Pakistan security personnel inspect the site of a suicide attack in Dalbandin carried out by Baloch insurgents targeting Chinese engineers on August 2018 | AFP
The institutions of religious education may have not completely eroded the nationalist ethos of the Baloch but they have at least provided them a sense of connectivity with the broader religious communities in Pakistan. The Tableeghi Jamaat is one of the instrumental organisations connecting the Baloch with the wider national, religious and social discourses in the country. Banned terrorist groups such as the Jamaatud Daawa and Al-Rehmat Trust were also encouraged to expand their networks in the province, especially in the insurgency-infested areas. “If these organisations are agents of national cohesion, they may take a few more years to dilute the nationalist tendencies and this cannot happen without the expansion of the middle class,” says Quetta-based civil society activist Ali Baba Taj.
Despite the conflicting views, this fundamental question still remains unanswered. A review of the Iran-focused militant group Jaishul Adl can help to understand this question.
Rapid urbanisation in parts of Balochistan and a growing middle class can be counted as primary factors behind growing religiosity in the province. The Baloch overseas workers in Middle Eastern countries, as well as Omani and Iranian influences in the coastal and bordering regions, have also factored in to change the socioeconomic fabric of the area.
Balochi separatists and militants have engaged in regular cross-border raids against Iran which has made the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchestan a flashpoint since long. In October 2018, 12 Iranian security personnel were abducted near a village 150 kilometres southeast of Zahedan, the capital of Sistan-Baluchestan province. The group that claimed responsibility of the abduction was the anti-Iran Sunni Muslim militant group which calls itself Jaishul Adl (JA), or the Army of Justice. Operating primarily in the Iranian province, it receives support from local Baloch tribes in Pakistan where it also operates from.
Jaishul Adl can be classified as a Baloch religious-nationalist militant group, which was formed soon after the arrest and execution of Abdul Malik Regi, the leader of the Sunni extremist organisation Jundallah. Jaishul Adl claims to be fighting for the rights of the Baloch and Sunnis in Iran. It had demanded of the government equal rights for both the Baloch and Sunnis in Iran, among other things, in exchange of freeing the Iranian guards.
Such a demand reflected that, unlike Jundallah, the group’s struggle is for the rights of the Baloch-dominated districts in Iran and not necessarily for the independence of these areas. However, on-the-ground reports reflect a different reality. Local accounts from Panjgur and Nushki claim that JA has separatist tendencies and, like the Pakistani Baloch groups BLA and BLF, it advocates for a ‘greater Balochistan’ comprising Baloch regions within Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.
This is the reason that has drawn the Baloch youth from Pakistan’s bordering towns to join the group. Quetta-based journalist Akber Notezai feels that “Unemployment could be one of the factors for Pakistani Baloch youth to join the Jaishul Adl.” Mainly those youth who subscribe to different Sunni sectarian and religious organisations comprise its ranks. JA’s core leadership, however, is mainly Iranian Baloch. In this context, it has become a transnational religio-separatist group of the region.
Jaishul Adl vs BRAS
JA is often engaged in skirmishes with left-leaning Pakistani Baloch insurgent groups. The Baloch Raaji Ajoi Sangar (BRAS) is an alliance including the BLA, the BLF and the Balochistan Republican Guards (BRG) and often clashes with JA in armed confrontation in the areas they share alongside the Pakistan-Iran border.
The BLA and the BLF are beneficiaries of Iran’s lenient attitude towards them and, in turn, BRAS insurgents believe that Jaishul Adl enjoys Pakistan’s inattention to its activities as well as support from some Middle Eastern countries. They also claim that JA has been undermining the nationalist insurgency. However, the presence of Pakistani Baloch youth in the folds of JA indicates that the issue goes deeper.
While Pakistani insurgents did not have a close association with Iran, the breakaway faction of the Jundullah group was tolerated by Pakistani Baloch insurgents. But now the situation is different. A few blogs maintained by BRAS supporters reflect that the debate among Pakistani Baloch insurgents to form an alliance with their Iranian counterparts carries on, though with little success.
A few among hardliner Baloch nationalists in Pakistan, who take pride in the traditionally left-leaning and secular roots of the Baloch nationalist movement, consider JA an illegitimate entity to lead the Baloch. They assert, instead, that the group is dividing the force of the insurgents while giving a religious colour to the resistance movement. According to them, the Iranian regime is, in fact, not against the Sunnis because it allows Sunni mosques and madressahs to function, that Sunni books are published in Iran, and Sunnis have representation in the Iranian parliament. They also point to Maulana Abdul Hameed, the head of the Sunni Council in Iranian Balochestan.
They argue that the Iranian regime is, in fact, against ethnic minorities including Baloch, Kurds and Arabs. They assert that the Iranian regime has not set up any Baloch cultural centre in Sistan and there is a ban on the publication of Balochi-language books. A secular Baloch cannot contest elections in Iran. This is a popular view among the hardliners, but many experts underscore that Baloch nationalism in Iran has become increasingly religious in nature, and JA is one of the reactions.
Although the groups in the BRAS’ fold have a critical view of Iran and advocate for a greater Balochistan, logistical support from Iran has also made them dependent on the country. This has given Iran clout over these insurgent groups and it is using them against anti-Iran groups such as JA. According to local accounts, families of BRAS commanders have been given protection and refuge by the Iranian security forces and, in return, they attack JA hideouts inside Pakistan and provide information about them to Iran.
The Zikri factor