SMOKERS’ CORNER: THE PLAGUE OF POLARISATION
Societies in multiple countries are suffering from one of the most serious illnesses that can badly damage democracy. That illness is polarisation.
One of the outcomes of this illness is populism. As a divisive style of politics, it feeds and thrives on polarisation. Populists pick a side and, in a bid to become the side’s champions, they begin to demonise the opposing side in such a manner that there is no room left for a meaningful dialogue between the two, let alone any chance of reconciliation.
And here’s an ironic fact: although polarisation is now seen as one of the most destructive occurrences in developed as well as developing democracies, there was a time when many political scholars believed that societies weren’t polarised enough. This was mostly during the Cold War. During this period, polarisation was understood as a symptom of diversity that needed to be encouraged to challenge the political and cultural homogenisation of societies.
This, of course, was a naive and romanticised comprehension of polarisation. The truth is, there was enough polarisation even during the period when some scholars were yearning for it. But mainstream political parties often managed to absorb it and then mitigate it through various mediating mechanisms. Interestingly, major parties were able to do this because they held vastly different views on various issues, but they agreed to work within a mutually agreed paradigm.
Polarisation, rather than being a healthy challenge to political and cultural homogenisation, now only fuels anger and extremism between opposing groups. But can it be mitigated by regulating mainstream and social media?
But, from the 1980s onwards, ideological differences between mainstream parties began to erode. They became different only in name. The mainstream parties, by becoming more or less similar, lost their ability to absorb, neutralise and resolve polarisation. Therefore, certain sections of society were left feeling alienated and unattended.
Polarisation intensified. Populists jumped in to pick sides that were now seething with anger. The anger was vented through rhetoric and actions that were once considered offensive, reactionary and dangerous. Mainstream parties still operating within the old paradigm became disoriented. They held on to the belief that the paradigm would hold, because the angry commotion taking place outside the paradigm was bound to burn out. They believed the majority of the people were still invested in mutually beneficial stability.
But the offensive and reactionary rhetoric and actions became normalised. Social media played an active role in this. In a November 2021 essay for The Guardian titled ‘Are We Really So Polarised?’, psychologists Dominic Packer and Jay Van Bavel wrote, “Divisiveness plays well on social media, where extreme voices are amplified. Moral outrage is particularly likely to go viral.”
Much of the exchange between opposing sides is now happening on social media. And it isn’t pretty. In the old paradigm, opponents were willing to debate their differences in person and then come to an agreement through equally shared compromises, gains and losses.
This is still true among parties existing in the old paradigm. But their populist challengers refuse to enter this paradigm, fearing they will lose their appeal, based as it is on demagogic rhetoric and cult of personality. This is why, for example, the former Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan continues to refuse to talk to his mainstream opponents.
Unmitigated polarisation is vital for the existence of populists. They understand exactly how mainstream and social media intensifies it. Elon Musk, the owner of the social media platform X (formerly Twitter), is himself a polarising personality. In a recent post, he congratulated the populist Indian prime minister Narendra Modi for being “the most followed political leader [on X].” For X, populists are good for business.
Allowing odious populist rhetoric on social media platforms is often justified by their owners as “free speech.” Musk often does this. But this free speech suddenly vanishes when it is in opposition to what Musk believes in. For example, X accounts that are vocal in condemning Israeli atrocities in Palestine have been suspended or quietly sidelined.
There is now enough evidence to prove that those who term demagogic speech as free speech are simply using this democratic trait to justify spreading malice and disinformation. The irony is, most folks who do this detest democracy as a whole and would want their favourite populist to rule as an unchallenged dictator.
Packer and Van Bavel speak of two kinds of polarisation: “affective polarisation” and “false polarisation.” Affective polarisation is identity-driven — ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Packer and Van Bavel distinguish this from “ideological polarisation”, because groups with different ideological dispositions are likely to agree on certain important policy matters. For example, in the UK, people on the right, centre and left all agree on improving the National Health Service (NHS).
False polarisation is when two sides develop exaggerated perceptions about each other’s evilness. A 2020 study by social psychologists A.E Wilson, Victoria Parker and M. Feinberg demonstrates that affective polarisation is often fuelled by false polarisation when, in fact, there are likely to be only thin differences between the ‘us’ and the ‘them’.
Populists, partisan media and social media dynamics contribute in falsely thickening the differences through the proliferation of misperceptions. Populists, for example, use conventional and social media to accuse their opponents of committing economic, political and social transgressions that are either exaggerated or even non-existent. Their opponents retaliate by paying the accusers in the same coin, thus perpetuating and hardening affective polarisation.
So what’s the solution? The old paradigm — in which mainstream parties brought polarised positions to the table and resolved them through dialogue to create a mutually agreed middle-path to tread on — seems to have been shattered. Non-populist political players and states are now trying to mitigate false polarisation through regulating mainstream and social media.
But whereas this ploy is easier to apply in authoritarian set-ups, such as those in China, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, it has been facing severe criticism in developed and developing democracies. The ploy is lambasted for being an anti-democratic act.
Those who support it claim that sometimes such means are required to safeguard democracy from being torn asunder by polarisation. They are also of the view that, if this kind of regulation can control misinformation and the demagogic rhetoric that is creating affective polarisation, people will become more aware of the dangers of populism, instead of falling for it due to its exaggerations and simplistic, binary worldview.
An experiment of this nature has been launched in Pakistan. The jury is already out to weigh this experiment’s outcomes, even though it is still too early to draw any substantive conclusions.
Published in Dawn, EOS, July 28th, 2024