A DEADLY terrorist attack with a grim death toll — the blast in a busy market in Parachinar, Kurram Agency, yesterday is a tragically familiar occurrence. Parachinar itself has suffered repeated violence: in June 2013, 57 people died in twin blasts in a market and at a taxi stand; and in December 2015, a market bombing killed 25. Nationally, the long war against militancy continues — while overall violence is significantly lower compared to several years ago, major attacks continue sporadically across the country. The latest Parachinar attack, though, raises at least three questions. One, do state officials fully understand the sectarian dimensions of militancy? Attacks in Shia-dominated Parachinar are invariably seen through the prism of sectarianism and the militants claiming such attacks themselves emphasise a sectarian motive. Indeed, from Al Qaeda to the banned TTP to overtly sectarian groups such as the Islamic State and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, the sectarian dimension is central to radical Islamic militancy. That is something that government officials need to bluntly acknowledge instead of soft-pedalling the problem.

Second, in Kurram Agency, in recent days leaders of local militias have rejected a government deadline to turn in their heavy weapons, arguing that IS and other militant groups are still operating in Kurram as well as neighbouring regions of Afghanistan. Yesterday’s attack also calls into question the security arrangements in the agency. At the moment it is not clear if the attack was carried out by a suicide bomber, as claimed by militant groups, or if it was the result of a bomb hidden in the fruit and vegetable crates that are transported from neighbouring Kohat, as alleged by local officials. Either way, a bomb was carried into the district despite the several security check posts that exist around Parachinar and Kurram Agency. It is the oldest of questions in this long war that never seems to be satisfactorily answered: was there a security lapse and, if so, will there be a revision of security measures and accountability for the lapses identified?

Third, after the ritual condemnations of the bombing by the political and military leadership, will attention turn to the languishing National Action Plan? Since the change of army command, there have been several meetings in which lip service has been paid to NAP implementation, but the gamut of actions contemplated under the policy continue to be only selectively enforced. And within the selective enforcement too, there is a great deal of variation in the degree of effectiveness. With the interior ministry still denied the extensive funding it has sought for NAP; with the interior minister making frequent pronouncements that contradict the job he is tasked with; and with Nacta still a moribund organisation, NAP has mostly come down to the will and priorities of the military leadership. The civilian leadership surely needs to do more.

Published in Dawn, January 22nd, 2017