Ritual, perfomance and politics converge in MQM’s stronghold of Azizabad
Central to this strategy is infusing politics with ritual and performance of the Barelvi belief system. Most TLP gatherings have gestures (raised hands) and slogans to indicate submission to Allah and Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). This tends to become a hypnotic and synchronised performance, with those participating convinced in their belief that the Prophet (PBUH) is cognisant of their loyalty and service, and that “victory” is just round the corner.
Together, these factors have exploited a very real faultline in Karachi politics of Barelvi politics that seemed to have been pushed down first by Altaf Hussain and, later, by the murder of the entire senior leadership of the Sunni Tehreek (ST) in a bomb blast back in 2006. The ST subsequently partnered with the MQM to ensure that its politics retained some space in the city. Today, the TLP in Karachi is constituted by Khadim Rizvi’s devotees but also of old MQM and ST workers.
I put this point of redemption, particularly in underprivileged localities, to Rizvi. The argument is that unlike the JI, which is largely a middle-class phenomenon in Karachi, the TLP is largely a working class phenomenon. And unlike the middle class’ politics of respectability, the working classes tend to accept causes they believe in and propagate it effectively, too.
“Where Islam impacted Hazrat Bilal (RA), it also impacted Hazrat Abu Bakr Siddique (RA),” responds Rizvi. “We have supporters from the upper class, the middle class as well, and of course the class that you are speaking about.”
And what of the system of governance?
“Democracy will be subservient to Islam, of course. What sort of an Islamic system is this where the Shariah court is subservient to the Supreme Court? To set it up that way was General Ziaul Haq’s biggest mistake.”
And how will this system of governance come about? Will it be change from the top, when power is first acquired and then reform instituted; or will it be a bottom-up approach, where people will first be reformed and then the government that will emerge will be formed by the pious.
“Power always comes from the top. You cannot make a clerk pious and ask him to hold someone senior to him accountable for theft. It doesn’t work that way.”
What is TLP? A sapling, a growing plant, or a tree? Or is it just a wave for the time being?
“It is a wave,” argues Rizvi. “The seed was planted by Mumtaz [Qadri] seven years ago when he defended the sanctity of the finality of Prophethood (PBUH). Then it became a small plant and we are on our way to becoming a tree.”
SPOILING THE PARTY
Throughout the election season, the mainstream Pakistani media described the TLP’s role as a spoiler — a party formed to draw votes away from the major parties and, therefore, spoiling their chance of winning an election. The post-electoral numbers released by the ECP tend to back that theory.
The TLP might have received over two million votes from across the country but the chunks of votes it chewed up served to dent the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz’s (PML-N) prospects in at least 13 constituencies [see table] and the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf’s (PTI) vote in at least six constituencies.
Consider the constituency of NA-13, Mansehra. The TLP bagged 4,731 votes — just enough to hand the PTI a win by 1,474 votes in a constituency where both major parties received over 100,000 votes. This trend is repeated in many other constituencies.
In fact, a Gallup Pakistan survey conducted in around 127 constituencies across the country and answered by 4,000 voters as they exited polling stations, makes the claim that, “46 percent of TLP voters stated that they had voted for PML-N in 2013, confirming that rise of TLP is majorly explained by voters leaving PML-N and joining TLP. Another way to look at the numbers is that between 2013 and 2018 General Election, PML-N lost around nine percent of its vote bank nationally. Of this nine percent, around three to four percent vote bank was lost not to PTI but to TLP.”
Another interesting way to look at the numbers is that, “those who actually did cast their vote in 2013 (leaving aside 17 percent who did not cast votes and 2 percent who did not respond), current TLP voters who voted for PML-N in 2013 crosses 50 percent.”
Then there were constituencies where the TLP emerged not just as a spoiler but as a legitimate player in its own right. Consider NA-118, Nankana Sahib. While the PTI (victors) and the PML-N both polled over 60,000 votes, the TLP bagged 49,345 votes. The margin of victory here (2,405) was just a fraction of what the TLP received. Similar is the case with constituencies in Karachi [see table].
Although the TLP can be considered a spoiler, these numbers suggest that they are more than just that. Compare and contrast with the ST’s performance in 2008 and 2013. Back in 2008, the ST was still reeling from a leadership crisis. It could bag only 1,501 votes from across the country even though their manifesto, too, spoke about protecting the sanctity of the finality of the Prophethood. This increased to 25,485 votes in 2013, registering as 0.06 percent of the total votes cast. In Punjab, where the TLP managed to bag the most number of votes from this time round, the ST in 2008 received only 392 votes. About a decade later, the ST still hasn’t been able to establish its presence.