WHAT is most in jeopardy? Relations between Washington and Islamabad, between the civil and military wings of the state, between the executive and judiciary or between the PPP-led government and the PML-N opposition?

Pakistan is fast turning into a conflict zone. Memogate has landed the country in the midst of a potentially lethal clash of institutions, not directly and immediately but in terms of setting the precedent for civil-military relations in future. The ultimate ownership of the state, whether in the hands of the army or the elected representatives, is again in question.

At the heart of the matter, this time, is not a Bonapartist general who committed the treasonable offence of violating the constitution, as has happened four times in Pakistan's history, but a civilian ruling set-up that allegedly sought Washington's help in pre-empting a much-feared putsch after the Abbottabad operation. Some point to the misplaced smartness of the protagonists while others see intellectual paucity in the whole venture.The crisis of civil-military relations was enmeshed along parallel lines of conflict when Nawaz Sharif filed a case in the Supreme Court for investigating the matter. Given the acute mistrust between the executive and the judiciary, this case can further discredit and weaken the civilian government in Islamabad and accelerate its downslide.

The court initially misfired. It established an inquiry commission, but the person in charge excused himself from serving in that position. The party in government launched a public campaign against Nawaz Sharif's recourse to the Supreme Court, instead of parliament, especially as it is typically the prerogative of the executive to institute a commission of inquiry. On its part, the PML-N feared a loss of initiative in the case, and relied on the judiciary instead.

That raised political temperatures. The Sharifs are concerned about the possible slippage of ground in oppositionist politics to the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaaf. They feel obliged to safeguard their constituency in Punjab and make inroads elsewhere. They operated in the perspective of a breakdown of communication with the PPP. The two sides have no understanding on the rules of the game and no agreement on not undermining the strategic interests of the other.

All this is played out against the worst crisis in US-Pakistan relations in half a century. The two countries have had long periods of coolness, especially during the 1970s and the 1990s. But, their current relations have no parallel in terms of the lack of trust and loud expression of this through diplomatic and strategic channels. Both are unsure about the outcome of the current exercise in brinkmanship.

The loss of life in the Nato attack on the Salala check post, followed by the vacating of the Shamsi airbase by the US and the stopping of military supplies to the war machinery across the border is a symptom rather than the cause of the latest crisis in US-Pakistan relations. At issue is the Afghanistan endgame. The regional power structure is developing along certain lines which do not promise a role for Pakistan.

Islamabad had not been able to cultivate a non-Taliban Pakhtun constituency in Afghanistan, in the face of rival contenders for power led by the pro-India Northern Alliance. It has not fully appreciated the sense of disgust felt by both regional and global powers for the Taliban as the leading terrorist group of the world and a legatee of Al Qaeda.

This situation has led to ad hocism in policy and profile, which is more reactive than planned. The conference of Pakistan's ambassadors and high commissioners in Islamabad this week has come too late after the signing of the India-Afghanistan strategic partnership and Nato plans to strengthen the Afghan army irrespective of the inconclusive deliberations of the Bonn conference.

Meanwhile, the spillover of Talibanisation in Pakistan has found fertile ground in the local political landscape. Various political groupings on the right of the centre have shied away from condemning the perpetrators of violence and distanced themselves from what is considered to be America's war against terror. Islamic outfits have especially thrived on the new wave of nationalist upsurge.

A minority within the establishment circles feels appalled at the way the nationalist discourse has been directed towards an uncharted path. A debate on policy options has been foreclosed under the pressure of jingoist phraseology used by both the emergent political leadership and political analysts.

Policy outcomes are far less discussed than projected and claimed. This may cost the nation and its decision-makers an objective outlook, a commitment to getting out of regional and global isolation and the pursuit of thinking out of the box. For the purpose of evolving a set of productive and genuinely nationalistic policies, the pall of darkness over serious channels of public expression must be removed.

A serious development is the government's agreement with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. It is underscored by the government's public expression of gratitude for the Taliban for not carrying out terrorist attacks on the Muharram rallies. It seems that the diplomatic isolation is now leading the powers that be to fall back on the Taliban since all other international channels are getting squeezed. This is a defeatist policy.

What is needed is a cool and objective analysis of the sources of insecurity for Pakistan, especially with reference to Afghanistan and India. There is a need to address questions as to what substantive re-evaluation in the policy framework can be undertaken, how we can cut down our losses and which regional powers we can approach with an open mind in order to develop a partial agreement on both the ends and the means.

The need of the hour is to create a national consensus not on the basis of a one-dimensional assertion of our ideological position but on keeping our house in order. This would involve keeping civil-military relations on an even keel, holding back spoilers from destabilising the political landscape and putting in place a mechanism of damage control vis-à-vis foreign and domestic policy.

The writer is a professor at LUMS.