JUST over a year ago, the US and China appeared to embrace a genuinely strategic relationship, such was the level of their public cooperation.

But a year can be a lifetime in international relations, so radical was the transformation in their relations. Instead of establishing a G-2, they appeared headed in a direction that threatened the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

On entering office, President Barack Obama had espoused the ‘resetting’ of relations with Russia and ‘consolidation’ of ties with China as his priorities. While he appears to have had considerable success on the first, there was an alarming failure as regards the second.

The Americans said that Beijing had become strident in its claims and assertive in pursuit of its interests, while the Chinese moaned about America’s failure to appreciate their country’s many gestures, especially in stabilising the global economy and in contributing to America’s monetary stability.

China’s increasing budgetary allocation for defence was also criticised. In particular, China’s development of sophisticated weapons systems appeared to irritate America’s national security establishment. The recent unveiling of China’s stealth fighter, while US Defence Secretary Robert Gates was visiting Beijing, led some US officials to claim that President Hu Jintao and the political leadership had been kept unaware of this important development.

This is, however, unlikely given the deep institutional linkages between the Chinese Communist Party and the military. The Americans also harbour a major grouse against China for not being sufficiently careful in protecting copyrights, as well as for refusal to revalue its currency. No less important is the perception that the Chinese have not been helpful enough in reigning in the North Koreans and in distancing themselves from Iran.

But the Chinese, too, have their own laundry list of complaints, starting with what they see as the American tendency to assume an air of moral superiority, as well as a proclivity to ‘lecture’ them on human rights. In addition, the Chinese are not amused at Washington’s refusal to refrain from selling sophisticated weapons to Taiwan, as confirmed by the recent US decision to sell it arms worth over $6bn.

The US administration also views the current Chinese leadership as weak and ineffective, especially in asserting its authority over the military. This may be true, as the military jostles for more influence while the political leadership is in transition mode, as the Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao leadership prepares to give way to Xi Jinping/Li Keqiang in 2012. But what accounts for recent deterioration in their relations is primarily their differing worldviews.

The US continues to perceive itself as the world’s sole superpower, invincible and indispensable. The Chinese, on the other hand, having become not only the world’s second biggest economy but a $5 trillion industrial colossus, a major military power and an essential fulcrum of global economic stability, see themselves as a genuinely global power that deserves respect.

Thus, President Hu Jintao’s US visit came to assume unusual importance, as both sides recognised its likely impact on both domestic and foreign audiences. In Washington, major administration officials joined in a chorus of allegations and demands for concessions on a whole array of issues. Whereas a year ago Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had declared that human rights issues would not be allowed to influence Sino-US relations, recently she not only injected China’s alleged repression of peaceful dissent and its treatment of political prisoners as a major theme in US diplomacy towards China, but warned that the longer China represses freedoms, “the longer its potential will remain unrealised”.

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner also chipped in, threatening that the US would not grant access to high-tech American products unless China opened its own domestic market to American products.

Beijing is concerned as well with the way the US has been encouraging its traditional allies such as Australia, Japan and Korea to enhance strategic cooperation among themselves in ways that could hurt China, while hinting at diplomatic support to others such as Vietnam if they were to challenge her in the region. Beijing could not have lost sight either of the enthusiasm with which the Obama administration has promoted India’s great-power ambitions.

Nevertheless Hu Jintao’s visit would have satisfied both sides. Concrete results were minimal, but both appeared determined to highlight the positive aspects and to minimise their differences. While Hu got the full state protocol that the Chinese had been seeking, Obama was able to calm his critics, both amongst the liberals who wanted him to focus on human rights and the conservatives who wanted him to emphasise economic issues. Neither side gave in on any major issue, with Obama making his demands publicly so he could extract domestic mileage by appearing tough and principled.

President Hu admitted that a “lot needs to be done in China in terms of human rights”, while offering $45bn worth of trade deals and pledging to resolve differences over market access and protection of intellectual property. Of significance also was Hu’s readiness to be more accommodating on North Korea.

These initiatives will restore some semblance of normality to Sino-American ties, but the underlying causes of their differing agendas will continue to cast a shadow on their relationship.

More than anything, the Americans have yet to adjust to China’s rapid emergence as a strong and economically rich power, whose cooperation is essential in tackling both regional and global issues. The Chinese, too, have to learn to enhance their influence without unnerving the established powers or alarming their neighbours.

This makes it imperative for both to formulate an ‘overarching concept for cooperation’, as they face the challenge of reconciling their ambitions. This poses a threat and an opportunity for those such as Pakistan, who seek to strengthen ties with both Beijing and Washington.

The writer is a former ambassador.