Imran Khan in Balochistan
ADDRESSING his first public gathering in Quetta in April, Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaaf (PTI) chief Imran Khan condemned the security operation in the province and vowed to find a political solution to the conflict.
The province was pushed into an insurgency-like situation by the military approach taken by the establishment to resolve the conflict. Now, Baloch separatist groups are involved in targeted killings of Punjabi settlers, and there are issues of sectarianism, extremism, separatism and state oppression. Meanwhile, the ‘establishment’ is blamed for kidnapping, killing and dumping the people suspected of being insurgents.
In fact, violence begets more violence and continuing this policy will add fuel to the fire of separatism.
What distinguishes Khan and the PTI from other politicians and political parties is that he and his party have not yet been tried or tested. The PPP, the PML-N and their respective coalition partners have ruled the country on multiple occasions.
The PTI’s chances for success are slim in the restive province if it follows in the footsteps of other political parties and adopts similar approaches to appease the Baloch. It has been proven that announcing financial packages or offering an apology is ineffective in resolving the Balochistan issue.
On his first visit to Quetta as the co-chairman of the ruling party, President Asif Ali Zardari offered an apology for the injustices meted out to Balochistan, as did then president Pervez Musharraf in 2003. While the Musharraf administration launched mega projects worth some Rs140bn in this province, the least developed in the country, it also conducted yet another military operation to subdue what the army called an insurgency on the part of some Baloch tribes.
Zardari announced a financial package for the province but failed to halt the security operation. Consequently, the 2009 package has proved absolutely worthless. It has failed to appease the Baloch or to improve the law and order situation. It did not curtail the security operation or recover the missing.
The restive province is virtually under the control of the country’s military establishment. Yet the killings and enforced disappearances indicate that the security apparatus is trying to resolve the issue through the barrel of a gun.
Last year, a report issued by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan said: “There is strong evidence of the involvement of security forces in enforced disappearances, and killings and FIRs registered against security personnel remain un-investigated without exception.”
The operation pushed more and more people below the poverty line and adversely affected economic activities in the province.
The killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti further intensified the feeling of alienation. The previous government failed to manoeuvre successfully and keep Nawab Bugti isolated from the insurgency camp.
Ironically, the Musharraf administration preferred the higher costs of the military operation (in terms of collateral damage, destruction of infrastructure and deteriorating law and order) over seriously striving for a political solution to the Balochistan crisis.
What Khan needs to do first is to understand the root causes of the frustration among the Baloch that forced some to want to go their own way.
Constituting 44 per cent of the total area of the country but inhabited by only five per cent of the country’s population, Balochistan is an impoverished province that has forever remained on the political periphery.
Successive governments, both military and civilian, have ignored the needs of the people of this province. Its remote rural areas still resemble scenes from a mediaeval age, with the province lagging far behind in terms of literacy, education, technological development, healthcare, infrastructure and industrialisation.
The province still has no say in the country’s decision-making economic bodies and is poor despite enjoying a rich mineral endowment and covering nearly three-fourths of the country’s coastal belt. With gold mines and huge oil and gas reserves, the province is strategically located in a region of immense geopolitical importance. The greater part of the proposed multibillion-dollar gas pipelines, whether from Iran, Qatar or Turkmenistan, would have to traverse it. Yet the main grievance of Baloch leaders has been that the province’s natural resources are being exploited without any benefit accruing to the local population.
Khan would need to do a lot more than the efforts so far to counter the ‘kill and dump’ policy and raise the issue of the missing persons. To become a popular voice in the province, the PTI would have to adopt an anti-establishment stance on Balochistan. Staging a sit-in for the recovery of missing or abducted people and against the targeted killing of the Hazara Shia community, as he did against drone strikes, could be the right initiative for the PTI at this time.
A first step towards appeasing the people of the province could be to issue a strong call for halting the ongoing ‘kill and dump’ operations that are adding fuel to the fire. Secondly, the pressure to produce all suspected abductees in court and for due judicial procedure to take its course should also be part of its approach to the Balochistan issue. Thirdly, the PTI should announce a clear-cut policy of appeasement vis-à-vis the Baloch people and the nationalist leaders, and a policy of containment vis-à-vis Baloch separatists and sectarian outfits.
Finally, the PTI needs to present its own ‘Balochistan package’ proposing measures that would ensure a sense of ownership among the Baloch of the province’s resources, a development process in accordance with local needs and demands, and a political approach towards resolving the issues fuelling unrest in the province.
The writer is the author of Economic Development of Balochistan.