PHYSICAL infrastructure dominated the development policy of the last government. In his first speech, the prime minister of our new government spoke of human development, environmentalism, devolution, government and bureaucratic reforms, and so on. He even spoke of child abuse. Roads and bridges were conspicuous by their absence. A shift in emphasis from the ‘hardware’ of society to its ‘software’ is clearly evident, at least in terms of vision. On the implementation front, we will have to wait and see.

It is obvious that focusing on hardware results in quick outcomes. A 25-kilometre-long metro can be up and running within a year, giving the government bragging rights about its hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries. Police, civil service or accountability reforms, on the other hand, will take much longer — and even longer for its outcomes to be perceived. Ensuring universal education for Pakistan’s children will take decades. The point is that the public will have to be patient with a ‘software’ paradigm.

Reforming institutions (ie systems) is also likely to be much more difficult and time-consuming than building metros and motorways. There is little resistance to infrastructure projects; in fact, powerful vested interests often stand to gain from such projects. On the other hand, any bad system that exists benefits at least a few or many. The beneficiaries of such systems, ie would-be losers of reforms, tend to resist change. For example, assuming that patwaris gain from manipulation of land records and that a manual records system facilitates this practice, authorities would have to overcome the patwaris’ resistance to digitising land records.

Rent-seekers will always come in the way of meaningful change.

Another issue is that of rent-seeking — to attempt to increase one’s wealth without actually contributing to its creation, ie by making use of one’s authority for personal gains (thus making it an abuse of power). Just as the introduction of any system that curbs corruption is resisted by the corrupt, similarly, rent-seekers will resist any system that reduces rent-seeking opportunities — and such opportunities are innumerable. Some more examples of rent-seeking will make clear how strong the resistance to reform truly is.

If the national and provincial polities want to be all-powerful, they will resist devolution of powers to local governments. Politicians and other elites enjoying rents from the police’s politicisation will try to dodge measures aimed at making this institution independent. If a backlog in the courts benefits stakeholders such as lawyers and prosecutors, then any attempt to facilitate speedy justice will be resisted. Those with business interests in the property or automobile sectors will resist purchasing restrictions on non-filers.

Bureaucrats enjoying rents by way of transfers from one prized post to another, totally unrelated to their qualifications or experience, will resist a move that checks such unmerited job-hopping from one ministry to another. A fraction of government employees who enjoy official housing will resist the monetisation of housing facilities.

Politicians enjoying rents by nominating their near and dear ones to parliamentary seats reserved for women will resist a direct election among women to reserved seats. Similarly, political parties or local councillors earning rents from indirect mayoral elections will resist a direct election by ordinary voters.

Underperforming employees, of any entity, enjoying rents by way of a seniority-based promotion system will resist its replacement with an objective performance-based promotion system. An employee, who enjoys rents by coming in for fewer office hours than re­­­quired, will resist a timesheet records system for employees. A person who can use an office car to get their children picked up from school will resist a proposal that prompts officials to use ride-hailing services for official business.

A teacher who saves time and effort, by assigning marks to students without checking answer scripts or not using class hours productively, will resist a system that constitutes any oversight over what the teacher does. A vendor who sells products by concealing their defects will resist amending the law from ‘let the buyer beware’ to ‘make the buyer aware’. People who make money by stealing water and selling it through tankers will resist the provision of clean tap water. People who steal electricity, and the people who allow its theft, will resist prepaid metering.

The list of rent-seeking opportunities, and the ancillary resistance to reforms from rent-seekers, is endless. The bottom line is that, given the need to overcome such resistance, reforming systems will take time — and even more time to have an impact. To see the fruits of the ‘software’ paradigm, the public will have to exercise patience.

The writer is dean, Air University School of Management, and is associated with the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad.

Published in Dawn, October 24th, 2018

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