With Quaid-i-Azam during his visit to PAF Base Risalpur, 1948
Air Marshall (Retd) M. Asghar Khan, who passed away on January 5 at the age of 96 was a true Pakistani icon. Not only is he credited, as the first native chief, with making the Pakistan Air Force a disciplined fighting force, he was widely respected for his moral uprightness as a soldier — opposing illegal orders while in service — and his incorruptibility in politics. But as someone who had interacted with Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah as well as almost all future leaders of the country, he also had a ringside seat to the history of Pakistan as it played out. And his observations deserve a wider audience. The following excerpt detailing the events from the 1950s — and strangely prescient even today — is from his book We’ve Learnt Nothing From History published in 2005. It is excerpted with permission from the book’s publisher Oxford University Press.
This is what happened in Pakistan. It lost its founding father and guiding figure, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, barely a year after its creation. Three years later, when it had hardly overcome the pangs of birth and was still in the throes of a host of problems, including the absence of a consensus on a constitutional framework, it lost its first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, through the bullet of an assassin.
The history of political engineering by the military in Pakistan goes back to the 1950s
This development brought to an abrupt end the little supremacy that the political leadership had over the bureaucracy and the army. This situation thus paved the way for a painfully long series of traumatic developments that left their scars on the body politic of the country, unleashing the forces of adventurism and palace intrigues.
However, Pakistan had a few special features that further complicated the picture. The armed forces, or about 85 percent of them, belonged to one province of West Pakistan, the Punjab, whereas the majority of the population was in East Pakistan and had virtually no representation in the armed forces. The situation vis-a-vis the bureaucracy was about the same. Whereas the army takeover, when it first happened, was generally accepted by the Punjab, it was resented in East Pakistan. To the various anti-democratic decisions taken by the rulers sitting in Karachi and later in Islamabad, the reaction of East Pakistan was different from that of the western wing for a number of reasons. Apart from the lack of geographical contiguity of the two wings, there was the fact that the people of the eastern wing were politically more conscious than those living in West Pakistan, who were suffering under the age-old domination of feudal lords and the serfdom imposed by tribal chiefs.
Linguistic, racial and social differences aggravated this situation and the military rulers could not ignore for long the feelings of the people of the more populous part of the country. The restraint that East Pakistan exercised on unbridled dictatorship was a factor which led those who supported these regimes to feel that they would be better off without the eastern half of the country. For such people, East Pakistan was an encumbrance. The ruling class of West Pakistan, therefore, conditioned itself to believe that Pakistan would do better without its eastern wing.
The involvement of the army in active politics goes back to the mid-1950s. The martial law of 1953 in the Punjab gave the army its first taste of power and it discovered that it could control seemingly unruly mobs with the power of the gun. Ayub Khan’s ambition, which was the normal response of a general in a classic situation, received encouragement from Ghulam Mohammad, the governor-general. A bureaucrat to the hilt, Ghulam Mohammad neither believed in democracy nor in equal treatment for East Pakistan. He dismissed Khawaja Nazimuddin, the prime minister, in April 1953, when Nazimuddin commanded a majority in the Constituent Assembly which had just passed the annual budget. This was the first major blow to democracy and it could not have been struck without the tacit support of Ayub Khan, the commander-in-chief of the army.
Chaudhary Mohammad Ali, the federal finance minister, and Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani supported Ghulam Mohammad in this move and six of the nine members of Nazimuddin’s cabinet, led by Chaudhary Mohammad Ali, joined the new government of Mohammad Ali Bogra, who was brought in from the USA where he was Pakistan’s ambassador. Another federal minister, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, who refused to be a party to this ignoble and unconstitutional act, shared the fate of Nazimuddin.
The civilian governor of East Pakistan, Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman, who could not agree to the dismissal of the United Front ministry of A.K. Fazlul Haq in Dhaka, was removed and replaced by General Iskander Mirza. The governor’s rule was clamped down over the province.
Encouraged by his arbitrary actions against the central and provincial governments, which remained unchallenged, Ghulam Mohammad chose in October 1954 to dissolve the Constituent Assembly which had just prepared a draft constitution restricting the governor-general’s powers. The constitution contained a clause which provided that the governor-general could not dismiss a ministry as long as it commanded a majority in the House. Ghulam Mohammad, who by then had suffered a series of strokes, was very ill but not too ill to destroy any remaining semblance of democratic propriety in the running of the country’s affairs.
Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, the president of the Constituent Assembly, challenged the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in the Sindh High Court, which gave a verdict in his favour and against the action of the governor-general. However, the appeal of the governor-general against the decision of the High Court was upheld by a majority judgment of the Supreme Court delivered by Chief Justice Mohammad Munir.
In the new cabinet that was formed, Iskander Mirza became the interior minister and Ayub Khan the defence minister. The fact that Ayub Khan insisted on retaining at the same time the post of the commander-in-chief of the army and was allowed to do so, speaks for itself. The bureaucracy-military collaboration was thus total and complementary. Despite their rivalries, both needed each other; the bureaucracy wanted the military to lend it support while the latter sought the skilled and adroit assistance of the former in elbowing out the professional politicians who were relegated to the status of junior partners. It was, therefore, not surprising that a half-dumb, half-paralysed Ghulam Mohammad ruled the country for more than a year.