“QURBANI ki khalain un ke liye ... gin ka lahu Islam ke liye” (Hides of sacrificial animals for those who dedicate/shed their blood for Islam). So says a bold inscription on a big plastic bag meant for stuffing and carrying such hides.

Other messages on the bags distributed by Jamaatud Dawa volunteers during Eidul Azha included a call for donating generously not only for those affected by the earthquake or having been internally displaced, but also for the “families of the martyrs”.

So when many other charities and political groups like the MQM or Imran Khan’s Shaukat Khanum hospital, and Jamaat-i-Islami were busy competing with each other for hides in Karachi and elsewhere, the JuD was quite focused, and somewhat better organised, in its campaign in most parts of the Punjab, NWFP and Islamabad.

The hide bag, distributed by JuD volunteers mostly through the local Ahle Hadith mosque, was plastered with what can best be described as the group’s mission statement. And if this were not enough, it came with the latest edition of JuD’s fortnightly publication, explaining their activities, whatever they stand for, and the extent to which they plan to go in pursuit of what they believe is a pure Islamic system.

It’s difficult to say how much is raised through such “qurbani mohim”, or a hide collection campaign, and to what extent it provides a cover for other, not so well-known, sources of funding. But regardless of the money raised, the latest campaign proved that it was also an excellent propaganda tool.

But does that in anyway prove that JuD was also involved in terrorist activities within or outside the country, or more importantly, in the Mumbai carnage?

This was the point Dawa’s founder, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, made at a news conference in Muridke before he was put under house arrest.

“We are a recognised charity, involved in a host of social welfare activities, and if anyone has any evidence of our involvement in acts of terrorism, then they should furnish the proof,” he said.

Hafiz Saeed also acknowledged the existence of Lashkar-i-Taiba, and clearly avoided criticising its militant activities. However, his insistence was that it was only operational in Kashmir, and since 2001 had no links with JuD.

As the government delayed a formal ban on the Dawa, asking India and others to provide sufficient proof of its involvement in the Mumbai carnage, the JuD activists were given a clear message by their leadership against resisting any police action.

So over the past 72 hours all the police raids to seal the various offices of Dawa in Pakistan went off smoothly. There was also no outcry on the move to place Prof Hafiz Saeed under house arrest.

In some ways, and on a smaller scale, it was a repeat of the 2002 action when five known Islamist militant groups were banned by Gen Pervez Musharraf, including Hafiz Saeed’s Lashkar-i-Taiba. Among others, the most prominent pro-Kashmiri militant group was Jaish-i-Mohammed of Maulana Masood Azhar.

Armed militant groups are not known to surrender so meekly. So either Dawa men are not involved in militancy, or they too regard the police action as a half-hearted, cosmetic, measure.

SCEPTICISM FOLLOWS ACTION: Many seasoned analysts of the Pakistani religious militancy have their doubts more serious measures may follow: “It’s not even as serious an operation as it was in 2002,” says Amir Rana, Director of Islamabad-based Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS).

“Then the authorities arrested over two thousand militants and kept them in detention for nearly two years before many of them secured their freedom by challenging the preventive detention laws under which they were confined.”

In 2002, the only group, or one of its factions, that resisted the government’s new approach towards the Kashmir militancy was Jaish-i-Mohammed. The group was later found to have been involved in a series of assassination attempts on former president Pervez Musharraf, and other acts of terrorism like abduction and the brutal murder of journalist Daniel Pearl as well as attacks on some local Christian targets.

Once outlawed, groups like Lashkar-i-Taiba, very reluctantly, agreed to stop or slow down their cross-border activities in Kashmir. The scale of religious militancy in Indian-administered Kashmir came down, but the groups previously involved in giving the Indian army a bloody nose in the valley, remained intact.

Some analysts argue that it was not a bad strategy as time demonstrated that the Indians were only interested in restoring law and order in Kashmir, which at best was a symptom, and were never inclined to look at the causes of the conflict or in curing the disease.

The 2002 ban came when Pakistan’s hand was forced by the 9/11 events, and a series of incidents in India. But the move was fraught with contradictions. At no time the government explained why it was banning these groups, and no charges were brought against the leadership even after the groups had been outlawed.

As a result, all of them were back in action in no time, albeit with different names. Hafiz Saeed became head of Jamaatud Dawa, declaring he had severed all links with Lashkar-i-Taiba.

Maulana Masood Azhar’s Jaish-i-Moahmmed adopted another name, and so did sectarian militant groups like the Sipah-i-Sahaba and Tehrik-i-Jafria. “This is how a government living in denial does things,” one analyst had commented then.

Today Muridke operates under the banner of JuD, but is regarded by everyone as the bastion of religious militancy in the region. Masood Azhar is mostly confined to his home town of Bahawalpur, where his madressah´s influence has continued to grow. His supporters are found all over the country.Other top militant leaders like Qari Saifullah Akhtar of Harkat-i-Jihad-ul-Islami or Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil of outlawed Harkat-ul-Mujahideen continue to command respect and influence in their respect circles, and have their activists operational in many parts of the tribal areas, where they are mostly called the ‘Punjabi Taliban’.

As things stand if the government and/or the military establishment don’t know for certain that the JuD is involved in the Mumbai carnage then there is no justification for the present crackdown. And if there is evidence to implicate them, then cosmetic measures such as the ones taken in 2002 are not going to impress the international community. Indeed, the pressure may continue to mount on Pakistan to prove that the state or its military establishment was not hand-in-glove with such militants.

JUSTIFICATION: But many in Pakistan would justify this inaction or half-hearted action, at best citing Islamabad’s support for the US-led war on terror and, despite this, the growing American-Indian nexus, particularly in Afghanistan.

Washington’s apparent reluctance to prevent what they believe is the ongoing Indian involvement in trouble in parts of Pakistan is also cited.

“If the international community regards Pakistan as part of the solution in the war on terror, then it needs to concentrate on removing Pakistan’s sense of insecurity vis-a-vis India,” says author and analyst Zahid Hussain.

In order to do so, he believes, the Americans and the Europeans need to coax the two countries towards some sort of a solution of the Kashmir dispute.

But like many other seasoned analysts of militant politics, Zahid Hussain too points towards the dangers of promoting the jihadi culture. “The fear is that if not controlled such non-state actors may then start to challenge the writ of the state”, that is if they aren’t doing it already.

Those like Amir Rana of PIPS believe even more important than satisfying the international community is Pakistan’s own interest in acting against these elements. The time to regard positively such religious militants, or the protagonists of global jihad, is long over. The ‘global jihadists’ never were Pakistan’s real “assets” and can never be.

The PIPS director says there is documented proof that Hafiz Saeed and his organisation have never believed in democracy or the country’s constitution, and have constantly undermined Pakistan’s own political and justice system.

However, the move to neutralise such elements or to dismantle the entire concept of using Islamists for regional policy objectives may not be easy. It may require a lot of courage and determination, and a clear desire to project Pakistan as a more responsible state.

ZARDARI’S RESOLVE: One may disagree with the present government on many counts, but if there is one person who can take firm action against such elements, it is President Asif Zardari.

After having lost his wife, and one of the country’s best known politicians, to such an act of terrorism, there is no reason to doubt Mr Zardari’s resolve to act against such elements. The big question is can he really do it on his own?

Such reversal of policy may not be possible without the active help and support of the military establishment, particularly its premier intelligence agency, the ISI. If recent write-ups by some of Pakistan’s knowledgeable analysts are anything to go by, it’s still not clear if the government and military are on the same wavelength on the issue.

Some believe they cannot think alike on such matters. “In the current situation, the military doesn’t want to hold any non-state actors accountable for the Mumbai attacks and the Zardari government cannot do anything about it, whatever the evidence,” says a write-up in a weekly news magazine.

Till such time as the government-military thinking is aligned on this matter, the situation will continue to resemble a tinder box.