than a decade, Gwadar (a focal point) cannot be removed from this unstable province. My guess is that OBOR will happen, but fail to bring as much money and resources as Pakistan expects and, in fact, it may affect the country in the long run. Chinese products will compete even more with Pakistani products and the main beneficiaries of the infrastructure work may well be army-owned companies, making ‘Military Inc’ (to use Ayesha Siddiqa’s formula) even stronger. In geopolitical terms, OBOR is part of the ongoing China/Pakistan rapprochement, which the US/India rapprochement is also fostering. The role of Russia remains unclear, but if New Delhi continues to turn to Washington, Moscow may get closer to China, and Pakistan.

Does the low tax-to-GDP ratio translate into a low level of social spending? Has this been opposed?

The low tax-to-GDP ratio has been one of the factors explaining low levels of social spending. But this is not the main reason: Pakistan is a highly hierarchical society, like India, where social spendings are very low in spite of a better tax-to-GDP ratio. This social structure translates into a deep sense of neglect for the plebeians. Social and political mobilisation to redress this state of affairs have been marginal for obvious reasons: the left has been decimated (the Communist Party was banned in the 1950s and the unions are weak) and state repression has been constant — even under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was more a populist than a socialist.

The book refers to collusion among the elite class in Pakistan. Is this linked to the fact that key political parties are led by dynasties with old interests to protect?

Parties do not need to be dynastic to represent vested interests. The PPP was not dynastic when Bhutto created it. But Bhutto had started his political career as a minister of a military dictator, General Ayub Khan, and turned to ‘Islamic socialism’ in a rather opportunist manner — as evident from his conservative land reforms. The PML-N was not a dynastic party when Nawaz Sharif created it, but he started his career as a protégé of General Ziaul Haq and reduction of inequalities has not been his priority. These vignettes suggest that many politicians have been initiated into public life in the shadow of the security apparatus.

— Rishi Majumder

The interviewer is a Delhi-based columnist and an associate partner at the new media company Oijo.

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, September 4th, 2016