WHAT WOULD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ENTAIL?
Ghani outlines what a political settlement to the war would entail, what form it would take, and why it may benefit all parties taking part in the process.
"What is fundamental about this strategy is to provide the ground for a political settlement.
And that political settlement involves two major components, and then the remaining threats that we have to deal with.
The first of these is a comprehensive discussion between Afghanistan and Pakistan as two states, state-to-state relationship, so the inherited problems of the last 40 years can be addressed.
Without peace between Afghanistan and Pakistan, political settlement in Afghanistan alone is not sufficient.
And second, is I hope and invite — I hold my hand out to Taliban groups and invite them for political discussion. So we can have an upfront dialogue that will bring an end to violence as a means of conversation.
Conflict is a relation, but it’s not a relation that’s productive.
Our political dialogue within the framework of the constitution modelled on the process that we followed with Hezb-i-Islami would be a critical ingredient of ensuring that the rights and obligations of citizenship are fulfilled.
What I earlier indicated, and welcome very much the strategy, is condition-based not time-based.
And this gives us the opportunity to tell people, get a watch, because the famous quip was the West and Afghan government have watches, but Taliban have time. They do not have the time.
The reason they do not have the time is because of the type of actions that had been committed that have lost—that have brought enormous disenchantment.
We need to understand that the tolerance of the Afghan public for violence has limits.
We need to act on the lessons of history and bring an end to violence as a means of dialogue and replace it with a political process of dialogue, where the strategy equally is not — it’s not a blank check.
The first issue is that it should be very clear to them that they cannot win militarily. And they still had, prior to the announcement of the South Asia strategy, they had confidence that they could win, or at least they could destabilise without the cost. That thing is becoming costly.
If they want to choose certain death, it will be their responsibility. They’re losing lives. Their leadership is committing criminal acts by sending young men to their certain death. In the past month, they have lost over 1,300 men. This is unnecessary bloodshed. So the cost is rising very, very substantially. And the capability is increasing.
The second part is the need for engagement. But the type of engagement differs.
We can have — our agreement with Hezb-i-Islami was an intra-Afghan agreement, carried out in Kabul, to the Peace Council and then endorsed by the National Security Council and the government.
Throughout, the representatives of Hezb-i-Islami came, they left in an open environment.
They had full access to the media, to the public, to forms of association.
And finally, their leader came. But Hezb-i-Islami had a leader who could act and decide. And today, he lives in Kabul.
Is this possible? That goes back as to whether they can speak for themselves or not.
So there’s a fundamental choice for the Taliban. Will they have the will and the ability to speak for themselves as Afghans to other Afghans? Or do they want to give the right of speaking and representation to a foreign power for them? That’s their decision. It’s not ours.
But we want to make sure that they have the possibility of engaging in a dialogue. The question of the outcomes depends on the processes.
We have prepared a full process with a full outline of the issues to be discussed.
Clare Lockhart and I wrote a long piece on peace agreements summarising the entire ’90s decade, because peace broke out. And there are key issues that recur with regularity in almost every peace agreement.
The distinction I’ll make, and it’s necessary to make, is between peacemaking and peacebuilding.
Peacemaking is the ability to come to see that politics... it shows them there is a price to be paid.
You wouldn’t have had dinner with those people who are acting — engaging in acts of terror. But tomorrow, because...of the peace... you sat down with them and incorporated them into the government. That’s the internal process.
There’s a democratic process second. Let them participate in the elections and see what—how many people vote for them. If they think they have support, let them contest the elections.
If the people of Afghanistan want to elect them as the next president, more power to them. If they want to elect them to parliament, etc. This is the democratic process.
The other component of this, in terms of maintaining peace, is the need for security.
And here, the security reform programme, it’s absolutely essential that the security sector is depoliticised. It becomes truly national and everybody can trust. So it’s not a Hobbesian deal, but it is a Lockean deal, that you entrust collective security to the state institutions.
Now, the obstacle. The fundamental issue is that the Afghan people, like a lot of other people, associate peace with security.
But the global experience is that peace is delegitimated violence, but it’s not necessarily broad security.
So that we need to make sure that public support for peace is translated into real security, and particularly for utilisation of Afghanistan’s resources.
The second lesson of these peace agreements is that ex-combatants have not been included. And we have a fundamental issue: 40 per cent of the population still lives below poverty level.
We don’t want to increase this and turn — the risk in a lot of these countries after peacemaking has been increase in criminality.
And given the drug problem, which is a criminal-organisation problem, we need to make sure that we have a comprehensive understanding.
Again, to make the main point, that peace discussion — invitation to peace discussions are unconditional. The outcomes need to be based on maintaining the goal — the gains of the last.
Women’s [rights] are nonnegotiable. We cannot put our women to apartheid. They won’t take it. And if Taliban want to engage in any democratic process, they need to understand that the women are part of this.
The adjustment to everybody is to understand that Afghanistan today is not Afghanistan of 1996 or 2001."