What's next for the House of Sharif?
By: Zahid Hussain
The irony is unmistakable: rewind to March 15, 2009 when Mian Nawaz Sharif defied house arrest orders to lead a rally to restore the then Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry.
As his convoy moved through Lahore, thousands lined up on the street and more waved at him from their rooftops.
CJP Chaudhry was ultimately restored and Nawaz had stolen the political plaudits for having an ‘independent judiciary’ installed. His third term for prime minister looked nailed in.
And indeed that was the case. Nawaz breezed through the 2013 polls with ease and until the Panama Papers leaks blew the lid early last year, he looked indomitable.
A fragmented opposition hardly posed any serious challenge to his party’s political stranglehold on Punjab while he was also able to extend his tentacles to other provinces.
A fourth term as prime minister beckoned, but for the Panama Papers — a whirlpool that seems to have drowned him.
Indeed the devastating Supreme Court (SC) ruling has not only delivered Nawaz Sharif the ultimate humiliation of being unceremoniously ousted from power, but has also put him and his entire family in the dock over corruption allegations.
This unprecedented and controversial court action has kept a Damocles’ sword hanging over his children as well as his younger brother, Shahbaz Sharif, who has now been nominated to take the mantle of power on a permanent basis.
That also raises questions about the future of the House of Sharif that has dominated the country’s political scene for the past three decades, whether in or out of power.
Surely the three-time prime minister has gone through such trials and tribulations in the past too when his government was ousted twice, once by a military-backed constitutional coup and the other by direct military intervention that sent him into exile. Each time he returned to power with a much greater electoral mandate.
Just a few months ago, another term seemed all but guaranteed for the recently disqualified prime minister. How did it all go so wrong for him? And what does the House of Sharif have in store for the future?
But will he be as fortunate this time?
From protege to nemesis
The rise of Nawaz Sharif to the highest echelon of power and the birth of a new urban-based political dynasty reflected changing realities of Pakistani politics after the 1977 military coup.
The military regime needed a measure of legitimacy and a social base of support. It co-opted substantial segments of landlords, industrialists and emerging commercial groups mostly belonging to Punjab.
The re-engineered Muslim League leadership was largely constituted of politicians who owed their political rise to the military’s patronage.
And the most favourite child of the establishment at the time was to lead them all.
Nawaz was of course politically baptised by General Ziaul Haq’s military government.
A scion of a prominent business family from Lahore, Nawaz owed his entry into politics to his father’s proximity with General Ghulam Jilani, a former chief of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) who had been appointed as the governor of Punjab as a reward for his role in the 1977 coup.
But the role handed to Nawaz Sharif was beyond any short-termism of gaining legitimacy.
He was groomed by the military regime as an alternative and counterweight to Benazir Bhutto, who had emerged as the uncontested leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) after her father had been executed by General Zia’s government.
The protégé’s first test came in 1981 when Nawaz was appointed as the finance minister of Punjab.
A couple of years later, he was elevated to the position of the provincial chief minister despite his not-so-enviable reputation of a man of mediocre talents.
He neither had charisma nor any political roots to really challenge the young and fiery Benazir Bhutto.
He retained his position as the chief minister of the province after the restoration of democracy in the country following Zia’s death in an air crash.
Although Nawaz could not form a government in the Centre after Zia’s demise, his trajectory from Punjab chief minister to prime minister in the 1990s owed much to the backing of the military and the powerful civil establishment of Punjab.
It is no more a secret that the military and the ISI formed the alliance of right-wing parties known as Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) under Nawaz Sharif to stop the PPP from returning to power.
The military-sponsored alliance largely comprised of the politicians who emerged on the scene during the 1980s under Zia’s military rule.
Sharif’s rising political power also saw an exponential growth in the family’s business fortunes. Within years, the Sharif family emerged as one of the richest business families in the country.
In fact, financial scandals continued to plague Nawaz throughout his political career, particularly after his ascent to the country’s top position.
It finally caught up with him after the Panama Papers named him and his children.
There is a strong perception prevailing among the senior members of the ruling party that the top military brass may have not been involved in Nawaz’s ouster, but that some senior and middle rankers with the military intelligence agencies were active in feeding to the press anti-Sharif material. But as for the allegation of a nexus existing between the judges and the military, it remains merely that so far: an allegation without any substance.
With his rise to the pinnacle of political power, Nawaz Sharif tried to break away from the influence of the military establishment that also brought him down in his previous terms.
His ambitions to accumulate absolute power reflected in his move to declare himself “Amir-ul-Momineen” (Leader of the Believers) was also a factor in the conflict with the military leadership leading to his government’s ouster in 1999.
Although the Muslim League has historically remained close to the military establishment, Nawaz Sharif tried to transform it into a mass populist party, though he may not have been fully successful in his endeavour.
Still, over the years, despite various ups and downs, he developed a popular mass base that elected him to a record third term in office.
The backing of the powerful Punjabi civil establishment, including the bureaucracy and sections of the judiciary, also appeared to have helped his family’s stranglehold over Punjab.
But such moves turned the former protégé into a nemesis of the military establishment.
It is not surprising that he remained locked in perpetual conflict with the military leadership throughout his third term in office.
This mostly had to do with past baggage of mutual distrust. It was difficult for Nawaz to let go of events following the 1999 coup, when he was taken out of the Prime Minister’s House, handcuffed and put on trial for treason.
In fact, Nawaz found himself locked in conflict with the generals within a few months of his returning to power for the third time.
The standoff was triggered by his government’s decision to put former military ruler General Pervez Musharraf on trial on sedition charges.
The generals would not allow their former chief to be humiliated.
The confrontation turned more ominous with Imran Khan staging a sit-in before the parliament demanding the ouster of the Sharif government in 2014.
There was some credence to the suspicion that the PTI agitation had the blessings of a strong group of Generals. Sharif, however, won that round with the support of the parliament.
Most opposition parties stood by him to prevent any Bonapartism. Civil-military relations remain uneasy following the 2014 standoff.
However, there was a resetting of civil-military relations following the appointment of a new army chief in November 2016 and a major reshuffling of top commanders that boosted the confidence of the Sharif government.
It was the second time within three years that the prime minister had appointed an officer of his choice to lead the most powerful institution in the country.
Both times he picked a dark horse for the coveted post, hoping to tilt the balance of power towards his civilian government.
He may not have been successful in his endeavour during the tenure of the previous high-profile army chief General Raheel Sharif.
Civil and military tensions cast a huge shadow over the country’s political landscape throughout that period often threatening to derail the entire political system.
His own ineptitude and absence of governance and a clear policy direction on key national security issues contributed hugely to the power imbalance.
But this time, Sharif appeared much more confident about taming the military by appointing a low-profile general who did not represent continuity in the policies of his predecessor.
The retirement of a number of senior commanders who were superseded shows a complete shift from the past hierarchical line.
There have been few instances in history where a new chief made so many new postings and promotions within a couple of weeks of assuming charge.
In effect, it was a complete overhaul of the top echelons. On the surface, at least, things seemed to be looking up for Nawaz.