Eleventh February, 2019, marked the 40th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution. The revolution is also remembered as an “Islamic revolution” by some historians. But was it?
Not according to celebrated American journalist and author Mark Bowden. In a November 18, 2009 piece for the Wall Street Journal, Bowden wrote that “the movement which ousted the Shah dictatorship was primarily a nationalist one.” He added that many of those who took part in the commotion “were not motivated by the desire to establish a theocracy, but a desire to cast off authoritarianism.”
Bowden is not the only prominent writer to hold this view. This assessment first emerged in 1982 in the book Iran Since the Revolution, written by the late professor of politics Sepehr Zabih. Writing just three years after the revolution, Zabih pointed out that the revolution was driven by a wide coalition of anti-Shah forces which included democrats, liberals, secular-nationalists, communists, socialists and “Islamists.” According to Zabih, after the Shah dictatorship collapsed in January 1979, there was a “power grab” among the various groups that had worked in unison during the revolution.
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However, some historians continued to explain the revolution as “Islamic”. While dealing with the immediate pre-revolution scenario, however, even they agree that multiple forces advocating a diverse range of ideologies were involved during the upheaval. They agree upon the point that Iran’s senior religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini was the most widely accepted figure of authority during the revolution — even by those who hold the claim that the clergy hijacked the revolution.
But foreign affairs expert Robin Wright in her book The Last Great Revolution writes that even though many secular, liberal and even some leftist forces agreed to accept Khomeini as the revolution’s central figure, they did so to keep the movement intact and, more so, because they believed Khomeini did not have any overt political ambitions.
Just before leaving for Tehran from Paris (where he had been in exile) Khomeini told the French daily Le Monde that it was not his intent to make religious leaders run the government. What’s more, as Bowden notes in his 2006 book Guests of the Ayatollah, on his return to Iran after the Shah’s fall, the Ayatollah retired to his home in Qom after agreeing to form an interim set-up of “secular technocrats” led by the anti-Shah “liberal-democrat” Mehdi Bazargan.
According to Wright, just a year after the revolution, Khomeini decreed that no cleric was allowed to run in Iran’s first post-revolution elections in 1980, even though he had already declared Iran to be an Islamic republic. A centre-right liberal, Syed Banisadar, won the election, attracting 75.6 percent of the popular vote.
The candidate of the Islamic Republican Party, which was pushing for an entirely theocratic set-up, bagged just 3.35 percent. But by 1981 Khomeini was being hassled by the clerics to dismiss Banisadar “because he was acting against the clergy.” In June 1981, after realising that he had lost Khomeini’s backing, Banisadar managed to escape abroad.