While the world grapples with the ongoing Russo-Ukraine War, and now the asymmetrical, murderous war in Gaza, attention has largely shifted away from South Asia. But here, the modernisation of nuclear and missile arsenals in the near-absence of any dialogue framework between India and Pakistan and unresolved disputes between them makes the region vulnerable to extremely dangerous crises.

The situation is further complicated by domestic developments in India, which has been ruled for the last nine years by a right-wing government that is not only eyeing to win the 2024 elections, but is on record with its statements of intent to aggress against Pakistan. Nor are those statements just theoretical. India, by its own announcements, attacked Pakistan in 2016 (the so-called surgical strikes) and then in 2019, when it used an aerial strike package to bomb a target in mainland Pakistan.

Click to see more

The failed Indian attack in 2019 led to Pakistan’s aerial response, the first since the 1971 War. In the ensuing dogfight in the skies, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) downed two Indian fighter jets, capturing the pilot of one. The engagement led to escalatory rhetoric from India which threatened to fire missiles at targets in Pakistan.

The situation was de-escalated after Pakistan made clear that it would respond in kind even as it returned the pilot of the downed Indian MiG. International diplomacy also played a role in bringing the temperature down. However, India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, who was heading into national elections at the time, used the episode to his full domestic advantage, winning big and returning to power.

Once again, different factors between now and India’s elections in 2024 portend a particularly dangerous time.

India’s development and modernisation of its nuclear arsenal, coupled with the BJP’s hostile attitude towards both Pakistan and China, is greatly impacting Pakistan’s deterrence strategy, regional stability, and the splintered world order. What should Pakistan’s response be?

MAPPING THE SECURITY ECOSYSTEM

This article seeks to first take a synoptic look at the modernisation of nuclear arsenals and diversification of delivery vehicles by India and Pakistan. It then places these developments in the backdrop of India’s Pakistan and China policies, though the primary focus remains India’s policy to shun any positive engagement with Pakistan and to hurt the latter’s interests at every level, including, as we have recently witnessed, even in the sport of cricket.

The China factor becomes important because India continues to cite the China threat as the primary reason for its missile development and modernisation. This is despite the fact that much of its force deployment, what is called the ‘Order of Battle’, remains Pakistan-specific.

For the purpose of this article, I look at India’s refusal to prescind China from its force modernisation calculations and its current policy to hurt Pakistan as important factors in complicating efforts to stabilise the security environment in South Asia.

Finally, to develop a comprehensive threat spectrum, it is important to place these technological developments in the broader framework of India’s policy of limited conventional engagements (operational) in a nuclear environment, its slide as a polity into Hindutva authoritarianism, and its foreign and security policy choices in what the British economist Paul Tucker calls a “fracturing world order.”

DEVELOPING AND DIVERSIFYING MISSILES

For both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, missiles offer the best way of delivering a distance (medium- to long-range) tactical or strategic strike. Missiles in some cases also seek to neutralise the asymmetric advantage of an adversary with a more capable air force.

Historically, the projectile — in its many different forms — has often been the deciding factor in battle. It does so by creating an asymmetry through projection of deadly power from a distance. Mythology tells us about David’s slingshot that blinded and felled Goliath; Achilles wielded the Pelian Spear while being protected by his mythical shield; Paris used his deadly bow; the catapult was the ancient ballistic device to launch heavy projectiles against forts; the English learnt the use of longbows from the Welsh and used them with deadly effect against the French. The list is long.

Long before the advent of modern artillery in the middle of the 19th century, King Louis XIV of France had his guns engraved with the phrase ultima ratio regum [the final argument of kings]. It expressed his faith in the effectiveness and decisiveness of his cannons. Even today, as is clear from the ongoing Russo-Ukraine war, artillery often plays the decisive role, both in battery and counter-battery roles.

Modern rockets and missiles are the result of multiple scientific principles coming together to create long-distance, intercontinental lethality. Today, we are at the stage of precision, stand-off, guided projectiles and hypersonic missiles, with many advanced militaries working towards introducing artificial intelligence in the kill chain.

Equally, as always, we are faced with the old dilemma of war through the ages: how to project long-distance lethality while defending ourselves from it. How do we have Achilles’ Pelian Spear and his mythical shield? This is where missiles and anti-ballistic and cruise missiles systems come in. The former is the spear; the latter an ongoing effort to have the Achilles’ shield.

The China factor becomes important because India continues to cite the China threat as the primary reason for its missile development and modernisation. This is despite the fact that much of its force deployment, what is called the ‘Order of Battle’, remainsPakistan-specific.

INDIA’S MODERNISATION OF MISSILES

While both the Indian and Pakistani nuclear and missile programmes largely remain opaque, official statements, satellite imagery, open-source intelligence, expert analyses etc. can put together a fairly accurate assessment of what is happening. In many cases, organisations dedicated to such assessments have developed methodologies to cross-examine data gleaned from various sources to analyse trends.

On the basis of this information, it is an acknowledged fact that India continues to modernise its nuclear arsenal. Let me give one example of how expert assessments, even when slanted, can contribute to fairly accurate analyses.

In a November 2, 2019 paper for the Hoover Institution titled ‘A Troubled Transition: Emerging Nuclear Forces in India and Pakistan’, Indian-American expert Ashley Tellis tried to downplay India’s modernisation, compared to China’s and Pakistan’s. However, by October 2022, Tellis was arguing (as widely reported) that, “India may be compelled to test again, and when it does, it’s in [the] US interest to avoid penalising it.”

This was with reference to an interview about his book, ‘Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in Southern Asia’, where he argued that “both arms of the Indian state will have to live with the weapons they have, while waiting for an opportunity for New Delhi to resume nuclear testing when circumstances permit”, because that’s the only way to “erode China’s qualitative advantages.”

In a July 2020 assessment, Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda for the Nuclear Notebook project of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, estimated that India’s continued modernisation of its nuclear arsenal include “at least four new weapons systems now under development to complement or replace existing nuclear-capable aircraft, land-based delivery systems, and sea-based systems.”

They also state that, “Several of these systems are nearing completion and will soon be combat-ready.” While India has produced “enough military plutonium for 140 to 210 nuclear warheads”, it likely possesses “only 160.” However, given the range of missiles India is producing (as shown in the infographic), it would need additional plutonium “to produce warheads for missiles now under development.”

India is also reportedly building several new plutonium production facilities. Kristensen and Korda also note that, while “India’s nuclear strategy [has been] traditionally focused on Pakistan, [it] now appears to place increased emphasis on China.” Beijing is already in the range of Indian missiles like Agni V, which is canisterised (warhead mated with the missile) and has a range of 5,500 km, though it had earlier claimed a longer range for it.

However, as the infographic indicates, there are a number of short- to medium-range ballistic missiles (Prithvi, Agni, Agni II, Agni III and the under-development Agni Prime — a canisterised MIRV (Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle, or warheads on a missile that can be independently targeted) with a range of 2,000 km — and short-range Prahar, Pralay and canisterised Shourya) as well as cruise missiles (BrahMos and the under-development Nirbhay and K-15) which are, by their very ranges, Pakistan-specific.

In this entire range, the canisterised Agni V, the under-development Agni VI MIRV and canisterised K-4 can be deployed against China. As noted above, pulling China into the India-Pakistan dyadic equation complicates efforts to find a stable balance in South Asia through bilateral arrangements and confidence-building measures. It is a matter of concern for Pakistan that even the hotlines meant for crisis management are barely used by India, a prime example of that being the accidental launch from India of a cruise missile that diverted course and entered into Pakistani airspace before hitting a field in a town in Pakistani Punjab. India only came clean on that incident after Pakistan Army did a press conference detailing that launch.

A further problem with dragging China in and making this into a Southern Asia rather than a South Asia issue is that it gives India the cover to continue developing its capabilities, including hot-testing if and when required. This is a deliberate policy by Indian strategists to make space for enhancing India’s nuclear and military capabilities across a broad range of platforms and delivery systems.

Since Sino-US relations are on a continuous slide, Indian strategists and policymakers think, not without reason, that breaking the taboo over testing is unlikely to bring the house down on India. What this assessment misses entirely is Pakistan’s likely response to the breakdown of a moratorium on hot-testing, as well as to the development of longer-range MIRVs.

THE DESTABILISING SHIELDS

In addition to developing missiles of different specification, employment and ranges, India is also pursuing advanced anti-ballistic and anti-cruise missile (ABM and ACM) systems. It has been working on an indigenous Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for lower altitude interception. Additionally, it contracted to buy the Russian S-400 system, of which two regiments have already reached India and are deployed against Pakistan and China.

In 2019, the United States offered to supply India the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system as well as the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile defence system. While India has opted for the Russian S-400, given a number of geopolitical factors and its close strategic partnership with the US, India could well end up getting the THAAD and PAC-3 systems at some point in the future.

What do ABM/ ACM systems do? In plain, simple terms, they destabilise deterrence. While deterrence can be gamed through complex models, at the very basic level it means one thing: the adversaries must understand that any offensive action by X will beget unacceptable punishment by Y and vice versa.

This is what is referred to as the ‘balance of terror.’ It was on display during the 13 days the Cuban Missile Crisis kept everyone on both sides on tenterhooks. But the history of warfare has always been the dialectic between offence and defence. Despite knowing that nuclear weapons are unlike any other weapon, the Cold War not only saw several debates about how a nuclear war could be fought and won, but also attempts (starting with Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars”) to develop interceptors that could destroy incoming missiles.

Those efforts continue apace. While officials dealing with developing ABM systems put their faith in the viability of these systems and keep drawing more funds, independent experts — including top scientists — have constantly put a question mark on the viability of such systems.

DISSENTING VOICES

For instance, a February 2022 study by the American Physical Society (APS) found that, “After 70 years and some $350 billion in investment — no ‘system thus far developed has been shown to be effective against realistic ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) threats’ to the homeland.”

Not surprisingly, the Pentagon’s Missile Defence Agency differs with the findings of the study, as it has with several other such assessments. The study concluded that, “The difficulties are numerous, ranging from the unresolved countermeasures problem for midcourse-intercept to the severe reach-versus-time challenge of boost-phase intercept.

“Few of the main challenges have been solved, and many of the hard problems are likely to remain unsolved during, and probably beyond, the 15-year time horizon the study considered. The costs and benefits of this effort therefore need to be weighed carefully.”

The study also observed that directed energy weapons to intercept missiles will not be meaningfully developed for the 15-year projection the study uses. The same is true for space-based interceptors, which would require hundreds of on-orbit platforms to shoot down a single ICBM.

However, none of this has dissuaded states from putting in a lot of effort into creating Achilles’ shields or, as someone termed it years ago, a Maginot Line in the sky. Since there have been some advances, as witnessed in Russia and Ukraine and the performance of Israel’s Iron Dome system against rockets, states have to factor in ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems in their calculations, for both offensive and defensive responses.

Much is made of pre-emption in the literature but, outside of the club and its fantastical scenarios, no one can take seriously the possibility of a pre-emptive nuclear strike that is launched under the assurance that the aggressor’s defensive shield will intercept every missile the aggressed state will launch in response. In any case, that scenario is further made effete by nuclear weapons states developing sea-based second-strike capabilities.

PAKISTAN’S CALCULUS

On October 18, Pakistan test-fired Ababeel — its first MIRV-capable ballistic missile with a stated range of 2,200 to 2,700 km. The official statement from the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the military’s media branch, said the test was aimed at revalidating “various design, technical parameters and performance evaluation of different sub-systems [of the missile].”

The statement also noted that the test would help in “strengthening deterrence and enhancing strategic stability in the region through the operationalisation of full spectrum deterrence in the overall construct of credible minimum deterrence.”

In simple English, it means the missile is meant to deter an adversary (read, India) from making mischief and thereby ensures stability. The term full-spectrum deterrence, a term introduced in nuclear strategic literature by Pakistan, refers to deterrence across the three levels in ascending order: tactical, operational and strategic.

Ababeel was first tested on January 24, 2017. At the time, the ISPR statement noted that the MIRV had a range of 2,200 km and was developed to ensure “survivability of Pakistan’s ballistic missiles in the growing regional Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) environment.”

As opposed to the recent statement, the 2107 statement actually goes to the heart of the issue, the dilemma I noted above. If a state has both the Pelian Spear and the mythical shield, while the other only has the spear, the one with the spear and the shield could think of striking first, while confident of being shielded from the adversary’s strike. That is a recipe for instability both in theoretical and real terms.

So how does the state with only the spear respond? It can develop a spear that overwhelms the shield, acquire its own shield, or do both.

That’s where Ababeel comes in. But this is not all. Pakistan too, like India, is now making strategy follow scientific demonstrators. You can develop a capability, so you must. Technical and performance parameters take on their own life.

TECHNOLOGY LEADING STRATEGY

Seen from that perspective, for the scientists, Ababeel is an important engineering milestone. It also helps strengthen the triad — land, air, sea capabilities — while, in operational and strategic terms, boosting the survivability of Pakistan’s strategic assets and delivery systems.

The point about technology guiding strategy is not a new one. Ralph Lapp wrote about it in his book, Arms Beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology. In a July 2023 article for India’s Observer Research Foundation, Bashir Ali Abbas talked about the historic tendency by “DRDO [India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation] for ‘project folding’ [i.e.,] to pitch a missile test as a technology demonstrator and immediately lobby for the next missile that incorporates the upgrades.”

There is also much debate about growing dual-use counterforce capabilities. I tackled this problem in a previous article on these pages. While missilery between a nuclear dyad is a big no, given that there is no way of knowing whether the incoming missile has a tactical or strategic warhead, India’s concept of limited pro-active operations creates a problem for Pakistan.

The other issue with conventional counterforce strikes through dual-use missiles is that accuracy and remote sensing have made hardening and concealment of nuclear forces increasingly difficult. In that sense, Pakistan’s continued improvement of MIRV capability and increasing the range of its missiles is a rational response to India’s growing capabilities.

The fact that some Indian analysts have tried to undermine Ababeel’s performance and even questioned that it’s a MIRV indicates that the missile in Pakistan’s inventory has complicated India’s calculus and, to that extent, enhanced crisis stability through mutual vulnerability.

India has already developed ICBM and A-SAT (anti-satellite) capabilities. It is working apace on its sea-based second-strike capabilities. In 2020, it successfully tested a hypersonic technology demonstrator vehicle (HSTDV) for BrahMos, which gives the cruise missile a Mach6 speed, capable of breaching any missile defences.

In light of these developments, while Pakistan has no need for tit-for-tat tests, it’s important for the country to develop capabilities that can prevent coercive strategies from kicking into play.

THE BROADER CONTEXT

While the military-operational context is important in any discussion of India’s growing capabilities and Pakistan’s responses, these developments have to be seen in a broader geopolitical context and also India’s domestic landscape.

The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the right-wing political extension of the ethno-fascist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), has sought to change the socio-political landscape of India. It has resorted to authoritarian methods, silencing dissent, struck at secularists in India through sponsoring right-wing Hindutva ideology, persecuted minorities, especially the Muslim population, and ratcheted up anti-Pakistan rhetoric.

Geopolitically, because of the increasing Sino-US rivalry, India has found space to get even closer to the United States, drawing on years of work by previous governments in that direction. This has also provided space to India to pursue a policy that is tolerated by the US and its allies, even when it clashes with the latter’s interests.

For example, when Turkiye, a NATO member and thus a treaty ally, went ahead with purchasing the Russian S-400 system, the US not only separated Ankara from the F-35 programme but also sanctioned it under its Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). It remained muted when India did the same.

It also tolerated India’s policy on the Russo-Ukraine War, even as it continued to press many countries around the world, including Pakistan, to put their eggs in the US basket. Recently, when Canada alleged India’s hand in the assassination of a Canadian national on Canadian soil, the US and its allies allowed the entire issue to slide, despite Ottawa being a treaty ally and a member of the Five Eyes.

Pakistan, on the other hand, has been losing its sheen steadily because of continued political instability and an economy on the brink of insolvency. With the war in Afghanistan having wound down, the little leverage Pakistan had with the US is also gone. This has been compounded by another Catch-22: distance from the US over the years has meant increasing closeness to China, which has resulted in even more distance from the US.

Islamabad’s responses, therefore, have to be seen not just in military-technical and operational terms, but also in the broader external and internal contexts, where its security threat perceptions have only increased.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Israel’s murderous bombing of Gaza show, once again, that history is the logic of might. Weakness invites aggression. For all the rhetoric about cooperation, multilateralism and international law, we are now in a state of global disorder, with competing blocs. With the old order coming under great strain, regional conflicts erupting into hot wars is both possible and increasingly probable.

It is in this environment that Pakistan has to make its choices to enhance its security.

The writer is a journalist interested in security and foreign policies. X: @ejazhaider

Published in Dawn, EOS, November 5th, 2023