THE challenges that China poses to America exceed those witnessed during the Cold War, according to US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell. US policies reflecting this perception have been a source of much upheaval in US-China ties. But the latest developments raise hopes that relations may finally be stabilising.

The visit to China by Jake Sullivan, the US national security adviser, that had capped months of his unpublicised talks with Wangi Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, and the exchange of cabinet-level officials, besides two meetings between presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, reportedly resulted in clarity on some fundamental issues. The US-China competition is intense, structural, and expansive, covering the economic, security and technology fields, but the two countries seem to have reached a consensus that they must manage it responsibly.

Will the US still tell countries to choose between Beijing and Washington? US diplomacy “is not about forcing countries to choose”, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in 2022, “It’s about giving them a choice.” The position has been confirmed by the US ambassador to China Nicholas Burns. Speaking to the Foreign Policy magazine after Sullivan’s visit to China in late August, he said the US is not asking countries to choose. “The world does not work like this anymore,” he added. Obviously, the US has learnt its lesson after the failure of its debt-trap rhetoric and being told by country after country that forcing a choice on them would not work.

While the US was busy in this futile campaign and in building military alliances against a hypothetical military threat from China, Beijing was hard at work expanding its economic footprint globally. By the time the US woke up, it was no longer possible to force a choice on anyone. Most countries, especially in Asia, where the US-China competition would have been fierce, had made their choice: they would have strong economic ties with China but look to the US as a security provider, given their own issues with Beijing. China has an edge in geo-economics, America in geopolitics and military power.

Most countries, especially in Asia, have made their choice.

Each year, the Yusof Ishak Institute of the National University of Singapore polls opinion leaders from Asean countries. In this year’s poll, the majority of respondents, for the first time, picked China over the US when asked who Asean should align with if forced to choose. The US is seen as a distant and unreliable power.

In courting the Global South, the US has obviously fallen behind the curve. It has belatedly set up the Asia Pacific Economic Forum, which has so far shown little progress. Its Build Back Better World initiative to fund infrastructure projects would be largely led by the private sector and may not be competitive against China. Yet this initiative and the APEF give countries another option.

The globalised, integrated and interdependent post-Cold War world offers great possibilities for prosperity, allowing countries to rise economically and militarily following the devolution of global power once monopolised by two superpowers. The US-China rivalry now gives them space to de-risk overdependence on either of them. Their ambitions find common purpose with both China and America. It is an ideal situation, especially for the middle powers, to hedge against any possible threat from China yet concert with Beijing through BRICS and the SCO against US hegemony. The alliance system has become polygamous as countries multi-align and multi-network.

Pakistan’s fear of being pressured to choose between China and the US is overblown. US interests — both direct and indirect — in Pakistan would be limited but sustainable. The US is interested in Pakistan’s stability as an un­­stable Pakistan would foster militancy, en­­danger its nuclear assets, and raise the prospect of an India-Pakistan conflict. China’s economic ties with Pakistan may be helpful in so far as they contribute to Pakistan’s stability. Washington is also interested in Pakistan due to Afghanistan and counterterrorism.

Regarding indirect interests, America does not want Pakistan to completely fall in the Chinese orbit as this might lead to such cooperation with China, like militarisation of Gwadar, that would undermine the Indo-Pacific strategy. For the same reason, the US would not want Pakistan to upset the strategic balance with India.

As for Pakistan’s interests, its strategic ties with China remain vital to them but if Pakistan also had good relations with the US, both Washington and Beijing would have an incentive to keep the ties strong. But for that Pakistan needs to gain internal strength and stability to enhance its appeal to them. A weak Pakistan will have no freedom of choice.

The writer, a former ambassador, is adjunct professor Georgetown University and Visiting Senior Research Fellow National University of Singapore.

Published in Dawn, October 12th, 2024