THE election campaign has ended, at least officially, with which the final countdown to the Feb 18 polls has begun. So even if the boycott campaign by the likes of Imran Khan and Qazi Hussain Ahmed had not been without reason, as things stand today these elections are already being described by many as one of the most critical exercises in the country’s highly chequered political history.

The election is critical because its outcome is not just going to give Pakistan a new set of national and provincial assemblies, the results may in fact become a catalyst to redefine the very fate of this nation. Quite understandably, therefore, even when most politicians as well as the electorate are devoting their energies to polling day activities, those who really matter in Islamabad and beyond have been burning the proverbial midnight oil debating the various predictable – and not so predictable – scenarios on the ‘day after’ and their likely consequences.

Such are the stakes in these elections that they are already giving many people at the presidency, the diplomatic enclave (read: the American Embassy) and the ISI, sleepless nights. The main question being asked, and rightly so, is whether this election could essentially turn out to be a referendum about President Musharraf.

There are other, equally important, questions weighing on the minds of many. It’s being asked whether the results would be credible enough to satisfy most political parties, and international observers, in terms of the outcome. Are the results going to throw up a more stable government, which is capable of meeting all the major challenges faced by the country, particularly issues such as the restoration of the rule of law, bringing the economy back on track, and more importantly, building a consensus to deal with the ongoing Islamic insurgency in the country’s tribal regions?

The situation is so complex that the more one thinks about the issues, the more confused one gets. The reason is that the kind of mess the country is in at the moment requires some radical solutions. The most immediate of these is whether to legitimise or reject the actions taken by President Musharraf in his capacity as the chief of the army, particularly those accompanying the imposition of emergency rule on November 3, 2007. Linked with this is the fate of the president, the deposed judges, and perhaps also the new parliament.

In his last two public appearances, the president has tried to put up a brave front but some of those close to him admit that he is certainly a disturbed man. This is quite understandable. The 2008 elections may well be all about his own fate.

In the past few days, the president has publicly criticised various opinion polls and pollsters for their faulty assessments. But sources close to him say that almost every day, he is being briefed about various political trends in the country, both by his favourite PML-Q and those managing the political wing of the ISI. Some say that at this stage, he is more inclined towards believing the PML-Q’s prime ministerial aspirant, Chaudhry Pervez Elahi’s highly optimistic – if not exaggerated – scenario, as compared to the one being presented by all other sources, including the intelligence services. But faulty assessments are not just confined to one political group or the other. The sort of events that preceded the present elections deprived most people of the crucial time to carry out an in-depth pre-poll assessment. For instance, it is not clear whether the lacklustre campaign that we have witnessed in the last couple of weeks would translate to a very low turn-out, or whether the election broadcasts of nearly two dozen television channels have achieved enough mobilisation to bring out a large number of voters on Feb 18. However, one thing is clear: a low turn-out may go in favour of the PML-Q and its allies.

Then, it is not clear whether the sympathy wave as a result of Benazir Bhutto’s murder is as strong in the Punjab as it is in Sindh. Perhaps not! But is it going to be a factor on the day of the elections at all? No one knows.

Similarly, no one is in a position to assess the real impact of Nawaz Sharif’s return. He has certainly drawn large crowds wherever he has gone during his campaign, but the party was neither prepared for this election, nor able to pull its act together enough to field sufficient ‘elect-able’ candidates. Small wonder, then, that both the Sharifs were not too unhappy over the rejection of their papers: in reality, they eyed not these but the next, possibly mid-term, elections.

Another crucial fact that none of the political parties, and the heavily-funded pollsters, have been able to analyse is about the major voting trends. For instance, it is not clear if in the Punjab, where the results will determine the formation of the government, the votes will be divided on the basis of anti-Musharraf and pro-Musharraf groupings, or whether the real division will be among the ranks of the traditional Muslim League vote. If the anti-Musharraf vote is divided, the beneficiary will clearly be the PML-Q. But if the Muslim League vote splits up, there is a strong possibility that the PPP may sail through.

In the absence of any clear-cut or scientific analysis, here are some of the likely scenarios and their impact on the post-election situation.

Scenario-1

Chaudhry Pervez Elahi succeeds in his scheme of getting more than 100 of the 148 national assembly seats in the Punjab, and another 30 from the rest of the three provinces. In this case the PML-Q, along with parties and groups such as the MQM, the JUI-F and independents, certainly stands the best chance of forming the government at the centre, and of course in the Punjab. Indeed, this is an ideal situation for President Pervez Musharraf.

But as things stand today, such a scenario not only defies all logic and ground realities, it may also result is some of the worst street agitation the country has seen since the bloody riots in the aftermath of the 1977 elections.

Scenario-2

The PML-Q manages about 65 to 70 seats in the Punjab, with a slight edge over the PML-N and the PPP. Then, with a few additional seats in the other provinces, political manoeuvring, horse-trading and manipulation, it may possibly form a weak coalition government. In this sort of situation some of the forces observing and managing the exercise do not rule out the possibility of roping the PPP into the fold, provided it is given a lead role in the coalition.

This too may give President Musharraf a new lease of life in the presidency.

Scenario-3

There is a landslide for the PPP and PML-N in Sindh and the Punjab, and a sizeable victory for the two parties in the NWFP and Balochistan. The combination gets more than fifty per cent of the seats in the National Assembly, and with the support of a number of other groups, independents, and a large number of PML-Q ‘lotas’ (turncoats) manages a two-thirds majority.

This presents a nightmare scenario for President Musharraf, especially if the PML-N has the crucial number to push forward a radical agenda on the issue of the judiciary.

The situation could result in a major tussle between the parliament and the presidency, resulting in a possible paralysis of administration. Some say it may even prompt a Gen Kakar-like action.

Scenario-4

The PPP-PML (N) combine, along with smaller groups and independents, manages enough seats to form a weak government which is not in a position to pass any laws or introduce radical changes with respect to the parliament’s relations with the president or in terms of the fate of the deposed judges. This may compel the main party like the PPP to accept the concept of a grand coalition of all the large and small groups, with some kind of a compromise about the fate of the president and the judiciary.

This may bail out the president to some extent, but may not prevent the lawyers and civil society from stepping up their street pressure and bringing a much larger crowd out on the streets of Islamabad to push for the restoration of the deposed chief justice. A civilian government under the PPP may find it quite hard to prevent this kind of protest. Such a crisis may even have the potential to bring down a democratic government, resulting in fresh elections.

Then, there are several other factors that may have a direct impact on one or all of the above scenarios. They include the unpredictable voting trends in some of the remote parts of the country, including large areas of Balochistan, or the towns and districts that border the tribal region, or the FATA itself. There are already reports that the MMA (read JUI-F) is heading for a complete rout. Some say its one-time ally, the Jamaat-e-Islami, by indirectly supporting the JUI-F rivals, is trying to prove the point that without its help, Islamic parties cannot win in the NWFP.

But the immediate issue would still be centred round the fate of the president and the deposed judges, and of how an elected government would deal with the crisis.

Most analysts would say that the Feb 18 elections could mark the start of the endgame for President Musharraf. But highly informed sources have told Dawn that being conscious of the possible post-election crisis, the presidency, American and British diplomats, and intelligence agencies have directly or indirectly remained in close contact with the leaders of almost all the key political parties.

And though in the given situation President Musharraf’s position remains extremely vulnerable, some of those involved in such manoeuvring believe that unless there is a dramatic result, such as a landslide for the opposition groupings, the president may yet manage to survive — at least for now.