Illustration by Abro
It is quite likely that the three factions of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement — MQM-Pakistan, MQM-Haqiqi and Pak Sarzameen Party (PSP) — will merge to re-establish the MQM as Karachi’s largest party.
Ever since its inception in the mid-1980s, the MQM enjoyed unprecedented electoral supremacy in Karachi. But over the last two years, and specifically from August 2016 onward, the party began to severely splinter.
Today there are four MQM splinter groups representing the Urdu-speaking (Mohajir) majority of Karachi. The first was MQM-Haqiqi which emerged in 1992. But Haqiqi has always been a tiny faction that had split from the main party after accusing it of ‘betraying Mohajir nationalism.’ It has only scant electoral influence.
The PSP was formed in early 2016 by the former mayor of Karachi, Mustafa Kamal, who had been a leading member of the MQM. Kamal was a popular mayor and his appeal cut across diverse ethnic groups residing in Karachi. However, in 2015 he developed differences with Altaf Hussain — the MQM founder and chief — and in March 2016 announced the launch of his own party.
MQM-Pakistan, which is the largest faction, emerged when the party’s top leadership in Karachi dislodged Altaf Hussain as party chief. They accused him of being “anti-Pakistan” and for “wrecking the lives of young Mohajirs” with his “reckless policies and statements.”
The fourth faction, the so-called MQM-London, is basically made up of Altaf loyalists, most of whom are stationed in London with the self-exiled leader. The name MQM-London was largely coined by MQM-Pakistan and the media to describe a faction which was backing Altaf’s increasingly belligerent (and, in many cases, “eccentric”) political views.
Laurent Gayer, a French academic and author of Karachi: Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for the City, and Dutch scholar Oskar Verkaaik, who wrote Migrants and Militants, undertook extensive field research on the MQM and maintain that Altaf’s power initially flowed from his erstwhile charisma and the way he utilised the ethnic ruptures in Karachi which had begun to develop during General Zia dictatorship (1977-88).
Both the authors then suggest that from the 1990s onward Altaf’s hold over the party was increasingly facilitated by his influence within the party’s alleged “militant wing”. It was thus a drastic act by the party’s leadership in Karachi to topple him in 2016. Such a move would have been almost impossible to make even a few years ago.
This extraordinary manoeuvre was largely enabled by the recent police and Sindh Rangers’ operation against criminal and terror groups in Karachi which, despite being controversial on various occasions, enjoyed the support of a large number of Karachiites.
According to the Rangers, even though the operation is mostly against religious terror outfits and criminal mafias, MQM’s so-called ‘militant wings’ too were taken to task. Along with Altaf’s increasing provocations against the operation, this finally created an opening for MQM’s leadership in Karachi to escape his hold without facing much untoward reaction from the loyalists.
When MQM-Pakistan was formed, many experts believed that Altaf was still popular among large sections of the party’s electorate. But the last two provincial assembly by-elections in Karachi, in PS-127 and PS-114, suggest that the revamped MQM lost just a fraction of its votes.