THE Financial Action Task Force debacle is the latest illustration of the consequences of obligations (the 1267 listing of the Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT]) hastily accepted under external pressure, which are difficult to implement.

Once threatened with being put back on FATF’s grey list Islamabad acted in panic. Pakistan’s diplomats succeeded, in closed meetings, to avert the listing. But this was reversed in a strong American reaction to Pakistan’s premature tweet of triumph. Now, Pakistan faces more extensive demands and the prospect of being put on the FATF’s black list. Hopefully, we will not combine incompetence with ingratitude by blaming our friends for the debacle.

The public reversal in Paris was executed by the US as part of its campaign to coerce Pakistan to act against the Afghan Taliban and pro-Kashmiri groups and accept unilateral restraints on Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes.

Without a clear plan, Pakistan can fall into the trap of making piecemeal concessions.

It is unclear if Pakistan has formulated a strategy to respond to the US (and Indian) campaign of pressure. Islamabad’s public statements have ranged from anger at American insults and defiance of its demands to appeals for Washington’s understanding and indication of support to the new US strategy in the region.

Pakistan’s ability to negotiate an acceptable outcome with the US will depend on: one, clearly identifying its objectives, priorities and red lines; two, convincing Washington that it will reject US demands if these cross Pakistan’s red lines ; and, three, generating support for its positions from China, Russia, Turkey, Iran and other regional powers.

Without a clear strategy and plan, Pakistan is likely to fall into the trap of making piecemeal concessions that add up to capitulation. Unfortunately, this seems to be the present trajectory. US officials have boasted that they have Pakistan’s attention and that they see some positive steps although not yet a strategic policy shift.

All diplomacy is transactional. If Pakistan gives something, it must get something in return. Asking for respect from the US is not enough. Such respect will depend on the resilience which Pakistan displays in the defence and promotion of its core national interests.

On Afghanistan, Pakistan appears to have persuaded the Afghan Taliban to offer talks to the US. The US has countered by asking the Taliban to talk to the Kabul government (which the Taliban consider an American puppet). President Ghani has offered to talk with the Taliban and to recognise them as a legitimate negotiating party. This offer is unlikely to get the Taliban on board.

Pakistan, together with other regional states, needs to build on these developments to revive the peace talks, perhaps in the Quadrilateral (Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, the US) Coordination Mechanism or another format. But as Pakistan propels the talks, it cannot be asked simultaneously to kill or capture Taliban leaders. The US should also take reciprocal action to eliminate the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan’s safe havens in Afghanistan and terminate Indian-sponsored terrorism in Balochistan and Fata from Afghan territory.

With regard to the pro-Kashmiri groups, Pakis­tan, having accepted the UNSC listing of the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad, is obliged to fulfil its obligations under UNSC Resolution 1267. It will need to find other legitimate ways to support India-held Kashmir’s freedom struggle.

In response to the US pressure, Pakistan can express its willingness to help in reducing militant violence in IHC if India’s security forces end their massive human rights violations there. Pakistan should also expect the US to arrest India’s current belligerence and threats, including the daily ceasefire violations along the Line of Control. This can lead to a disastrous war that could escalate to the nuclear level.

While working for an agreement on US non-proliferation objectives, Pakistan will have to resist demands for unilateral restraint on Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes. As an alternative, Pakistan should propose a set of measures for reciprocal arms control and disarmament between Pakistan and India and invite the US to help in securing India’s agreement to such mutual restraint.

However, Pakistan should be in no hurry to conclude agreements with the US if they are inconsistent with Pakistan’s vital interests. Pakistan can afford to exercise strategic patience for several reasons.

One, as US Defence Secretary Jim Mattis has stated, henceforth, the US security priority will be competition with China and Russia, rather than terrorism. Also, the Trump administration’s multidirectional belligerence is likely to lead to new confrontations (with North Korea, Iran, Russia and China). Afghanistan may become a sideshow. A consensus may emerge in Washington that Afghanistan is a strategic liability and should be abandoned.

Two, Washington’s domestic dynamics may propel a change in US policy on Afghanistan and South Asia and other issues. Trump could be impeached. The Democrats may gain control of the Congress in the upcoming midterm elections. Trump may decide to cooperate with rather than confront China (and downgrade the alliance with India). In most of these scenarios, American and Indian hostility towards Pakistan is likely to diminish.

Three, over the longer term, America’s ability to exert military and economic pressure on Pakistan and other states will diminish. America is politically and socially divided. Its internal wounds will take time to heal after the Trump era. China, on the other hand, will enjoy policy consistency under Xi Jinping’s extended leadership. It also has economic momentum, growing at seven per cent annually. By 2040, China will account for over 20pc of global GDP; the US for 13pc; India for 7pc.

When economically integrated with the 65 countries covered by the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s influence and impact on the global economy, and thus on global politics, will significantly surpass that of the US, whose main instrument of influence is an expensive military. For most of the world’s nations, the choice between an open and affluent China and a closed, mean and militarist America will be a no-brainer.

Pakistan, with China as a strategic partner, can expect to be on the right side of history. Despite its present weaknesses, Islamabad need not concede to the US or India on any of its core national security objectives: independence from Indian hegemony; credible nuclear and conventional deterrence; a fair solution for Jammu and Kashmir; a friendly Afghanistan.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

Published in Dawn, March 4th, 2018