WITH efforts to restore the writ of the state on its regions taken control of by the extremist militant organisations, exercise to bring the tribal areas in the normal administrative and judicial domain of the country, and an undertaking to count its inhabitants through a census taking place after 19 years, Pakistan has found itself in the 70th year of its existence.

The present tells a lot about the past. That the picking up of the pieces is taking place so belatedly, speaks loudly about the mistakes and failures compounded right from the beginning, and accentuated in different phases of the country’s history.

From historical and political perspective, what stands out to be discussed, is the state itself—its emergence, nature and development. Pakistan was carved out of the Indian subcontinent as the solution of the communal issue, which despite Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s sincere efforts, could not be resolved within an Indian context through political means.

On its inception, the new state found itself in a precarious situation. Its territory was not properly defined, the princely states had yet to accede to it, the fl ow of migrants continued for a couple of years, the central government had to establish itself from nothing, and the country had to demonstrate sovereign existence to the world. In the absence of well-organised and competent political formation, which the Muslim League was not, it was the administrative arm of the state that took the initiative in its hand.

The civil servants with their administrative experience mustered during the colonial period, became the pivotal factor in the statecraft in Pakistan. In the 1950s, the military high command joined hands and a military-bureaucracy combine became not only the actual operator of the state but also defi ned the nature and character of the state itself.

Emerging in an environment, where the real as well as the imaginary fear of a hostile India provided a pretext to adopt security concerns as the major parameter of the statecraft, the national security paradigm had its own repercussions. It obscured the public welfare aspect that had been highlighted as the major objective behind galvanising the Muslim masses during the freedom movement. It also brought about a highly centralised arrangement negating the provincial urges that had matured even during the period of the realisation of independence.

The centre-province dichotomy exacerbated due to the disproportionate size of the provincial populations. In a country which desperately needed concrete settlements among the provinces, ethnicities, and the national groups on the one hand, and the centre and the federating units on the other, the national security objective put all this in the background. Constitution making, political processes, and public welfare agendas, all succumbed to it. In the first two and a half decades, the country experimented with three constitutions (1935 Act, Constitutions of 1956 and 1962), a nine-year long viceregal system, a pseudo-parliamentary phase, and two military rules.

This era ended on the break-up of the country. The causes were all home-grown. They were made use of by the adversary neighbouring countries. Since 1971, Pakistan has continued to follow the same philosophy of statecraft. A constitution, made in 1973, and shorter or longer periods of civilian dispensations, have not been able to alter the basic nature of the state. A political economy of defence, an overly-centralised mindset of the ruling elite, and an imbalance between the civil/political and military institutions, continued to define the state of affairs in the country.

However, over the years the state has come to bear gigantic pressures and had to undergo difficult circumstances. It is striving to wither these away. The historical unity among the military and bureaucracy which was so pronounced in the 1950s and 1960s, gradually weakened with the former emerging as the dominant component in the state structure.

The military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq stamped the ascendancy of it. The subsequent decision regarding the foreign policy, economy, law and order, etc., were all predominantly taken by the military establishment with the civilian dispensations playing only a secondary role. It is this predominance of the extra-political forces that is at the centre of the crises, the country has been facing particularly in the last three decades. The nature of statecraft, the centralising practices, and neglect of the societal thrusts apart, one major decision that had had a highly devastating impact on the developments in Pakistan, had been the decision to indulge in the affairs of Afghanistan after Soviet invasion of it in 1979. Pakistan’s decision to fight a proxy war on the behest of the Western powers proved fatal for not only the country and its society, but also for the institutions hitherto in command of the state.

As a result of our acceptance to fight a war against the so-called communist threat, Pakistan made itself vulnerable to all sorts of dangers. The social fabric of the society was torn away. The law and order was compromised. Extremism was not only tolerated but was, in fact, in a way, encouraged. The society was allowed to be weaponised.

And apart from all this, and above all, the state gradually started losing its writ on its territories and on theforces of its own creation. As if the Afghan adventure was not enough, another round of mistakes came to the fore following the 9/11.

The policies pursued following it further exposed the country to the extremist militant groups. Most of the groups were once created or these were grouped in their creation through official patronage. With the passage of time, many of these groups became autonomous to the extent that some of them, after fighting for years for their founders, are now making themselves available in the international terror market.

These mercenaries pose a major threat today to our sovereign existence. Much later in the day, it was realised, one believes, that much has happened and that something has to be done to bring order in a gravely disordered situation and the worsening writ of the state, lest everything is lost. But correcting the situation seems to be a mammoth task.

Of course, there can be short-term measures but then there are things which have to be done on permanent basis keeping in view the long-term future of the country and the generations to come. The National Action Plan and the subsequent 21st Amendment, a NECTA, the military courts, etc., can only ensure temporary control. The last two years brought some order but the root cause of such a malaise has not been checked.

Now an extension in the doctrine of state exceptionalism is on the cards. There will be more military courts, another set of operations, and severe punishments. But such arrangements cannot last forever. They are relied upon under conditions beyond the control of normal institutions of governance and judicature. But their dividends will prove useful, if during the course of time, the normal institutions are reformed to cope with the challenging situation.

In that respect, the two years following the induction of the 21st Amendment in the constitution seem to be a lost period. Should one hope that after the extension of the extraordinary regime of military courts, the civilian administrative and judicial infra-structure would be improved?

There is a big question mark lying there. Of the major things that need to be addressed, there are: de-weaponisation of the society, a focus on law and order, and capping of the militant organisations and their sources of funding. However, these are only the things that need to be done immediately and in the short-term. The long-term measures should begin from creating a culture of tolerance in the country. What has happened over the years is that extremism and jingoism at the sectarian level was promoted in the name of religion. It is interesting to note that in 1947, there were only six religio- political parties.

However, by 2002, their number had grown to 239. The mushrooming of these parties and groups certainly was the result of the offi cial patronage they received. To what extent they served the cause of religion must be known to them, but what one has seen is the growing intolerance in the society. It is high time that the state policies regarding the religious outfi ts should be totally changed.

Religion is certainly the personal matter of the individual and our constitution allows total religious freedom in that respect. However, no religious group should be allowed to force its views on others. This was what the founder of the nation had envisioned and had tried to bear upon the people and the rulers in the very beginning. In order to retreat from the state’s policy regarding the use of religion for its purposes, it is necessary to ensure the state’s neutrality. This would make it compulsory to evolve an alternative national narrative, which itself should have clear imprints of the people and their elected representatives, rather than of those individuals and institutions whose handiwork was the narrative that had brought us to this state of chaos.

Keeping in view the long-term perspective of the reforms, one needs to realise that our actual stakeholders are the people, the federating units, and the nationalities that constitute our country. Unless permanent settlements are made among them through constitutional means, and the issues of political participation and representation, resource-sharing, and cooperative functioning of the federal institutions, one may not hope the reversal of the situation.

The country also needs substantial affirmative actions as far as the marginalised and subordinated segments of the society are concerned. A fair representation and a visible uplift of the workers, women, minorities, and the less developed regions in the body politic and the political economy of the country would be the minimum in the direction of development and creation of a socially just environment.

Last but not the least, there is the most difficult question: how to change the nature of the state, for within the framework in which it has worked till now may not ensure the integrity and prosperity of the country. The diversities within the country can be harmonised, the differences can be bridged, permanent political settlements can be reached, and social contracts can be worked out among the people, the nationalities and the federating units, on one hand, and the state and the society on the other, only as part of a political and democratic process.

For this to happen, it is inevitable that the political class, political organisations and the civil society, all come in a position to assert themselves. And for this assertion, it would be necessary that they overcome their weaknesses. As the political parties are found at present with quite noticeable democratic deficit, they may not be able to correct the imbalance between the political class and the extra-political institutions.

Democratic functioning within the parties, their adherence to their own constitutions, their being able to have well-researched policy options and a clear vision about where they would like the country to be led, are the essential ingredients of what may bring them in a position to have a claim on the state power. Certainly, Pakistan’s fate as an advanced and modern state lies in its emerging as a state with social welfare as its prime objective, but for this to happen it would have to have a total shift in its paradigm of state.

The writer is a professor at Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi.