This week, the world celebrated International Youth Day. For Pakistan, this year’s theme of “transforming education” could not be more pertinent. As the country continues to rank abysmally on virtually every education indicator, the theme begs a closer look at past and present attempts at reform.
One important but highly contentious aspect of the education debate in Pakistan is the quest to reform the madressah education sector. In May, the PTI government and the Ittehad-i-Tanzeemat-i-Madaris Pakistan (ITMP) — a federation of the main madressah oversight bodies in the country — reached an agreement to bring the deeni madaris into the fold of mainstream education.
Unfortunately, for those of us who have followed the education debate over the years, such pledges have become cliched. Over the past four decades, virtually every government has attempted to move in this direction. Yet, none ended up with much to show for their efforts.
If the PTI government is to avoid the fate of its predecessors, it will have to learn the right lessons from previous failures. Chief among them is to avoid approaching the issue as a national security imperative, and instead direct focus to improving education outcomes.
Education is a critical element in a state and society’s responsibility towards ensuring the youth’s healthy transition to adulthood. Pakistan’s 2017 Human Development Report on youth summarises this journey as a combination of three ‘Es’: education, employment and engagement. An educational experience that allows youth to develop the skillsets necessary to acquire a respectable livelihood and empowers them to engage productively within the broader society enables a country to transform its youth bulge into a dividend. The opposite — an environment that leaves large segments of youth marginalised and alienated from mainstream economic, political and social activity — presents a ticking time bomb; it has led youth around the world to seek agency by supporting or participating in violence.
The question of how to enact madressah reforms has continued to plague governments particularly since seminaries were linked in the popular consciousness to rising religious extremism. Ironically, that national security focus may well be the reason all attempts have failed so far...
For it to be sustainable, any attempt at reforming education must therefore target the student’s wellbeing. The end goal: achieving the three ‘Es’.
This is where previous efforts at madressah reform in Pakistan have faltered.
The Madressah Sector
Pakistan inherited around 250 madressahs at the time of independence. While estimates vary, and accurate numbers are difficult to assess, today around 32,000 madressahs cater to between 2.5 to 3.5 million students. The sector employees nearly 75,000 teachers. A large proportion of the madressahs are unregistered.
Majority of the madressahs are loosely run by one of five umbrella network associations, the Wafaqs: Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia (Deobandi); Tanzeem-ul-Madaris (Barelvi); Rabita-ul-Madaris Al-Islamia (Jama’at-i-Islami); Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Salfia (Ahl-i-Hadith); and Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Shia (Shia). Each Wafaq represents its own denomination (maslak). The ITMP is a supra-body where the five Wafaqs notionally converge. In practice, individual madressahs have extreme autonomy. The Wafaqs primarily determine syllabi, administer exams and award degrees.
The Misplaced National Security Approach
For decades, the madressah problem has been viewed through a national security lens. Concern that Pakistan’s post-9/11 militancy problem stems, in part, from madressahs has misplaced the sector’s reform under the national security umbrella. Believing that more formal governance and oversight will break links to extremism, reforms have aimed to attain greater control of the sector. Well-rehearsed fixes involving madressah registration, oversight of finances and revision of curricula have been cornerstones of past attempts at reform. Even though these efforts were presented as means of ensuring holistic education in a more conducive environment for students, these were ancillary concerns that would benefit from the downstream effects of attempts to curb the madressah sector’s extremist links.
Viewing madressah reform through a national security lens is not devoid of logic. In 1980, after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the Pakistani state, allied with the US, encouraged these traditional centres of free religious instruction to give a fillip to its support of the ‘jihad’ next door. The effort also coincided with General Ziaul Haq’s ‘Islamisation’ agenda under which he diverted funds to select madressah networks. The state’s use of Islamist militants for proxy wars through the 1980s and the 1990s allowed both sanctioned and unsanctioned actors a relatively safe space to expand and blossom.
That a minority of madressahs got embedded in the militant milieu during this period was only natural. While the first signs of an internal backlash were evident in the 1990s — when links between growing sectarian hatred and the strictly sect-based teachings of madressahs emerged — it wasn’t until 9/11 that this sector was deemed to be an immediate national security problem. As the US-led ‘War on Terror’ commenced, hundreds of Western scholars took to unpacking the madressah problem purely from a counterterrorism perspective — going far enough to declare Pakistani madressahs as “incubators of violent extremism.” The Musharraf government, also fixated on terrorism post-9/11, approached the issue similarly.
Couched in the language of education reform, the security lens became even more explicit as time went by. Madressah reform was included in the National Action Plan drafted in the aftermath of the Army Public School terrorist attack in 2014 and the 2018 National Internal Security Policy (NISP). Continued international pressure on Pakistan to ‘do more’ on the counterterrorism front, including curbing elicit financial flows to satisfy the Financial Action Task Force, has further entrenched the madressah-extremism link in the popular discourse given that many prominent madressahs depend on undocumented donations from local and foreign sources.
Justified as it may have seemed, given the post-9/11 context, the national security approach was too fixated on the immediate terrorism threat to develop any long-term reform agenda with a focus on student wellbeing. To the contrary, it stigmatised the entire sector even though only a small minority was involved in promoting militancy. This caused widespread resentment among madressah leaders and students. Besides, the reforms never took off.
Each attempted reform was met with resistance from madressah authorities who contested the government’s efforts to register them and increase oversight and control. Lacking cooperation, the state was forced to resort to law-enforcement operations to target extremists linked to the madressahs. While it did score successes in identifying and neutralising extremist institutions and actors, these actions also caused tensions with the madressah authorities who have repeatedly criticised the state for dealing with them as a national security threat rather than educators of some of the poorest children in the country.