There’s a feeling of urgency within the military establishment to counter a ‘narrative’ that began to take shape just before former PM Imran Khan came into power.

The narrative was a fusion of anti-corruption rhetoric, rigid nationalism, selective anti-elitism, Islamism and pop-Sufism. It was largely elusive to pin down, yet compressed, as if all of its elements were seamlessly linked. In fact, these elements often contradicted each other. Thus, inherent in this narrative was the possibility of it being turned against those who helped build it.

The narrative began being weaved from 2011 onwards, when Khan’s journey to the top was initiated in earnest with the aid of some members of the country’s intelligence agencies. Certain TV news anchors were brought on board to give momentum to the initiative. Those who refused, were taken to task through harassment, threats and bans.

From 2013 onwards, the government of Mian Nawaz Sharif was demonised as being ‘corrupt,’ and part of a political elite that was working against the interests of state institutions, and also against the ‘educated’ segments of the polity that believed in ‘merit.’

The military establishment is understandably worried. Their man and their narrative have gone rogue

Khan intensified this notion in his animated speeches, denouncing two of Pakistan’s oldest mainstream political parties — the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) — for functioning like political and economic ‘mafias.’ He claimed they were robbing people, especially the respectable, hard-working middle classes. These classes, according to some recent studies, constitute approximately 48 percent of Pakistan’s population. The political economist Akbar Zaidi slots them as ‘aspirational classes’, which include middle and upper-middle income groups.

This part of the post-2011 narrative was based on the theory that, in developing democracies, the middle classes manage to acquire economic influence, but they are blocked by a political elite from attaining political power. This leaves the middle classes squeezed between a political elite on the top, and the classes below. The segments below get more attention by the (electoral) political elite because they have a larger number of votes, making the middle segments feel neglected.

Khan and his erstwhile supporters in the military establishment lambasted the political leverage that the established political outfits monopolised through politics of patronage, and by building electoral networks. But nothing was said about that other major component of the country’s ruling elite: the military establishment.

The military has directly ruled Pakistan for a total of 32 years. It was, thus, only a matter of time that this omission from the aforementioned narrative would rear its head, when Khan’s many failures as PM compelled the establishment to quietly pull back its support for a malfunctioning regime.

Now a former PM, who was carefully crafted as the establishment’s civilian instrument, is out on the streets mouthing ‘anti-establishment’ rhetoric, with his supporters specifically targeting top military men who ‘betrayed’ him (and therefore, ‘the whole country’, which actually means Khan’s core urban middle class constituencies). This exhibits the volatility of the narrative that had begun to take shape from 2011.

Read: Trends against institutions see ‘organic decline’ as Imran softens tone

The anti-corruption bit in it, that was designed to demonise PML-N and the PPP, crossed the red line too when Khan, while responding to allegations of his own love for quick materialistic gratification, said that, if military men can get plots of land, why couldn’t he benefit (as PM) by acquiring things from the toshakhana [gift depository]

So, here we see the anti-corruption and anti-elitism dimensions of the narrative spilling into areas that were the domain of the original makers of this narrative, spun when they and their instrument were ‘on the same page.’

The rigid nationalism bit as well has been turned against state institutions. After Khan was ousted through a no-confidence vote, and when the military and the judiciary refused to endorse the unconstitutional ways he was trying to stop the vote, for him everyone — except, of course, himself and his cronies — is now working against the national interest. To many of his supporters, this now includes the military chief and Supreme Court judges as well.

During the military’s operation against Islamist militants between 2014 and 2018, the military leadership had attempted to differentiate its idea of Islam from the one propagated by the militants. The Sharif government had quickly fallen in line. Yet, ironically, the same military had already initiated its Khan experiment, despite the fact that the Islamist aspect of Khan’s rhetoric was largely sympathetic towards the militants. As soldiers, politicians, and common civilians were being cut down by the militants, Khan was claiming that Pakistan was fighting someone else’s war, and that the militants were ‘misunderstood brothers.’

Maybe his sculptors thought his rhetoric and mindset could be altered once he was in power? Perhaps. But nothing of the sort happened. And now he is out, saying not a word about the soldiers losing their lives almost every day in the renewed hostilities between the state and the militants. Instead, one can hear slogans in his post-ouster rallies which one also hears in gatherings of controversial outfits such as the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan.

And the most surreal dimension of this is the thousands of ‘educated’, trendy, upper-middle and middle class men and women (‘burgers’) chanting along. In their heads, this is all something to do with ‘Sufism’ — the pop version they initially learned from shows such as Coke Studio!

The military establishment is understandably worried. Their man and their narrative have gone rogue. To some analysts, this was always on the cards. And today they are wondering how could a rational institution such as the military not have seen this when they were going all-out to construct Khan as their man?

One can now expect a systematic deconstruction of a project gone wrong.

Published in Dawn, EOS, May 1st, 2022