The Kishanganga conundrum
Imagine a case involving the most sensitive issues of national security possible. Imagine that Pakistan wins a conclusive victory in that case. Now imagine that Pakistan wastes that victory and spends 5 years blundering about in a dead end. Kishanganga is that case.
To restate the above paragraph in less dramatic terms, Pakistan’s dispute with India over the design of the Kishanganga Project involves vital aspects of national security. Whatever conclusion is reached will affect not just the Kishanganga Project but every subsequent project designed by India on the Western Rivers.
Given the importance of water to our economy and our security, it is hard to imagine a more vital issue. Unfortunately, there is both good news and bad news to report.
The good news is that Pakistan did well in the first round of the Kishanganga dispute and received a favourable award from a seven-member Court of Arbitration.
The bad news is that Pakistan has not taken advantage of this victory.
After winning its legal case in 2013, Pakistan should have referred the technical aspects of the Kishanganga dispute to a Neutral Expert. Indeed, that had been the plan.
However, Pakistan made an ill-advised u-turn and sought to take all remaining questions to a different court of arbitration.
As a consequence, no progress has been made for the past five years.
Pakistan is today in the same position as it was in December 2013. Meanwhile, India has completed the Kishanganga project.
Published in Dawn, EOS, November 18th, 2018
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Origin stories
The roots of the water dispute with India go back, like many such disputes, to Partition.
The development of the canal irrigation network in the Indus river basin was one of the finest achievements of the British Empire. However, when the British left in 1947, they had yet to ensure its continued operation.
The consequence of this failure became evident on 1 April, 1948, when India cut off the flows of certain canals into Pakistan.
While flows were restored after a few weeks, trust between India and Pakistan was destroyed. Pakistan and India then negotiated for many years on a comprehensive agreement regarding water flows.
In 1951, the World Bank became formally involved in those negotiations. And in 1960, those efforts resulted in the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960.
The substantive provisions of the treaty can be summarised as follows:
a. The waters of the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) would be reserved for Pakistan and India would be under an obligation to “let flow” their waters (subject to certain specified rights and exceptions).
b. The waters of the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas) would be reserved for India exclusively.
c. India would be free to construct hydroelectric projects on the Western Rivers (subject to various design constraints intended to limit India’s capacity to manipulate water flows).
Between 1960 and 2002, the treaty was rarely in dispute between India and Pakistan.
Issues did arise, but they tended to subside after both parties had stated their respective positions. However, starting from 2002, the treaty became a “hot zone” as India started pushing ahead aggressively with the Kishanganga and Baglihar projects.
Under the treaty, all “questions” are first required to be addressed bilaterally by the Indus Waters Commission.
If the two sides cannot resolve these questions, then they are referred — depending on the nature of the question — to either a Neutral Expert or a Court of Arbitration. For example, technical or engineering differences are referred to a Neutral Expert. Other disputes are referred to a Court of Arbitration.
Published in Dawn, EOS, November 18th, 2018
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Disputes under the Treaty
The first questions to be formally litigated under the treaty related to the Baglihar Project and were taken before a Neutral Expert. The most important question related to India’s usage of low-level outlets.
In simple terms, the level of the outlet matters because it allows India to drain all water above the outlet. The lower the outlet, the greater India’s capability to interfere with Pakistan’s water flows and, consequently, the greater the threat to Pakistan’s security.
The treaty states in clear terms that outlets for sediment control are to be as small and as high as possible. Pakistan’s argument with regard to India’s design was therefore as follows:
a. Low-level outlets are only superior to higher outlets (in relation to reservoir sediment control) if the water level of the reservoir is lowered.
b. The treaty prohibits lowering of the reservoir water level except in the case of an “unforeseen emergency.”
c. Sediment control does not constitute an unforeseen emergency.
d. The low-level outlets provided by India were, therefore, contrary to the treaty.
Pakistan’s argument was ultimately rejected by the Neutral Expert. He admitted that Pakistan was correct in contending that unless the water level in the reservoir was lowered, low-level outlets provided no additional benefit as compared to high-level outlets. Nonetheless, he held, in February 2007, that the prohibition on drawdown applied only to “operation” of a project, not to its “maintenance.” And on that basis, India’s design was upheld.