Maulana Fazlur Rehman expected the 2024 elections to significantly enhance the fortunes of his political party, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam–Fazl (JUI-F). With the Maulana’s main rival in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), splintered into three factions, stripped of its election symbol, its influential members having defected and forced to head into the elections without a coherent campaign, the consensus among most analysts was that the Maulana would emerge as the primary beneficiary of these circumstances in the province.

However, to his great disappointment, the results showed the exact opposite. The elections turned out to be a debacle for the Maulana of Maulanas. Both he and his close relatives were defeated in their constituencies in KP, and the party could not improve on its performance in the 2018 elections, significantly diminishing JUI-F’s political influence.

Adding insult to injury, his former allies from previous coalition governments, along with the establishment, sidelined him during the crucial post-election phase of the power-sharing process. As things currently stand, the JUI-F chief has rejected the election results and announced that he will sit in the opposition in the National Assembly.

Now, the frustrated Maulana has suggested that he might consider aligning with his long-standing adversary, the PTI. In a statement that supported the PTI narrative, he accused top military leaders, including former army chief Gen (retd) Qamar Javed Bajwa, of orchestrating the downfall of the Imran Khan-led PTI government in April 2022. 

Shunted out by the voters and out of favour with his erstwhile benefactors, JUI-F chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman is fighting for his political survival. In his desperation, he is even considering an alliance with a sworn political nemesis, who mocked and humiliated him publicly with nicknames. What is the veteran politician playing at?

This proposition is something that neither the nascent coalition government at the centre nor the establishment can afford to disregard. Despite efforts to undermine the PTI, the party has risen as the most significant political force in the elections and it is set to challenge the new government, both in the parliament and through public demonstrations.

Should Maulana Fazl forge an alliance with the PTI, it could pose a significant dilemma for the government. The Maulana’s supporters are not as easily ‘managed’ as PTI activists. State actions against clerics, preachers and seminary students could provoke a severe backlash and the Maulana is fully aware of this dynamic.

Why is the wily Maulana so angry? What does his anger mean for Pakistan’s political landscape? How risky is his gamble to align himself with his former adversaries? And what lies ahead for him and his party?

THE MAULANA’S STAKES

One has to assess the extent of Maulana Fazl’s setbacks to understand the paradox he faces. So far, the Maulana’s most notable achievement has been maintaining his party’s relevance in an environment where other religious parties have seen their political and electoral influence wane.

A key to the Maulana’s success is his foundation in the expansive network of Deobandi madrassas and the devout Deobandi section of Pakistan’s population, who generally have less formal education compared to the followers of parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI).

While the JI support base shifted towards mainstream parties, JUI-F’s supporters remained relatively resistant to their appeals until recently. Maulana’s voter base is also geographically concentrated, providing him an edge in Pakistan’s first-past-the-post electoral system.

Even more importantly, Maulana Fazl’s approach to politics has been pragmatic. He steers his party not solely on ideological grounds but also through patronage politics, keeping close ties with the political elite.

From 2002 to 2018, Pakistan witnessed a succession of hybrid civil-military governments, including those led by the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). A constant presence through these shifting administrations was Maulana Fazl.

The Maulana has often been criticised for his unyielding pursuit of power and his seeming indifference to the ideological stance of whichever party happens to be in power. But it was precisely this that helped the Maulana cleverly navigate the diminishing influence of religious politics in Pakistan as a survival strategy.

The Maulana’s favourable circumstances began to change with the emergence of the PTI. In 2018, after a long time, the Maulana was not part of a coalition government — at the centre or in KP. Not only this, Imran Khan singled him out for public humiliation, calling him ‘Diesel’ and encouraging his supporters to mock him. In Imran Khan’s eyes, the Maulana — alongside Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif — symbolised the decadent politics of Pakistan that needed to be replaced.

RIDING TURBULENT WATERS

Since the 1980s, overtly religious politics in Pakistan has been on the decline. The Barelvi Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) and the pan-Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) have suffered the most. The JI saw its stronghold in Karachi taken over by the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (which would morph into the Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan), and later lost its Punjab voter base to the PML-N. The once-important JUP has virtually disappeared from the political landscape.

During the 1990s, the religious vote shifted away from religious parties towards the PML-N, boosting the latter’s voter base while reducing the influence of religious groups. In 1988, the JI joined the Nawaz Sharif-led Pakistan Muslim League in an electoral alliance, facilitated by intelligence agencies, with the goal to stop a resurgent Benazir Bhutto. When JI walked out of the alliance — called the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) — its voters decided to stay put with Nawaz Sharif.

Tahir Mehdi, an expert on elections, has made an interesting observation regarding the 1993 elections. “The six million votes that had purportedly been deposited by the ‘establishment’ in the IJI’s account in 1988 were moved to Nawaz Sharif’s account, while his politics earned him an interest of two million additional votes.” The JI, however, went bankrupt.

Despite this trend, the Maulana successfully shielded his party from decline. In the past four decades, under Maulana’s leadership, the JUI-F has managed to outperform other religious political parties. Differing from the JI’s leadership, a youthful Maulana vigorously opposed Gen Zia’s regime — an opposition that landed him in prison

The JI’s close ties with the establishment, forged through its participation in the Afghan and Kashmir jihad, persisted into the 1990s. Throughout that decade, the JI leveraged its establishment connections and adopted populist strategies to engage voters, yet failed to translate this into electoral success.

As Zia had changed the game of politics in Pakistan through his crony politicians, mainstream parties focused on the politics of patronage. Maulana Fazl was shrewd enough to recognise that the path to maintaining relevance for his party lay in prioritising patronage over ideology, ensuring his party’s continued influence and comfort by staying in power.

The era of Pervez Musharraf briefly boosted the fortunes of religious parties between 2002 and 2008. The Maulana was instrumental in forming a coalition of religious parties, which established the first government of religious parties in the erstwhile North West Frontier Province (renamed KP in 2010) under the banner of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) in 2002.

After the MMA disbanded in 2008, the JI sat out the elections while the Maulana secured enough support to ally with the PPP government. By the 2013 elections, the PTI emerged as a formidable challenge to religious parties in KP, appealing to a portion of the JUI-F’s base.

The 2018 elections were particularly perilous for established religious parties, facing not only the PTI’s challenge, but also the rise of new religious movements, such as the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) led by Khadim Rizvi and the Allah-o-Akbar Tehreek (AAT) led by Hafiz Saeed.

It was more out of fear than opportunity that the religious parties banded together again in 2018. Predictions foretold a significant defeat for the MMA — which indeed suffered a major loss. Adding to the blow, its leaders, including Maulana Fazl and Sirajul Haq of the JI, lost their seats.

The TLP, under Khadim Hussain Rizvi, garnered 2.2 million votes, ranking as the fifth-largest party based on vote count nationwide. Together, the TLP and the AAT secured over 2.3 million votes, a significant portion of the total 5.2 million votes earned by all religious parties.

PRAGMATIC RELIGIOSITY

The Maulana secures his base’s loyalty by showcasing a commitment to religious ideology and advocating for Sharia law through parliamentary and democratic means. For example, while steadfastly supporting democracy and allied with PPP, he also referred to Mumtaz Qadri as a shaheed [martyr] after he was hanged for murdering PPP’s Punjab Governor Salman Taseer in 2011.

Earlier, in July 2005, the MMA, led by JUI-F, had passed the Hasba Bill, which aimed to create an Afghan Taliban-like department of vice and virtue, complete with an enforcement mechanism, and included measures such as the removal of mannequins from stores and the defacing of billboards featuring images of female models. However, in September of the same year, a nine-member bench of the Supreme Court struck down the bill, declaring it unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Maulana Fazl positions himself as the heir to the pre-Partition Indian Deobandi movement in Pakistan. For instance, in 2017, JUI-F commemorated the centenary of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind, attracting delegations from 30 countries, underscoring the party’s historic significance and international appeal. The event in Nowshera in KP was attended by high-profile religious figures, including the Imam-i-Kaaba and Saudi Arabia’s religious affairs minister, highlighting the transnational recognition of the party.

On the other hand, similar to other major catch-all political parties, he has established a broad network of support, based on patronage within his constituencies and among politically active Deobandi clerics.

Since the restoration of democracy in 1988, the Maulana has consistently sought to be part of coalition governments, aiming to secure benefits and patronage for his supporters. The 2002 elections, under Gen Musharraf, marked a peak for the Maulana. As a leading figure in the MMA, an alliance of religious parties, he secured the position of chief minister for his party in KP (then NWFP) and became the Leader of the Opposition in Pakistan’s National Assembly (NA).

CHANGE OF FORTUNES

The Maulana’s favourable circumstances began to change with the emergence of the PTI. On one side, the PTI drew supporters from sub-nationalist parties like the MQM and the Awami National Party (ANP) while, on the other, it appealed to the educated demographics within the JI and JUI-F in the KP region.

In 2013, Maulana Fazl tried to convince Nawaz Sharif to form a coalition government in KP. Nawaz Sharif, on the other hand, wanted to honour the Charter of Democracy, which promised giving a chance to a party with the largest share of votes to form a government. The PTI was given a chance to form the government in KP, even though the party was not a signatory to the charter. It was an act of graciousness the PML-N now considers a mistake, because it allowed the PTI to strengthen itself in KP.

In 2018, after a long time, the Maulana was not part of a coalition government — at the centre or in KP. Not only this, Imran Khan singled him out for public humiliation, calling him ‘Diesel’ and encouraging his supporters to mock him similarly, in reference to an accusation that the Maulana had allegedly benefitted financially by receiving fuel permits during the PPP government in the 1990s.

In Imran Khan’s eyes, the Maulana — alongside Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif — symbolised the decadent politics of Pakistan that needed to be replaced.

The JUI-F as a whole also experienced a significant setback in KP at the hands of the PTI in the 2018 elections. Alongside other political parties, the Maulana cried foul over alleged rigging in elections.

In October 2019, Maulana Fazl initiated his ‘Azadi [Freedom] March’ to protest against electoral rigging and to pressure the PTI out of power. At this juncture, other major political entities were subdued, their voices stifled in mainstream media, too intimidated by the establishment’s influence to engage fully in protests.

The Maulana’s sit-in lasted two weeks but managed to exert significant pressure on the government. It is acknowledged for its role in facilitating the departure of PML-N’s ailing leader, Nawaz Sharif, from the country. Though the two major parties eschewed active involvement, their support lent credibility to the Maulana’s allegations of election rigging and his calls for the government’s resignation.

TIP OF THE SPEAR

Initially, the Maulana’s political collaborators needed him to be the ‘bad cop’, to show what ‘good boys’ could do but were good enough to control the temptation. The Maulana, on the other hand, used dharnas to consolidate his position as a pre-eminent opposition politician. Thanks to his defiance, the Maulana became the undisputed leader of the resurgent opposition. He had inflicted the first cut on the government at a time when the opposition was shy of hurling a stone in the direction of Bani Gala.

This collaboration reached its peak with the formation of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) in September 2020 in Islamabad, with the Maulana elected as the leader of the alliance. The PDM issued 26 demands, which included the resignation of Prime Minister Imran Khan, the cessation of undemocratic forces interfering in politics, and the call for free and fair re-elections, after the implementation of electoral reforms.

Both the PML-N and the JUI-F wanted to resign from the assemblies, while the PPP resisted such a move. In April 2021, the PPP departed from the alliance after receiving a “show cause” notice from the PDM for its rejection of the mass resignation strategy.

Nevertheless, the PPP later re-aligned with the PDM parties to support a no-confidence motion against Imran Khan. This no-confidence motion was successfully passed in Pakistan’s parliament on April 10, 2022, marking a significant moment, as Khan became the first prime minister in Pakistan’s history to be ousted from office through such a vote.

Under the new regime, the Maulana gained significant influence over the KP government when his close relative, Haji Ghulam Ali, was appointed as the governor in November 2022. With the province under the nominal leadership of an ailing former bureaucrat as the caretaker chief minister, Haji Ghulam Ali effectively wielded authority for the duration of the caretaker government’s term. This extended period of interim governance allowed the Maulana to exert control over KP through his proxy.

Maulana Fazl seized this opportunity to intensify the distribution of patronage, utilising state resources to his advantage. Ghulam Ali, exceeding his official remit, used his position to advance projects and make appointments that benefitted the Maulana’s allies and supporters.

This strategic manoeuvring was aimed at bolstering Maulana’s position in anticipation of the KP elections, where he was expected to make significant gains and possibly lead the government. During this time, governance in the province deteriorated, accompanied by widespread allegations of corruption and appointments lacking merit.

TRANSITIONAL PAINS

The Maulana’s defeat by the electorate in these recent elections signals a shift in the political landscape. Like other mainstream parties, Maulana has not adapted to the evolving political dynamics. The traditional politics of religious and patronage-based parties are facing challenges. Notably, many mainstream parties are experiencing dynastic transitions at a time when the youth are increasingly disenchanted with political dynasties.

The Maulana, along with his entire family, participated in the elections, with his two brothers and two sons in the running for the seats in the NA and the provincial legislature. Additionally, he nominated two women from his family for the reserved seats. Despite these efforts, none of his relatives secured a seat, although the Maulana himself managed to win a seat from Balochistan. The Awami National Party (ANP), another major party in KP undergoing a dynastic transition, has encountered a similar dilemma.

It will be unfair not to count the challenges the JUI-F faced due to attacks from terrorists. The JUI-F became a target for terrorists during the election campaign, with its rallies increasingly attacked in Pakistan in recent years. The most devastating attack occurred on July 31, 2023, killing at least 54 people. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) claimed responsibility for this tragic event. Some attacks were suspected to be orchestrated by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

During a hectic period of election campaigning, the Maulana visited Afghanistan, aiming to persuade the Afghan Taliban to rein in the banned TTP and prevent its use of Afghan territory for anti-Pakistan activities. He was officially received and met the Islamic Emirate’s top leadership. On the very day the Maulana was meeting with the Afghan prime minister, Mullah Hasan Akhund, the TTP launched a deadly assault on police officers guarding polio vaccinators in Bajaur, resulting in the death of at least six police personnel.

Maulana’s initiative failed to bear fruit. While it might have appealed to the ultraconservative part of the electorate who advocate for open borders with Afghanistan, it failed to convince the mainstream voter in KP to vote for the Maulana. It also failed to impress the establishment, which has vowed to halt terrorism emanating from Afghan territory.

PPP leader Faisal Karim Kundi, who competed against the Maulana and also lost to a PTI candidate, labelled Fazl a “spent cartridge” in politics and reminded him about the times when Imran Khan would openly criticise him. In reality, traditional parties are experiencing a downturn, and their waning influence is paving the way for new entrants.

WHAT IS THE MAULANA’S END GAME?

Just as the PPP’s decline in Punjab cleared the path for PTI’s rise, the diminishing presence of mainstream religious parties has led to the emergence of extremist groups like the TLP. In Punjab, the TLP has occupied the space once held by other religious factions.

The decline in Deobandi politics is attributed to both internal and external factors. Globally, a new form of religious politics has emerged, one that leans on identity over scholarly religious arguments. Today, religious sentiment outweighs direct religious political engagement. In this context, Imran Khan has arguably outperformed traditional religious leaders.

The de-intellectualisation of the religious parties can also be counted as a leading factor. For example, since Maulana Maududi, there has been a lack of comparable intellectual leadership in the JI. This has resulted in a diminished ideological appeal to the religiously inclined middle class. The party has struggled to expand its ideological foundations and remain politically relevant within the evolving political landscape.

The longstanding rapport between secular ruling elites and Deobandi scholars, which persisted for nearly two centuries, is now challenged by the emergence of new religious parties, introducing fresh social dynamics into politics. The TLP’s appeal to the religiously inclined lower middle class, disengaged from PTI’s political activism and disillusioned with conventional patronage politics, mirrors Imran Khan’s mobilisation of the educated middle class by voicing their grievances.

Despite their lack of widespread popular support, the ulema [religious scholars] have established a strong alliance with the country’s secular ruling elite. This partnership supports the ruling elite by validating their authority, fostering a national identity rooted in religion, and mobilising religiously motivated young men for various political and foreign policy projects. Moreover, the ruling elite indulges these religious factions, driven by fear and, in the case of politicians, the pursuit of electoral votes.

This dynamic has led to an unprecedented amalgamation of religion and the modern nation-state, a blend that has had disastrous consequences. Although the ulema aimed to dominate the state apparatus — as seen in Iran — they have instead settled into a profitable compromise with the state, akin to the situation in Saudi Arabia.

As JUI’s electoral prospects diminish, will the Maulana revert to his base and take more extremist and populist positions in future or will he keep trying his luck through mainstream politics?

The Maulana’s display of anger could be a strategic manoeuvre designed to regain a prominent position on the political stage once more and claim a better share in the new set-up. Both the Maulana and the establishment need each other and the system cannot afford to alienate him altogether.

Currently, it seems likely that the Maulana will be open to genuine efforts at reconciliation from both the establishment and the new government. Though he did not get the kind of “support” he wanted during elections, and he may not get the share in government that he aspires to, he may yet be mollified if offered a share he can be content with.

The PTI remains the Maulana’s major political challenge and he cannot fight it alone.

The writer has a degree in social anthropology from the University of London and works in the field of social development. X: @zaighamkhan

Header image: A PTI delegation visited JUI-F chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman at his residence last week as jockeying for position and power continues in Pakistan’s turbulent landscape|Tanveer Shahzad / White Star

Published in Dawn, EOS, February 25th, 2024