Lord Robert Clive meets with Mir Jafar Ali Khan — who betrayed Nawab Siraj-ud-Daulah — after the Battle of Plassey. Mir Jafar was subsequently made Nawab of Bengal, and his rule is considered the start of British Imperialism in India | Public domain
Shashi Tharoor’s new book, An Era of Darkness: The British Empire in India, originated with a speech he made at the Oxford Union Society. The speech — the video of which went viral on social media — was on why Britain had to own up to its historic colonial sins in India, and it may well endear him to people of all political persuasions across the subcontinent. As one of modern India’s eminent politicians and authors, he has used his intellectual heft to swing a sledgehammer at the legacy of the British Raj.
Debunking point by point any notion that Britain was a benign master, Tharoor contends that rapacious exploitation by colonial authorities impoverished what was then one of the richest economies in the world: “In 1600, when the East India Company was established, Britain was producing just 1.8 per cent of the world’s GDP, while India was generating some 23 per cent. By 1940 after nearly two centuries of the Raj, Britain accounted for nearly 10 per cent of the world’s GDP while India had been reduced to a poor third-world country.”
The extensive railway network is considered a crowning achievement of the Raj, but by no means, Tharoor asserts, was it a selfless transfer of technology for the uplift of its colonised subjects. In his view, the rail links were chains that bound the subcontinent, mobilising natural resources, military apparatus and personnel to impress control. Resources were shipped to ports via trains and ferried as grist for British mills — on the back of which Britain powered the Industrial Revolution and became the premier industrial power of its day.
Demolishing the idea of the ‘magnanimity’ of the Raj
Colonial apologists point out that the English language and cricket are indelible ‘gifts’ by the Raj to its Indian subjects, but closer historical examination proves otherwise. Instruction in English and participation in the sport was open only to the British and a select few Indians belonging to the privileged elite. And even then they faced discrimination — as the infamous inscription at numerous social clubs frequented by the British read, “Dogs and Indians [were] not allowed.” There was no concerted effort for widespread public education even as universal education was mandatory in the British Isles. As Tharoor points out, it was to their credit that Indians learned and excelled at the language and sport despite the hurdles.
Tharoor contends that the representative democracy bequeathed by the British, wholly unsuited to Indian demography and diversity, disrupted India’s own natural political evolution and played no small part in the institutional bloat endemic today. That begs the question, however, of why successive governments haven’t come up with solutions more suited to their own societies. Tharoor only gives a brief hint of what the political calculus of India would have been in the absence of British intervention.
Tharoor also finds disingenuous the claim by some historians that the unity of India as an idea and geographical entity is to the credit of the Raj. He lists historical precedents going back to the ancient scriptures of the Vedas, Mahabharata and Puranas where a Bharat Kshetra — a unified geography — was explicated. Rulers of the Mauryan and Mughal empires also sought to make this ideal a political unity. Ergo, to say that the British unified India is simply not true. A similar opinion has also been voiced in Diana L. Eck’s India: A Sacred Geography.