ID: 872            3/28/1997 11:47          97ISLAMABAD2533 Embassy Islamabad      CONFIDENTIAL            96ISLAMABAD10540|96PESHAWAR926|97ISLAMABAD2488    "O 281147Z MAR 97

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5862

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AMEMBASSY ROME

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"           "C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 002533

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E.O. 12958:  DECL:  3/28/07

TAGS:  PGOV, KISL, PREL, PINR, AF

SUBJECT:  AFGHANISTAN:  THE ENIGMATIC MULLAH OMAR AND TALIBAN DECISION-MAKING

REFS:  (A) ISLAMABAD 2488

(B) 96 ISLAMABAD 10540

(C) 96 PESHAWAR 926

1. (U) Classified by John C. Holzman, Deputy Chief of Mission. Reason: 1.5 (C) (d).

2. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Peshawar.

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Summary

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3. (C) Not much is known about Mullah Omar, the Taliban founder and leader. He comes from a small village near Kandahar and his family, while respected, did not belong to the Afghan elite. A small-time commander in the Afghan resistance, he formed the Taliban in late 1994 as a reaction against “immoral” local commanders. He rarely appears in public and does not meet with many non-Muslims. Those who have met him say he is a man of few words and lives in Spartan surroundings. Although his political beliefs are obscure, most observers agree that Omar plays the key, and probably decisive, role in Taliban decision-making. End summary.

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Not much bio-data

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4. (C) Shortly after the Taliban seized Kabul in September 1996, the Taliban movement announced that Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Taliban founder and leader, would serve as the head of their “Islamic state of Afghanistan.” In this capacity, his title remains “Amir al-Mu’minin” (“Commander of the Faithful”), which a Taliban-convened group of religious leaders conferred on him in April 1996 in Kandahar city. Omar, who is approximately 38, is from the Maiwand district of Kandahar province and is a member of the Hotak sub-tribe of the Ghilzai tribe (Ref C). Omar was a relatively unknown commander in the Afghan-Soviet war, who maintained affiliations with Hezb-i-Islami (Khalis) and Harakat-i-Inqilab-Islami (Mohammedi). He lost his right eye in the war. After the fall of the communist regime in 1992, Omar, who reportedly has two wives, returned to a madrassa, which he had attended in his youth, in his home village of Sangasar, near Kandahar City. It was from this village that Mullah Omar and fellow Talibs, angered about the “immoral behavior” of local commanders, began the Taliban movement in the fall of 1994.

5. (C) Asked about Omar’s background, Hamid Karzai, the deputy leader of the large Popalzai tribe, told PolOff March 22 that Omar came from a family locally respected for its religious piety, but not involved in politics: “Omar’s father was a local religious leader, but the family was poor and had absolutely no political links in Kandahar or Kabul. They were essentially lower middle class Afghans and were definitely not members of the elite.” Agreeing with Karzai's assessment, Hamed Gailani, son of Pir Gailani and a leader of the small National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), told PolOff March 23 that “Omar is admired by the Taliban for three reasons: his religious piety, his reputation for incorruptibility, and his bravery in the jihad. Because of these qualities, he is considered like a teacher, a guide.”

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Few public appearances

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6. (C) Mullah Mohammad Omar is rarely seen in public. One of the few times he has made a public appearance was in April, 1996, when he accepted the Amir al-Mu’minin title and held the “cloak of the prophet” (a Kandahari relic) in front of a crowd. He also personally inaugurated a Taliban-sponsored refurbishment of the mausoleum of Ahmad Shah Durrani in Kandahar. Whether he chooses to remain shrouded in secrecy or is a genuine recluse is not clear, but Mullah Malang, a former resistance commander who knows many of the Taliban leaders, told PolOff on March 26 that Mullah Omar has no desire to develop a public personality: “what you must realize is that Omar is totally inner-directed. His legitimacy comes from God and not from the public; because of this, he feels no need to emerge from his chambers. In addition, he does not want to meet anyone who may divert him from his chosen course.”

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A reluctance to meet non-Muslims

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7. (C) Malang's remarks highlight one of the problems in trying to get to know Mullah Omar: he does not meet many non-Muslims. To our knowledge, he has met with non-Muslims only two times: he met UNICEF Afghan representative Jim Mohan in 1996 for approximately 15 minutes, and again in 1996 he met (briefly) with a Russian delegation seeking the release of members of a Russian aircrew which was captured and detained by the Taliban from 1995 to 1996. Francis Okelo, the deputy head of the UN Special Mission For Afghanistan (UNSMA), told PolOff march 21 that UN Special Envoy Holl (a non-Muslim German) has requested meetings with Omar on several occasions and been turned down every time. Asked whether the UNSMA had ever received an explanation from the Taliban, Okelo replied that “they basically tell us that he is always busy and intimate that he does not like to meet with non-Muslims.” In addition, UNOCHA coordinator Alfredo Witschi-Cestari (a non-Muslim) recently expressed optimism to the DCM that his request to meet with Omar in Kandahar to explain UN humanitarian assistance/ development programs would be granted. (Comment: this remains to be seen.)

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A man of few words

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8. (C) Those who have met Mullah Omar remark that he is a man of decidedly few words, and one who keeps to simple surroundings. On March 21, Ibrahim Bakr, the OIC special envoy for Afghanistan, told DCM that he had met Omar on March 15 to request lenience for two jailed Frenchmen held in Kabul by the Taliban on vague charges of immorality. (Note: after a brief trial, the Frenchmen were released on March 19.) Bakr described the meeting: “I explained why I thought the Frenchmen should be released and at the end of my comments Mullah Omar said 'thank you. We will consider that.’” Bakr added that Omar's office (which apparently doubled as his bedroom) was sparse and dimly lit. The only furniture was a charpoy (simple wooden bed) and a wardrobe. Guests sat on the floor, looking up at Omar, who sat on the charpoy. Another person who met Omar, Iftikhar Murshed, Additional Secretary (Afghanistan) at the Pakistani MFA, told us December 15 that, during a December 8 delegation visit to Kandahar, a Pakistani delegation met Omar and in that meeting “the Pakistanis spoke for the first 85 minutes and Omar for the last five.” In this meeting (Ref B), Murshed recounted that the gist of Omar's comments were, “I am very glad you have come; I have listened very carefully.” (Note: Murshed has also told DCM that the Pakistani consul general in Kandahar has easy access to Omar.”) In describing his meeting with Omar, UNICEF representative Mohan said he did all the speaking and received little reaction from Omar.

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Political beliefs are obscure

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9. (C) The limited anecdotal evidence available provides little information on Mullah Omar's personal political beliefs. Most observers do not think that he is an “ikhwani” or “fundamentalist Muslim” in the classic Muslim brotherhood sense. In a March 20 conversation, Dr. Ghairat Baheer, the Islamabad representative for Hezb-i-Islami and son-in-law of Islamic radical Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, commented that “Omar is too poorly educated in Islamic principles to be an ikhwani; he is basically a fervent Muslim with obscurantist tendencies whose views are strongly affected by his tribal background.” Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that Mullah Omar is an Islamic radical with an anti-Western agenda. He has not been known to make anti-Western statements, although he is known to be anti-Russian because of the Afghan-Soviet war. However, we recently heard one comment that indicates that Omar may have some antagonism toward the west: Abdul Hadi, the Taliban deputy governor of Zabul province and their (self-described) choice for governor of Wardak province, told DCM on March 17 that he had attended a meeting March 1 in which Omar had defended the Taliban's relationship with fugitive Saudi financier bin Laden -- “Omar told us that we have to help bin Laden because he is a good, Islamic person, who is fighting the kaffirs (unbelievers).” (Note: see Ref A on a March 25 meeting between Omar and fugitive ex-Saudi financier Osama bin Laden.)

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Taliban decision-making: Omar and the shura

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10. (C) Most observers believe that Omar has a key, and probably decisive, role in Taliban decision-making. They note, for example, that virtually every important Taliban edict on social issues or the military situation comes out in his name. In addition, he reportedly makes high-level personnel decisions. Tayyab Hussaini, a second secretary at the Afghan embassy and a Talib, told PolOff on March 14 that “the Amir al-Mu’minin has total control of personnel decisions. Of course, he makes these decisions in consultation with other shura members.” PolOff asked Hussaini about the precise nature of Omar's relationship with members of the shura. In response, Hussaini observed that policy decisions are made in Kandahar and implemented by the “caretaker council” in Kabul, which gives orders to Taliban provincial chiefs. Somewhat confusingly, he then added that before making decisions Omar consults closely with Mullah Rabbani, the head of the “caretaker council” and Mullah Hassan, the deputy head of the “caretaker council.” (former commander Rahim Wardak, in a recent conversation with the DCM, also indicated that Omar consults widely among senior Taliban officials; however, after hearing various viewpoints, Omar sometimes comes up with a decision completely different from any of the expressed views and then expects implementation. Based on Wardak's comments, one could conclude that Omar was a bit of a “control freak.”) Hiroshi Takahashi, an UNSMA political officer, told PolOff on March 5 that he thought that two other key advisers for Omar are another Mullah Hassan, the governor of Kandahar and four neighboring provinces, and Mullah Jalil, a Taliban “deputy foreign minister,” who is stationed in Kandahar.

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Comment

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11. (C) While reports vary of how willing or reluctant Mullah Omar was to accept the title “Amir al-Mu’minin” from the assembled Taliban in Kandahar in April 1996, nevertheless he did accept it. Created early in Islamic history and first used by the second of the orthodox caliphs, Omar, the title has been adopted by a series of Muslim polities up to the present day. In the Sunni Islamic world, the adoption of the title implied the claim either to the caliphate or to autonomous political authority over a region of the Islamic world. Not even the most ideological Taliban claim that Omar with his title is a successor to the caliphate, most recently held in Ottoman Turkey. But, in the second sense, the Taliban are most certainly claiming authority over the Afghan region of the Islamic world. Omar buttressed this claim by displaying “the cloak of the prophet” when he assumed the title of Amir al-Mu’minin. Also, in more recent history, the title has had a strong ideological resonance among some reformist, messianic, and militant Islamic movements, responding to what they perceive as the corrupt and irreligious ways of the existing rulers. Besides the Taliban, some other Islamic movements on Afghan soil have used this title. For example, a Wahhabi sect with strong Arab backing, most active in Kunar province, until quite recently called its leader “Amir al-Mu’minin.”

12. (C) In contrast to many of the holders of the title in classical Islam or to many of the lawless commanders the Taliban ousted or co-opted, Omar lives austerely, without an elaborate court and entourage, and without the ubiquitous Pajero's so many mujahidin commanders sped around the countryside in. Whether Omar's ascetic lifestyle is based solely on his temperament or is coldly calculated to set him and his movement apart from the discredited mujahidin commanders and leaders the Taliban replaced, many Afghans react approvingly. So far, no personality cult or emperor syndrome appears to have developed around Mullah Omar.

13. (C) Omar, as reporting in other channels suggests, may be adopting increasingly hardline attitudes towards the West and issues about which the U.S. is concerned (narcotics, terrorism). What is motivating this is difficult to assess: genuine ideological convictions, a growing resentment that the West has not accepted the Taliban as a legitimate government, a bazaar bargaining attitude, financial and logistical squeezes on the Taliban, outsiders' advice, or some other factor could all play a role.

14. (C) On several occasions the embassy has asked whether a meeting with Omar might be possible, but nothing has ever come of it. This is unfortunate because it is important that U.S. views get through to Omar accurately, given his key role in the Taliban decision-making process. At this point, based on the Taliban's human rights record and determination to end the conflict by military means, it would seem that if he is hearing our message from other high-level Taliban and from U.S. public statements, he is not listening to it.

SIMONS