Advani admits he sabotaged Agra summit
The Times of India quoted Mr Advani as saying in his new book My Country, My Life that the failure of the Agra summit “was a huge PR disaster for the NDA government.”
Mr Advani said that “the Pakistan leader’s televised breakfast meeting with Indian editors, blasting India’s position on cross-border terrorism and Jammu and Kashmir ensured the collapse of the summit in acrimony and mutual blame-game.”
Consequently, the Vajpayee government was “accused of poor planning and allowing Musharraf to launch an audacious bid to ambush Vajpayee on commitments which would recognise Kashmir as the core issue between India and Pakistan with no references to cross-border terrorism or Islamabad’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the dispute under the Shimla Agreement.”
Mr Advani recalled in his book that President Musharraf in his book, In the Line of Fire, had accused the BJP hardliner of scuttling the summit. Mr Advani’s book offers a rare admission by him that President Musharraf was not entirely wrong.
From India’s point of view, two unwelcome things happened at Agra, he writes. “Firstly, the exercise of drafting a joint declaration proved highly unsatisfactory. The inconclusive draft, which (foreign minister) Jaswant Singh brought from his meeting with Pakistan’s foreign minister, Abdul Sattar, was discussed at the informal meeting of the (cabinet committee on security) that the prime minister convened in his suite on the evening of the July 15. I noticed that there was no reference to cross-border terrorism in the draft. ‘This cannot be accepted,’ I said. My view was unanimously endorsed by all present in the room.”
Similarly, Mr Advani claims credit for the genesis of the summit following a bloody standoff with Pakistan over Kargil. “The six-month-long break in combat operations was soon drawing to a close, and Atalji, in informal discussions with Jaswant Singh and me would ask us ‘Ab aage kya karna chahiye’. (What should we do now?).” I too had been thinking about the issue for quite some time. During those days, I was in close contact with a senior Pakistani diplomat... On the Pakistani side, it seemed that Gen Musharraf, who had since then assumed the tag of President from CEO, in June 2001, was keen on ending his country’s isolation.
“For that purpose, he too was keen on resuming talks with India. I said to myself that we should test the mind of this military ruler who does not carry political baggage and seems to be his own master in a country where democratically elected leaders have never exercised real power...Thus, one day in May 2001, when the Prime Minister had called Jaswant Singh and me for lunch at his residence to discuss the next course of action, I suggested to him, “Atalji, why don’t you invite the General to come to India for talks? It does not matter that your Lahore initiative failed. It was highly appreciated both at home and abroad. Similarly, your invitation to him will be welcomed as an act of statesmanship, both within India and internationally.” Jaswant Singh concurred with the suggestion and the prime minister accepted it.”
Mr Advani describes his first meeting with Gen Musharraf at the Presidential Palace in Delhi thus:
“Our initial banter was centred around the fact that both of us had studied at St Patrick’s high school in Karachi which I have mentioned earlier. After exchanging pleasantries, I said, “General, although you were born in Delhi, you are visiting your birth place for the first time in 53 years... there are lakhs of families on both sides that are not even as fortunate as we are; they have never visited their native places. Isn’t it odd that this should be the case even after the passage of more than a half-century? Shouldn’t we find an enduring solution to the issues that are keeping our two countries and two peoples apart?”
“Of course, we must,” Musharraf observed. “What are your ideas?”
“The most important thing is to build trust in each other.” He nodded in agreement, and again asked how that could be done. “Well I will give you an example. I have just come back from a fruitful visit to Turkey. I understand that you have a special liking for Turkey, having spent your formative years in that country.”
“Yes, my father was posted there. I can speak fluent Turkish.” “I had gone there to conclude an extradition treaty between India and Turkey.
Now, what great need does India have to have an extradition treaty with Turkey? If an extradition treaty is needed, it is between India and Pakistan, so that criminals committing a crime in one country and hiding in another can be sent back to face trial.”
Musharraf’s first response, not quite knowing where the conversation was headed, was: “Yes, why not? We should have an extradition treaty between our two countries.”
“Even before we conclude a formal extradition treaty, you would be making a great contribution to the peace process if you handed over Dawood Ibrahim to India, who is the prime accused in the 1993 Mumbai serial bomb blasts case and who lives in Karachi,” I continued.
Musharraf’s face suddenly turned red and unfriendly. Hardly able to conceal his discomfort, he said something that I regarded as quite offensive.
“Now, Mr Advani, that is small tactics,” he remarked. I could sense a sudden change in the atmosphere of the room, in which five Indian officials were seated on one side and five from Pakistan on the other... Musharraf, his unease palpable, replied assertively: “Mr Advani, let me tell you emphatically that Dawood Ibrahim is not in Pakistan.”
Mr Advani then gives an interesting reason for disbelieving Gen Musharraf, saying: “Several years later, one of the Pakistani officials who was present during the meeting said to me, ‘What our President said about Dawood Ibrahim on that day was a white lie.”