SWAT appears to be returning to normalcy after the ceasefire agreement between the government and Taliban militants.

The basis of the agreement — brokered by Sufi Mohammad, leader of the outlawed Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM) — is the acceptance by the government of the Taliban demand for Sharia law. The agreement has drawn extensive comment, including from foreign governments.

That there is disaffection in Swat is beyond question. Insurgencies do not erupt without reason. This is the second — albeit more serious — insurgency in over a decade. Ironically, the earlier one in 1994 was led by none other than Sufi Mohammad himself, but was crushed decisively by the then government — although not permanently as it appears now. The reason for the resurfacing of the insurgents can be attributed to the failure of successive regimes post-1996 to understand and address the underlying causes of the 1994 uprising.

Prima facie, the unrest in Swat appears to be a demand for Islamisation in general and for the enforcement of Sharia law in particular. However, a closer analysis indicates that militant groups are merely using the cover of religion to exploit a deeper set of public grievances. Generally, these centre on issues of economic or political deprivation. This does not appear to be the case in Swat. It is noteworthy that the nature of Taliban demands in Swat is different from that in other areas where they are operating. In Swat, the demand for the Sharia is very specific in terms of nizam-i-adl and detailed with regard to the structure and functioning of the courts. Even in the 1990s, the demands included the establishment of qazi courts.

Currently, the demands include detailed guidelines with respect to the number of cases each judge will handle, the duration of the case, penalties for parties asking for adjournments etc. Clearly, in Swat there is a serious problem with the functioning of the judiciary, which is failing to address the people`s litigation needs. An analysis is in order. This will require delving into history to understand the causes of unrest.

Swat was occupied by the Yusufzai Pathans in the 16th century. They set up a stateless society organised along clan lines. All Yusufzai clans were considered equal and had autonomy in internal affairs. There was no political leadership as a whole. As a result, moral leadership came to be vested in religious leaders.

One of the religious leaders during the early days of Yusufzai rule in Swat was Shaikh Milli who devised the system of `wesh` which came to be called Daftar-i-Shaikh Milli. This entailed rotation of land-holdings among clans and households every 10 to 20 years. There was no permanent ownership of land and the logic behind rotational land-holding was to ensure equality through a system where no clan or household was in possession of superior or inferior land for all times.

The consideration for equality was limited to the Yusufzais. Non-Yusufzai Pathans had no right to land. Society was therefore divided between the Yusufzai `haves` and the non-Yusufzai `have-nots`. Religious leaders were allotted small pieces of land, called `serai`, which were generally juxtaposed between Yusufzai estates called `daftar` in order to prevent intra-clan warfare.

Thus, religious leaders emerged as arbiters

of disputes, which provided them political stature as well. One of the 19th century religious leaders was Abdul Ghaffur, who also came to be called the `akhund` of Swat. His death in 1877 plunged Swat into anarchy for the next 40 years, till his grandson, Miangul Abdul Wadud, called an assembly of Yusufzai clan chieftains in 1917 and manoeuvred to have himself proclaimed as the `badshah` of Swat. The contours of a state were beginning to emerge. In 1926, the British government recognised the state of Swat and Miangul Abdul Wadud as the `wali` of Swat.

One of the first official acts of the wali was to abolish the wesh system of rotational land allotment and to grant permanent ownership. He took advantage of the land reform process to reward his supporters, whose land-holdings were confirmed as permanent, and to punish his opponents, who were deprived of land. He also manipulated the process to declare all disputed land as state property and, by implication, the property of the wali.

In 1969, the state of Swat was dissolved and merged with Pakistan as a district of the North West Frontier Province. Following the merger, the question of the ownership of the wali`s landed estates became a moot point. As the property of the state of Swat, the estates held by the wali should have stood transferred to the Pakistani government upon the merger of the state with Pakistan. However, the Pakistani government did not press any claims on the estates and allowed the ex-wali`sfamily to retain control. The legal status of the estates, however, remained somewhat undefined and disputed.

Under these circumstances, families who had lost their lands post-1926 pointed out the unlawful nature of the then wali`s actions and demanded restoration of their rights. The ex-wali`s family defended their ownership of the estates on the grounds that the transfers were in order. There were, thus, two claimants each to various properties. In 1972, the then pro-poor federal government introduced land reforms and provided ownership status to many of the tenants thereby introducing a third claimant. The matter was further compounded during the Zia dictatorship, when some of the former landowners forcibly evicted the tenants. However, all three claimants to the same property produced documentation to support their claims.

Several of the cases, perhaps in hundreds, landed in courts and have festered for years, even decades. On account of the absence of timely resolution, many of the cases degenerated into violence between contesting parties. The developing circumstances added more cases, including those relating to assault, even murder. These, too, have remained unresolved. The Taliban militants have cleverly exploited the situation to gain a commanding position in the district.

The government has arrived at an agreement with respect to judicial reform in Swat. This is, however, a half-measure. The land issue needs to be attended to first at the legislative level before being addressed at the judicial level. It is necessary to introduce judicious legislation in consultation with all three parties to provide a legal framework for the resolution of the land issue. Of course, the need to introduce reforms in the justice system to render it more efficient, transparent and just across the country is paramount if militant groups are to be denied opportunities to exploit local situations.