ADM Mike Mullen, the outgoing chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, spoke unusually bluntly about Pakistan’s military and intelligence services during his last appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Sept 22.

He said: “The fact remains that the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network operate from Pakistan with impunity. Extremist organisations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers.For example, we believe the Haqqani network — which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pakistani government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency — is responsible for the Sept 13 attacks against the US embassy in Kabul.

“There is ample evidence confirming that the Haqqanis were behind the June 28 attack against the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul and the Sept 10 truck bomb attack that killed five Afghans and injured another 96 individuals, 77 of whom were US soldiers. History teaches us that it is difficult to defeat an insurgency when fighters enjoy a sanctuary outside national boundaries, and we are seeing this again today.

“The Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network are hampering efforts to improve security in Afghanistan, spoiling possibilities for broader reconciliation, and frustrating US-Pakistan relations. The actions by the Pakistani government to support them — actively and passively — represent a growing problem that is undermining US interests and may violate international norms, potentially warranting sanction. In supporting these groups, the government of Pakistan, particularly the Pakistani Army, continues to jeopardise Pakistan’s opportunity to be a respected and prosperous nation with genuine regional and international influence.”

When Mullen, the foremost US defender of maintaining sound working ties with Pakistan’s military, expresses this much exasperation, those who seek to retain decent bilateral relations are in trouble. Ties have become extremely tenuous and are likely to deteriorate further.

By publicly confirming and not qualifying reality, Mullen has changed the rules of the game, while laying the predicate for actions that will further inflame anti-US sentiment within Pakistan by embarrassing Pakistan’s military hierarchy. The prosecution of the US military campaign in Afghanistan will then become much harder, and whatever residual support Pakistan provides to the US on other issues will be placed at risk.

The Obama administration has apparently concluded that its earlier mix of carrots and sticks cannot influence Rawalpindi’s unfortunate choices. Both countries are well past the stage of doing favours for each other; cooperation is limited to common interests. After 9/11, the Bush administration issued an ultimatum for Pakistan’s military establishment to cut ties with the Taliban and help the US crush Al Qaeda.

Pakistan’s military was paid for its support and its self-interested sacrifices, but each party became disillusioned with this compact. Rawalpindi’s contributions in the ‘war on terror’ are highly selective, and the benefits provided by Washington have come with insults to Pakistani sovereignty and contention over the Taliban’s role in Afghanistan. Disputes now loom larger than common interests.

In 2009, there was talk of moving beyond this transactional relationship with the passage of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, but these hopes have been unfulfilled. Not much aid has made it through the pipeline because of bureaucratic obstacles and concerns over corruption. Differences in US and Pakistani policies have also grown as Washington’s relations with New Delhi have improved. Only Pakistan opposes the start of negotiations to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Rawalpindi has doubled down on very unwise decisions about Afghanistan and India. Inputs from Pakistan’s president, prime minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs on these matters are imperceptible, so ritualistic and assorted denials, vows and pledges only serve to further diminish those who speak what they do not know or cannot change.

Both Washington and Rawalpindi are quite capable of repeating past mistakes and making matters worse. Pakistan’s woes are mostly self-inflicted, but Washington has repeatedly bet against Pakistan’s future by focusing on military ties. Even so, Pakistan’s military leaders continue to budget substantial sums for nuclear weapons while resisting improved relations with India, a prerequisite if Pakistan is to become a normal nation.

Rawalpindi’s Afghan policy, which seems to be repeating the mistakes of the 1990s, may be based on the assumption that the Pentagon and the US intelligence community will continue to prevent another divorce — but both of these stores are now under new management.

Alternatively, the boldness of recent strikes in Afghanistan by Rawalpindi’s proxies may reflect the conclusion that the relationship has been broken beyond repair. Either way, Pakistan’s security establishment is acting in a way that suggests that its influence within Afghanistan matters more than its relations with the US.

Adm Mullen advised his listeners on Capitol Hill not to disengage from Pakistan, but rather to “reframe” the relationship to buttress civil authority and to expect far less from military leaders in Pakistan. This was the sentiment behind Kerry-Lugar-Berman — one well worth pursuing, but which has not yet had much success.

Unless Rawalpindi changes course, Pakistan may find itself reframed from a major non-Nato ally to a state sponsor of terrorism. Then the architects of policies that have diminished Pakistan’s security and international standing will again blame the US for exiting the relationship after misusing it.

The writer is co-founder of the Stimson Centre, a think tank in Washington.