Selective accountability?
IT may be a consensus decision, but it is a wrong one.
All parliamentary parties have rejected including the military and judiciary in the ambit of a new accountability law, dealing a blow to the hopes of a unified, across-the-board accountability mechanism.
There is a twofold objection to including the military and judiciary in the same mechanism as other public servants: both have their own mechanisms that are already functional; and their inclusion in a law covering politicians would threaten to politicise them if the accountability mechanism is manipulated and abused.
However, neither of those reasons are adequate or acceptable.
Arguably, the internal mechanisms of both the military and judiciary are not as effective as they ought to be and since the very purpose of overhauling the regime for public servants is to create an independent and autonomous organisation, the issue of politicisation can be addressed at the outset.
Unhappily, parliament itself has created several excuses for other institutions to keep themselves out of the purview of a new accountability law.
The issue ought to have been addressed years ago, with both the previous PPP-led coalition and the current PML-N government having vowed to introduce a new law.
Instead, all governing parties have found it mutually convenient to drag out the matter, while the PTI has preferred street politics over federal legislative strengthening.
And with parliament taking up the matter of accountability in the midst of Nawaz Sharif’s and his family’s legal woes and allegations of interference in the democratic process by some state institutions, there may have been doubts about the intentions of the government at the moment.
An across-the-board accountability bill could have become embroiled in Mr Sharif’s political war with other institutions.
In the end, parliament has exposed its continuing weakness by not even being able to debate the matter or put forward recommendations for a transparent and effective mechanism across all institutions of the state.
Failure at this stage, however, does not mean failure in perpetuity.
If a new national accountability commission with meaningful powers and true autonomy is established and it goes on to effectively carry out the task given to it, the process of accountability in the country could gradually be depoliticised.
Once it becomes clear that parliament has created a good law and the new or overhauled commission is an example of democratic strengthening, it may become possible to expand the latter’s mandate.
To target corruption is not to target institutions; indeed, reining in corrupt officials strengthens institutions.
Parliament is the supreme lawmaking body in the country and uniformity of laws across institutions is a desirable outcome.
If this parliament does not have the courage to implement across-the-board accountability, future legislatures should revisit the matter.
Published in Dawn, November 3rd, 2017