US, India betray nostalgia for Musharraf: report
WASHINGTON, Aug 22: Before the ink was dry on former president Pervez Musharraf’s resignation letter, Washington and New Delhi quickly lamented the end of one-stop diplomacy, notes Yale Global, a publication associated with the prestigious Yale University.
Now both New Delhi and Washington have adopted a “wait-and-see” policy, not knowing what democracy brings to Pakistan, says the publication.
Another report by the US Council on Foreign Relations quotes experts as saying that Musharraf’s exit has left a power vacuum in the political corridors of Islamabad.
“Mr Musharraf, as army chief and president, was arguably the most powerful leader in the country, but now it is unclear how much control the civilian government wields.”
The council notes that the civilian rule so far has been marked by spiralling food and fuel prices, rising militant violence, and deteriorating relations with neighbours. Critics say the government has done little but argue about Mr Musharraf’s fate and the deposed judges’ reinstatement.
Yale Global, however, warns that this “nostalgia” for Mr Musharraf “will blind the US and India to the opportunities that political change might bring.”
The report points out that Pakistan’s civil society denounced former president Musharraf’s abuse of civil liberties dislodged the president and set the tone and content -- if not a sure path to success -- for Pakistan’s parliament and parties.
Yale Global, however, warns that the weak ruling coalition may not meet the ethical or efficacy standards set by civil society. The report notes that disagreements among the major political parties centre on fundamental policy issues -- including the role of the judiciary and the constitution -- and not just positions and favour. Their public disputes are among the most transparent political discussions to which voters have been privy in a very long time.
The report notes that at least one coalition member, the Awami National Party, recognises the delicate relationships between citizen rights and border security, and came to office with plans to deal with militants sensitively and responsibly.
If this pattern can be carried over to more substantial dealings with Afghanistan and India, and if the desire for peace can lead public opinion and the army towards a more liberal stance on Kashmir, then this fragile government might provide the region an opportunity to recast its relationships, the report adds.
“For this to happen, Pakistan will finally have to recognise that cross-border belligerence, on its east and west, cannot overcome its own inequality and poor governance,” says author Paula Newberg.
“That is a hard lesson to learn, and one that will stick only if India, Afghanistan and the US take up the challenges it implies: to take a long, serious view of Pakistan’s governance and the possibilities it might one day offer the region.”
To achieve this target, the US and India will have to help Pakistan democratise Mr Musharraf’s personalised command structure and the electoral system he designed to thwart popular politics, the author argues.
They will also have to work with parliamentarians with whom they may not agree, and ensure that the government can recognise and represent its own interests, even when they may diverge from those of their allies and neighbours, the author adds.
Ms Newburg notes that the betting in Pakistan is that the coalition won’t last long enough to tackle the economy, let alone the broad problems of disaffection and militancy. “That may be. But wait and see won’t work for long: for everyone’s sake, Pakistan’s fledgling government needs help now,” says Ms Newburg who has covered Pakistan’s politics for almost three decades and is the author of “Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan.”