THE triumph of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led resistance in Syria has further disturbed the geopolitical equilibrium in the Middle East and beyond. For Pakistan, this development should mean not only modifications in its diplomatic priorities but also careful evaluation of the country’s internal and regional security dynamics.

Pakistani fighters were not only involved in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, they were also inspired by various Islamist militant movements, potentially influencing the militant landscape in the country and complicating the security challenge.

The HTS attempts to project a more moderate image to gain acceptance with its neighbours and international actors, including the US. In a recent interview with the BBC, its de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, stated that Syria is exhausted by war and does not pose a threat to its neighbours or the West. However, a significant challenge for HTS remains managing internal and external jihadists.

Since 2017, HTS has effectively managed its foreign fighter allies. Aware of the challenges posed by foreign fighters, the organisation adopted a strategy of controlling both foreign and local fighters. It crushed certain factions, both local and foreign, while co-opting others, integrating them into its own structures, and renaming their units to obscure their foreign origins.

One cannot afford to disregard the implications of the events in Syria for Pakistan.

Nevertheless, Syria remains home to a diverse range of Islamist and jihadist factions, many of which played key roles in the HTS’ recent offensives. These factions — in case they become dissatisfied with the group’s plan for Syria — may encourage foreign fighters to align with them. But as of now these are assumptions, and the coming weeks will expose the direction of the situation.

One cannot afford to disregard the implications for Pakistan, whose own militant landscape is a complex one and prone to external influences. Changes in militant dynamics and actors from other regions often directly impact Pakistan, and in many instances, these developments reshape the character of militant movements in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. For example, when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) emerged, it caused fissures within the ranks of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, leading to the rise of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and the formation of Jamaatul Ahrar, once a powerful breakaway faction of the TTP. In the same way, the Nusra Front’s formation triggered debates within Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in Afghanistan, prompting calls for a shift in strategy to make their movements more inclusive and strengthen their political fronts.

The Afghan Taliban regime, along with close ally TTP, has welcomed the events in Syria and congratulated the HTS. However, their rival, the Islamic State, has issued a warning to the HTS. All this could have significant repercussions for us in Pakistan. The presence of Pakistani Shia fighters further complicates the picture, painting a worrisome scenario for the country’s internal security and regional stability.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Al Quds Force-backed Pakistani Shia militant group Zainebiyoun, which was initially formed to protect the Assad regime, still maintain a presence in Syria. If Iran no longer finds them useful in Syria or elsewhere in the Middle East, these fighters may return to Pakistan, with a sense of defeat. Zainebiyoun already has established roots in Pakistan, particularly in the sectarian conflict-prone region of Kurram. Influenced by developments in the Middle East, this group could absorb returning fighters and exploit existing sectarian tensions in the region and across the country.

It is notable that the Islamic State, which was decimated by a coalition of state and non-state actors, including the Nusra Front, has been fiercely critical of HTS. The irony lies in the fact that HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani originally split from ISIS nearly a decade ago. Now it accuses HTS of betraying the cause of jihad and collaborating with the enemies of Muslims. Indeed, the ISKP will adopt a similar approach, using this narrative to target HTS’ so-called ally, the Taliban.

The Taliban, TTP, and Al Qaeda share strong bonds, which compel them to support HTS, despite their divergent theological differences and contrasting worldviews. A shared resistance against the Islamic State and its offshoot, ISKP, remains a common factor uniting them. However, while ISKP and Iran-backed Shia proxies, including the Zainebiyoun, share a common enemy, the likelihood of them allying is minimal due to their history of hostility and conflict.

Even if no formal alliance emerges, any violent campaign initiated by the Zainebiyoun against the Taliban or TTP — particularly if the Zainebiyoun clash with Sunni tribes in conflict-ridden Kurram — could significantly complicate border dynamics between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such developments may further escalate tensions and deepen mistrust between the two states.

Previously, the Taliban and TTP sent fighters to support the anti-Assad resistance. In 2014, the TTP announced the deployment of 120 fighters to join anti-Assad forces in Syria. No doubt, Al Qaeda was the primary actor motivating these deployments. However, HTS has since successfully managed foreign fighters, integrating them into its structures.

An important factor that could influence the Taliban regime is the state structure and system that the HTS-led coalition may introduce in Syria. On the surface, HTS appears more moderate and accommodating towards the West. It also seems to be aware of Syria’s varied social, religious, and political landscape, which suggests it may establish a different system compared to the Taliban model in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s governing system is transitional, deeply conservative, and non-negotiable; it restricts itself to a rigid ideological framework.

After Iran and Afghanistan, Syria is the third Muslim country to come under the control of Islamist forces. However, these Islamist groups differ significantly in their sectarian, political, and ideological priorities. How they will interact with each other and the broader Muslim world remains to be seen. So far, the Taliban have presented a governance model that is widely seen as incompatible with and unacceptable to most Muslim societies.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, December 22nd, 2024