Pakistan faces two challenges in the twin domains of foreign and security policies: deteriorating regional situation and emergence of new global/regional alliances; terrorism and violent extremism.
The first is a function of inter-state relations, the second a problem of non-state actors and, in some cases, state actors using and exploiting non-state actors to wage sub-conventional, proxy wars.
The emergence of new alliances is a direct result of China’s rising power, its projection in the East and South China seas and the United States’ ‘Pivot to Asia’ to balance and counter China. This is where the foreign policy options will take the lead.
The terrorism and violent extremism, as also the use of non-state actors by hostile states, calls for a security policy and response that requires harnessing all elements of the state’s coercive apparatus and integrating it with the foreign policy.
A word about the relationship between foreign and security policies: they are interlinked and each complements the other.
However, during periods of peace, the security policy takes a backseat and acts as a subset of foreign policy. During crises, conflicts and wars, the security policy takes the lead to create more favourable space for diplomacy.
Equally, diplomacy continues to work towards offsetting the causes of conflict to ease the pressure on the security policy.
Corollary 1: policies in these two areas must be integrated. Any disconnect between the two can lead to undesirable situations.
Corollary 2: the two policy areas in the case of Pakistan have often been out of sync with civilian principals moving on a different track from how the military perceives and responds to the threats. The worst example of this was the Kargil operation in 1998/99.
Corollary 3: this situation is owed to the imbalance of civil-military relations in this country.
By the time these lines are read, the July 25 election result will be out and one of the contesting parties will be putting together a coalition.
From the instability, polarisation and engineering we have seen in the run-up to the polls and what we will likely see in its aftermath, these two crucial areas will witness neglect.
While the sherpas will continue their work, the civilian principals will find it hard to get their act together, do a policy review and give a policy direction.
Not good but that’s the reality.
Exhibit: while the army is operating under Ops Raddul Fasad (eliminating disruption), political engineering, as also passive neglect, has seen extremist Barelvi and other denominational groups morph into political parties contesting elections.
The argument that it is better to pull them in the mainstream tends to ignore the fact that they bring their exclusionary discourse to the hustings.
One of the biggest security (also foreign policy) challenges is to change the discourse. Tactical political considerations have put paid to that.
Afghanistan, India and Iran, three neighbours, offer their own security and foreign policy challenges.
The new government will need to review current approaches and set direction. If Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf comes to power, its team will be new to the task and will need at least six to eight months to get a grip on things. And this presupposes that stability will return after the elections.
The military has its operational strategy chalked out, but in the absence of an integrated policy direction from the new government, it will continue to ‘satisfice’ instead of optimising. Killing terrorists is a necessary but not sufficient condition for succeeding in this nonlinear war.
The new alliances, with the rise of China and countermoves by the US, are a classic example of structural realism — i.e., the ordering principle of international relations is anarchy. In other words, there cannot be a unipole.
The US emerged as one in 1991. That episode is ending. The middle and small powers will have to adjust to that. That adjustment requires innovation. Innovation requires making smart policy choices. Smart policy choices require institutional harmony, stability and synergy.
None of that has been on display and it won’t be, post-elections.
The writer is executive editor at Indus News and writes on defence and security. He tweets @ejazhaider
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