EVEN after several attempts in the last few decades, Pakistan has been waiting for its own version of the Arab spring.

The Arab spring in the Middle East is itself in transition and it is difficult to predict the course it will take. The Islamist forces there have not only become part of the mainstream but have also gained a substantial stake in power. Many wonder if the Islamists in Pakistan can go down the same road.

The Islamists in the two scenarios operate in contexts that are poles apart. In the Arab world, Islamist forces suffered for long under very harsh dictatorships, while their namesakes in Pakistan enjoyed perks and power as supporters of almost all governments; here, they have influenced the policy discourse.

The lessons the Islamists learned in the Arab world persuaded them to modify their approach and this has contributed towards their successful entrance into the corridors of power. They have also succeeded where others failed, leaving the West no option but to recognise their mandate — which was not the case when the Islamic Salvation Front scored an electoral victory in Algeria or Hamas in Palestine. The West may simply have learned that pressure on liberal democracies may be counterproductive but credit is also due to the Islamists whose accommodative, persistent and flexible attitude paved the way for ‘Islamist democracies’.

Constitutionally, Pakistan is already an Islamic republic — a status which has eluded most of the Islamic world so far.

Making comparisons in two important aspects would be worthwhile; first, the level of anger and frustration among Muslim youth, and secondly, what they want to achieve. In Pakistan, the anger against the ruling elite is rising. The major contributing factors identified are political, economic and ideological.

By contrast, in the Arab world, demands for freedom of expression and better economic conditions were the triggers for the spring. On that stage, the constitutional legitimacy of Islam was not the protesters’ destination. The Islamists are trying to develop good governance models and trying not to disturb the social contract which their societies have had for a long time.

That has been the key to their success.

In Pakistan, whenever the Islamists have got the opportunity to taste power, whether through democratic means or by allying with military dictators, they have influenced the constitutional sphere to push through their narrow agendas. This has created resentment against them among the urban classes.

From Mufti Mehmud’s government in the then NWFP in the 1970s to Gen Ziaul Haq’s Majlis-i-Shura and the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal’s provincial governments in the western border provinces, the Islamists have tried to build legal fortifications around the fort of Islam of their interpretation.

Despite the contrasts, the Arab world has remained a source of inspiration for Islamists in Pakistan. Different religious parties in the country have maintained links with the governments and Islamist elements in the Arab world, although often these links have only remained confined to groups with a shared sectarian identity. It seems that the religious political parties in Pakistan have failed to make use of the anxiety prevailing among the masses to start a meaningful movement aimed at realising the change they seek.

The Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), which has considerable links with Islamist movements abroad (mainly with likeminded Brotherhood movements in the Arab world) has failed to mobilise its supporters. Some analysts argue that Pakistanis appear least concerned about the sea change in the Arab world on account of internal political, economic and security crises. This may not be the case after all, as religious publications have certainly focused on the changes in the Arab world — yet unfortunately along sectarian lines. The Arab spring is indeed influencing the Pakistani youth and Islamists in certain ways.

As Pakistan’s young are largely confused in their ideological and political vision, the thinking patterns in Pakistan are dominated by an ideologically strong national state vision with a good governance model. In the peripheries, ethnic identity and secular tendencies have taken on growing importance. Islamist forces were used to force peripheral tendencies through the ‘mainstream’ vision, but now it seems that divergent trends are also emerging.

The prevailing trends offer space for new political forces that can satisfy both tendencies. The Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf is trying to exploit mainstream tendencies and Islamists have the potential to manipulate a favourable outcome in other areas.

But the political landscape in Pakistan is diverse, competitive and complex. It would be a harder task to generate a change on the pattern of the Arab spring.

The Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Fazl) (JUI-F) seems to believe that it has correctly assessed the changing scenario, is taking a more pronounced anti-establishment stance and trying to gain ground in the political mainstream. However, the party is beset by a conformist support base and deficient organisational structure. Although the madrassahs have increased their influence in Pakistan, their students and teachers come mainly from the peripheries and lack the capacity to influence the local political discourse.

For mobilising the required wave of change, a good organisational network and likeminded people among the leadership are needed — and the JUI-F lacks both. The JI qualifies on both counts but it is persisting with its traditional political path despite recent changes.

Pakistan has received some negative influences from the changes in the Arab world, too. Each school of sectarian thought is trying to interpret those changes through a sectarian prism. During the unrest in Bahrain, Pakistan’s religious parties held street demonstrations in support of their faith-fellows. Even the Jamaat-ud-Daawa was quite active in supporting Saudi Arabia. Investigators connected attacks on the Saudi consulate in Karachi and the killing of a diplomat with the events in the Gulf. As tensions increase in the Gulf, the sectarian divide increases in Pakistan.

The current trends show that the Arab spring may not trigger the same wave in Pakistan but its influence over the religious discourse may continue to have a negative effect, at least until the fate of the change in the Arab world itself takes definite shape.

The writer is editor of the quarterly research journal Conflict and Peace Studies.

mamirrana@yahoo.com