Gen Zia with President Reagan.
But then in 1987, Arshad Pervez, a Pakistani-origin Canadian businessman believed to be Gen Zia’s agent was caught in Philadelphia while trying to buy 25 tons of a steel alloy crucial for building a nuclear bomb. There were furious demands in Congress to cut off aid to Pakistan. Given all these developments, could elements within the CIA have decided to curtail Gen Zia’s nuclear and regional ambitions once and for all?
Interestingly, a US State Department meeting held on Oct 26 to consider whether to recommend to Secretary of State George Schultz that an Accountability Review Board be convened to investigate the crash, unanimously decided against such an action. The proceedings were detailed in a memo to Mr Schultz.
Strangely, it also took nearly a year for an FBI team to arrive in Pakistan. “I think that was only to fulfill some legal requirement because American citizens had died on foreign soil,” says Mr Akhtar. “They did nothing.”
Gen Zia’s son concurs. “I gave them 26 names of people they should have interviewed. In the end, I asked them why they had come if all they were going to do was sightseeing.”
For its part, a US State Department document pertaining to the FBI visit from ambassador Robert Oakley to Mr Schultz records: “They appear satisfied with GOP cooperation…The one disappointment was refusal of COAS Beg to see them despite my urging and that of [Minister of Internal Security] General [Naseerullah] Babar. They found that the ongoing GOP investigation under Bandial has gone nowhere and is unlikely to ever do so.”
(Brig Naseem, for one, finds the notion utterly preposterous that the US may have been to blame. “Why would America kill its most obedient servant?”)
The Soviet Union’s KGB is another plausible suspect. A communiqué from the US embassy in Moscow to Mr Schultz soon after the plane crash reads: “Soviet Oriental Institute Afghan expert Yuriy Gankovskiy told [embassy officials] August 25 that Pakistan president Zia’s death might result in a more evenhanded Pakistani approach to the question of Afghanistan…The Soviets had been increasingly uncomfortable with the direction Zia had been taking on Afghanistan. Zia, he argued, had extremely close ties to Pakistan’s Jamaat-i-Islami and thence to Gulbadin Hekmatyar.”
In the months leading up to the crash, the Soviet leadership had made its displeasure towards Pakistan clear, accusing it of obstructionism and violation of the terms of the Geneva Accords. In fact, a mere two days before, Dawn reported that the Soviets had declared that the “continuation of this policy by Pakistan cannot be further tolerated.”
Curiously enough, the US did not belabour the point or try to pin the blame on the Soviet Union, its only rival superpower. In fact, the US government decided to push the malfunction theory that its own experts had discredited in their joint report with Pakistani investigators.
Epstein, through his contacts in the US State Department, surmised that the truth “could undermine everything the US was trying to achieve by damaging détente, leading to armed confrontation on Pakistan’s borders or even destabilise the new and shaky Pakistan government.”
India also harboured a grudge against Pakistan, alleging it had been funnelling arms to the Sikh separatist movement and now was working to fan the flames of the Kashmiri resistance. Besides, it was well known that the Indian intelligence agency RAW had long had its assets in place in Pakistan.
A reliable workhorse
During his first government, Nawaz Sharif set up the Shafiqur Rehman Commission to investigate the crash. Neither Mr Akhtar nor Ejazul Haq has a copy in their possession. After a few years, the Commission issued a ‘secret report’ in which it accused elements in the military of having deliberately obstructed the investigation. For instance, PAF did not even give them access to the wreckage at the Multan air base.
“Nawaz Sharif used the investigation as a means of pressuring Gen Aslam Beg,” says a source. “The fact is, everyone wanted to stop it at a certain level because it could bring the entire army into disrepute.”
But there are many in the military that refuse to give credence to this version of events, and are even offended by it. Gen Agha Masood, who remains a staunch admirer of Gen Zia — he in fact lowered Gen Zia’s remains into the grave — and was also close to Gen Beg, emphatically denies any existence of a conspiracy.
He concedes that the general had internal enemies — “Bhutto and the Sindhi lot, not the Punjabis, Pathans and Baloch” — as well as external ones. “But if [foreign powers] wanted to kill him, they would have chosen an easier way of doing so.” He also points to the high-level security accorded to VVIPs which he believes makes it impossible to tamper with an aircraft carrying the army chief. According to him, the possibility of sabotage was never even discussed within the army’s officer cadre.
Brig Naseem is convinced it was a maintenance problem, resulting in a malfunction that brought down Pak-1. “Gen Zia would always ask why he was made to travel in such an aircraft.” This claim, however, is firmly refuted by Ejazul Haq who says his father had no qualms about flying C-130s: “We in fact went by C-130 to Lahore for my brother’s wedding, that too in extremely bad weather.”
Wg Cmdr Munawar, with 10,000 hours on the C-130s, vouches for the aircraft’s reliability and safety record. “The C-130 can fly even if one falls asleep at the controls.”
Thirty years on, Gen Zia’s death remains shrouded in mystery. Why was no effort made to unmask the perpetrators? Conversely, why was so much effort expended on suppressing incriminating evidence? Having examined the evidence, and spoken to multiple witnesses, one may ask; is it not time for Pakistan to reconcile with its past and confront the many truths that have never seen the light of day?