JULY is traditionally a month when things slow down in the US capital, with key figures in the administration as well as Congress taking time off to take stock of what has been achieved and what needs to be done.

But this has not been the case this year, as the administration keeps getting buffeted by bad news every day, both domestic and foreign. It is sad to see a leader who generated great hope and expectation only a year ago appear to lose his bearings. Such has been the change in his fortune that the Republicans are seriously hopeful of gaining control of at least one house of Congress and thereby creating the kind of gridlock that will prevent Barack Obama from being able to enact major legislation. Vice-President Joe Biden recently protested that he did not expect his party to suffer a “grand debacle” in the November elections!

But it is Afghanistan that has been the subject of interest during my current stay in the US capital, especially as there is growing recognition that with little hope of any meaningful improvement in the economy, it is Afghanistan that is likely to define the Obama presidency. Having accused his predecessor of neglecting this theatre and declaring it the “war of necessity”, Obama now finds himself in an engagement far more frustrating than what he had bargained for.

Admittedly, Gen McChrystal's gaffe was a rare break for the president. It allowed him to display the kind of resolute leadership that goes down well in this country. More importantly, it allowed Obama to place responsibility for the Afghan war in the hands of the only general who could sail through congressional confirmation without triggering a Republican attack on his policies.

But these are at best tourniquets on a massive haemorrhage that the Afghan war has become. Washington insiders claim that Obama is convinced that the war cannot be won and yet he cannot abandon the battlefield, for that would permit the Republicans to literally chew him up. Nor can he approve increased troop levels either, as it would drive his already disillusioned supporters into deep despair. That leaves him with a dilemma, which may explain the urgency with which the administration is seeking an exit strategy to allow him to start bringing home combat troops in a year's time and on the back of this somewhat dubious 'victory' seek re-election in 2012.

But achieving even this minimal goal will be extremely difficult and fraught with serious risks, particularly in view of the conflicting interests of the various parties with stakes in what happens to Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the effort to seek Pakistan's assistance in this venture appears to be the administration's current focus. To this end, it has begun by acknowledging that Pakistan's concerns vis-a-vis its eastern neighbour may be exaggerated but not unfounded, which has prompted it to use its influence, gently and gingerly, to urge India to resume the dialogue process with Pakistan. It has also recognised that Pakistan — thanks to its historic linkages with the Afghan Taliban — may be the only country that could play a helpful role in the process of 'reconciliation' in Afghanistan, which is being seen increasingly as the only option that just may permit the US to disengage itself militarily from Afghanistan.

This has led the administration to claim that US-Pakistan relations are better now than at any time in the past many years, as it seeks a relationship that is durable, not episodic, focusing on assisting the people rather than on propping up individuals. It also acknowledges that the Afghan war cannot be 'won' without establishing ties of trust and confidence with Pakistan, which explains efforts to address at least some of its concerns, as evident from the passage of the Kerry-Lugar Bill, such as the sale of sophisticated weapons systems and engaging in a multi-sectoral 'strategic dialogue'.

But as Secretary Hillary Clinton heads for Islamabad next week, it would be a huge mistake to ignore the many minefields that could still blow away this nascent understanding. It may sound clichéd but it is nevertheless true that a major trust deficit continues to plague the US-Pakistan relationship, reflected in the fact that a Gallup poll in Pakistan a year ago had 59 per cent of respondents seeing the US as a bigger threat than India, while a Pew poll indicated that only 16 per cent of Americans had a positive view of Pakistan. Not surprisingly the Atlantic Council, in a report last month, characterised US-Pakistan relations as “precarious”.

Admittedly, Pakistanis continue to hark back on a “history of betrayals”, claiming that US interest in them is “transactional”, fearing that they will be left to handle the mess once US troops leave Afghanistan. In support of their misgivings they point to the absence of large, effective and high-impact American assistance, and the fact that notwithstanding assurances at the highest levels, no meaningful action has been taken on such symbolic steps as the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones or market access. Nor has the US done anything to ease Pakistan's desperate energy needs, an initiative that would have had a powerful impact on public opinion in the country.

Nevertheless, close cooperation between the US and Pakistan in promoting 'reconciliation' in Afghanistan that brings peace and stability to that country is an initiative worth pursuing. Its benefits for the region — possibly the world — would be immense. But it will be an extremely difficult process, not only because of the huge challenges that it will face from domestic actors within Afghanistan but also because of the fears and concerns that it is likely to arouse in the region.

While Russia and Iran would be most unhappy with the return of the Taliban to power in Kabul, it is India that has made its opposition known in no uncertain terms, seeing this development in terms of its rivalry with Pakistan and fearing the loss of its investment and influence in Afghanistan. To India, a Taliban-dominated Kabul is a nightmare and it would do anything to avert this, as evident in the views of retired US ambassador Robert Blackwill, articulated in an article in the Politico of July 7.

Long known for his openly pro-India views, Blackwill accused Pakistan of showing “no willingness to end support for their long-term Afghan Taliban proxies, or accepting a truly independent Afghanistan”. He then acknowledges that since “the Taliban will inevitably control most of its historic stronghold in the Pashtun south”, he calls upon Washington to “ensure that north and west Afghanistan do not succumb to jihadi extremism”, even if this requires the administration to “accept a de facto partition” of Afghanistan, while focusing on defending the northern and western regions, including Kabul.

This may be a minority view, but it confirms the belief that bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan will be a long and tortuous process that will require great imagination and ingenuity, as well as vision and statesmanship on the part of the interlocutors. But failure could plunge us all in a disaster of unimaginable consequences.