THE withdrawal of US troops from Afg­h­anistan has changed the dynamics of terrorism and counterterrorism (CT) in Afghan­is­tan and its neighbourhood: while the ope­r­ational capabilities of Al Qaeda appear weakened, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K) has gained space, and the status of the Taliban has changed from insurgents to the ruling elite. Meanwhile, Central Asian jihadis, particularly the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and other groups, continue to pose a threat to regional security.

The IMU has a peculiar story — one of persistent transition; from Tajikistan to Afghanistan, the tribal areas of Pakistan, to Syria and Iraq. It has had marriages of convenience with Al Qaeda, the Taliban and even IS. It was born in Uzbekistan, which shares borders with Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The country spent most of the past 200 years as part of the Russian empire and then the Soviet Union. Living under the authoritarian USSR, the Muslims of Central Asia experienced an identity crisis. This, coupled with political marginalisation, weak institutions, growing inequalities, poor governance and porous borders, resulted in the rise of violent extremism.

IMU’s co-founders, Tohir Yo’ldosh and Juma Namangani, had initially established a group called Adolat (Justice). In 1992, Islam Karimov banned Adolat and Yo’ldosh and Namangani left Uzbekistan for Tajikistan. The Tajik civil war ended in 1997. By 1998, they had rebranded Adolat as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. In August 1999, Namangani, leading a contingent of 700 fighters, left Tajikistan and seized the Kyrgyz portion of the Ferghana Valley. It hoped to use the territory as an operational base to launch attacks into Uzbekistan. That same year, IMU was blamed for a series of bombings in Tashkent.

From 1998 to 2001, the IMU tried to integrate itself into Al Qaeda’s global jihadi movement and fought alongside Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan, first against the Northern Alliance and then the coalition forces. After the arrival of US troops, it relocated to Pakistan’s tribal areas. Prior to military operations, the IMU took refuge in the Taliban-influenced Pakistani tribal belt, but quickly earned the hatred of locals.

Ideologically, the IMU remained aligned to external groups like Al Qaeda and IS. In 2000, the US placed the IMU on a list of designated foreign terrorist organisations. In 2001, Namangani died while defending the Taliban. After his death, Yo’ldosh became IMU’s sole leader. By 2006, the IMU had birthed three new groups. A significant number of dejected IMU fighters left IMU for good and settled in neighbouring countries. Another group of demobilised IMU fighters returned to Central Asia and took advantage of amnesties offered in Uzbekistan. However, numerous IMU fighters remained scattered in pockets of Central Asia, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Drone attacks and CT operations eventually damaged IMU’s command and operations. Key leaders Tahir Yuldashev (2009), Najmiddin Kamolitdinovich Jalolov (2009), and Abu Uthman Adil (2012) were killed in in drone attacks. The Afghan Taliban, too, punished the IMU for its betrayal in developing an association with IS. In 2015, Usman Ghazi, the emir of the IMU, had pledged his loyalty to Al Baghdadi as the IMU needed recognition and funds. As punishment for his disloyalty, Usman was killed in Zabul, Afghanistan, in 2015.

Though the IMU ultimately failed to attain its primary objective, other militant groups greatly benefited from its strength. Under the command of Baitullah Mehsud, the IMU and TTP had a cordial operational equation under which they carried out joint attacks. Attacks on the Mehran Naval Base in 2011 and the airbases at Kamra and Peshawar in 2012 reflected their synergetic relationship.

The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan has transformed the role and responsibilities of the Taliban. The insurgents of yesterday now have to prove that they also have the capabilities to counter terrorism, especially from the vestiges of groups like the IMU. Delivering on their counterterrorism commitments will not only bring stability to Afghanistan, but also qualify them to be recognised by the international community.

The question is, how will the Taliban distance themselves from militant groups? Operational disengagement may be an option, but in an uncertain situation, how will the group sever its ideological linkages? A peaceful neighbourhood is beneficial for Afghanistan, but a mere desire to have friendly relations with neighbours may not yield dividends, as the presence of militant organisations in Afghanistan erodes the credibility of the Taliban government. A reduction of space for militants will push them to return to their homes; however, that will not be possible to do without fulfilling counterterrorism commitments.

The writer is author of Pakistan: In Between Extremism and Peace.

Twitter: @alibabakhel

Published in Dawn, April 11th, 2022