THE third round of an upgraded Pak-US strategic dialogue was held in Washington on October 20-22 following sessions in March and July earlier this year. The joint statement issued at the end of the dialogue as well as public statements of the leaders of the two sides reiterated their strategic partnership, shared values and mutual interests. Such remarks however cannot cover up the irritants in the bilateral relations.

In order to appreciate the dynamics of Pak-US relations, a few factors need to be kept in view. To begin with, the bilateral ties are driven at once by mutual dependence and distrust. Washington needs Islamabad to achieve its foremost national security policy agenda “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda and its affiliates,” as outlined in the national security strategy (NSS) of the Obama administration. The Americans believe that the northwestern part of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan is the epicentre of terrorism and unless Al Qaeda safe havens located there are destroyed, the network cannot be smashed. On its part, Pakistan needs American assistance to keep the wheels of its economy moving and fight against militancy.

When a politically instable and economically vulnerable country like Pakistan is so important for the national security of a military and economic superpower like the US, the logical result is increased engagement between the two. This engagement can take various forms including the stepped up economic and security assistance, the incessant pressure to do more, the intervention in domestic affairs and if required violation of territorial sovereignty.

The Kerry-Lugar law passed in 2009 commits the US to providing annual economic assistance of $1.5 billion to Pakistan for the period 2010-2014 and possibly for another five years. During the recent Strategic Dialogue, the Americans announced to provide $2 billion security assistance to Pakistan, subject to Congress approval, for five years starting 2012. The proposed military assistance marks the renewal of the $1.5 billion aid that Pakistan received between 2005 and 2010. Islamabad also receives a hefty disbursement from the American Coalition Support Fund for the campaign against militants.

However, since the purpose of the US assistance is to shore up Pakistan's counter-terrorism capability, the aid is accompanied by mounting pressure to step up fight against the militants, especially in view of the planned withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan starting in July 2011. Washington acknowledges that the final settlement of the Afghan problem is political and is backing Kabul's negotiations with the Taliban. However, Washington is also alive to the fact that that the political outcome of the Afghan problem hinges on the military reality and that the Taliban's position has to be weakened significantly to strike a deal with them on American terms. It is in this context that the US wants Pakistan to launch an operation in North Waziristan, which according to Americans and their Nato allies is the epicenter of militancy and where the top leadership of Al Qaeda has taken refuge.

For the Americans then the economic and security assistance to Pakistan is the means and the fight against terrorism is the end. If the end is not achieved, the means are meaningless—a very simple logic indeed. And where Pakistan is unwilling or unable to act on its own, the Americans themselves step in, for instance, by drone strikes on suspected militant targets. On September 30 last, the US-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) helicopters intruded into Pakistan's territory near the border with Afghanistan and killed two soldiers. This precipitated Pakistan, the main conduit for Nato military supplies to Afghanistan, to cut off one of the two supply routes to Afghanistan and send out a clear warning that such violation of its territorial integrity would not be tolerated.

The tough stance of Pakistan prompted apologies from the Americans, who realized that they had crossed the red line. Although the position taken by Islamabad is appreciable, it is difficult to understand if the Isaf air strikes constituted a violation of Pakistan's territorial integrity, why do the routine drone attacks not deemed a violation? And if they do, as they do, why does not the Pakistan government take a similar stance on drone strikes?

The claims of a strategic partnership and mutual dependence notwithstanding, trust deficit continues to characterise the relations between Pakistan and the US. On the part of Washington, the trust deficit is on two counts: One, the suspicion that the security establishment of Pakistan is not going all-out in tracking down Al Qaeda leadership. The suspicion was renewed in a recent Obama administration report to Congress, which alleged that Pakistani troops were avoiding 'direct conflict' with Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. This allegation prompted foreign minister Qureshi to state during the Strategic Dialogue that Pakistan was committed to fighting against terrorists and that it did not draw a distinction between the good Taliban (Afghan) and bad Taliban (Pakistani).

Two, the US apprehends that Pakistan's nuclear material may reach terrorists, who may use it against Americans. The US also fears that an attack on its territory, like the failed Time Square Bombing earlier in May this year, may be planned in Pakistan. During a meeting with the Pakistan delegation on the sidelines of the Strategic Dialogue, Mr Obama warned of tough measures against Pakistan if an attack on the US soil was traced to Pakistan.

Despite their convergence of interest — fight against religious extremism and terrorism — the two countries do differ as to the locus of the threat. In the context of terrorism, Pakistan's immediate threat emanates from the Taliban and it is the Taliban insurgency that the security forces are putting down in Waziristan.

On the other hand, the US regards Al Qaeda as its main enemy. The 9/11 incident was planned and executed by Al Qaeda and not the Taliban, though Al Qaeda leadership was reportedly operating in Afghanistan under the umbrella of the Taliban regime. There is a strong nexus between the Taliban and Al Qaeda as both profess the same ideology of 'militant Islam'. But they are not the same. Whereas the Taliban are a local organisation, Al Qaeda is a global outfit. The demise of the Taliban will not root out Al Qaeda, though it may weaken the latter.

The Taliban do not pose a direct threat to US security, though they are a menace to Pakistan's security. For Washington, the dismantling of the Taliban is merely a means to that of Al Qaeda. It may even embrace the Taliban if they cease their support to Al Qaeda. The US suspects that religious elements in the security establishment of Pakistan have a soft corner for Al Qaeda. It is this suspicion which accounts for stringent conditions contained in the Kerry-Lugar law for US security assistance to Pakistan.

In particular, the provisions of the Act relating to strengthening of democracy in Pakistan, non-interference of the armed forces and spy agencies in political matters and civilian control over military affairs are rooted not in US love for democracy in Pakistan but in its perception of the involvement of security forces of Pakistan in terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Obama Wars

On the other hand, there is a widespread view in Pakistan that the war against terrorism in which Islamabad is a frontline player is essentially Washington's war and that all the repercussions of the war on the country's society and the economy are a 'gift' of American 'friendship'. These suspicions have been strengthened by Bob Woodward's disclosure in his book that the America's prime spy agency is maintaining an army to attack militants in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Strategic Dialogue may help remove the trust deficit. However, it may also raise the expectation level on both sides, which if not realised may widen the trust deficit.

Although the Strategic Dialogue provides a useful forum to discuss a wide range of issues, the Americans continue to remain oblivious of Pakistan's major demands: these include (a) civilian nuclear cooperation similar to that between India and the US, (b) the transfer of drone technology, (c) American mediation in sorting out Pak-India disputes particularly the Kashmir issue, and (d) enhanced market access to Pakistan's exports in the form of a free trade agreement as well as operationalisation of the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (RoZs) scheme, whose bill is pending with the Senate. Progress on these issues will go a long way in strengthening the bilateral relations and achieving the avowed purposes of the strategic Dialogue.

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