THERE is, of late, an orchestrated chorus of voices propagating closer relations with China versus relations with the West.

In general, the case is made as follows: the United States is an unreliable ally, politically and economically. Moreover, it is mired — along with Europe — in an economic crisis, which has depressed Pakistan’s exports and growth. As such, prospects for future Western economic support to Pakistan are not bright.

By contrast, the argument goes that Pakistan has a time-tested strategic geopolitical relationship with China, which can be relied on to reduce the country’s economic vulnerability. Accordingly, China can be invited to provide financing for joint venture projects to be executed by Chinese companies and which can multiply Pakistan’s exports.

Proposals also include denominating Pakistan-China trade in the Chinese yuan instead of the US dollar and asking China to place a part of its large foreign exchange reserves with the State Bank of Pakistan. In official discussions, China appears to be the panacea of almost every economic problem.

The case for tying Pakistan economically to China is premised on assumptions that do not hold relevance to realities. To begin with, the postulation betrays the half-century-old mindset of Pakistan needing one or another ‘protector’. It appears that the Pakistani establishment has failed to shed its subject status complex from the colonial era.

First, it needed a US umbrella and now it appears to be seeking a Chinese cover. Of course no country can be absolutely independent economically, but the opposite of economic independence need not be subservience and it is not necessary to be a client to one or another superpower in order to develop economically.

There are two basic flaws herewith. The first false premise is that economic relations can be built merely on the foundations of geopolitical interests. The fact is that the reverse is true and, in the long run, it is underlying economic interests that define the contours of geopolitical relationships.

The second underlying delusory premise is that Pakistan occupies a central place in Chinese regional and global economic and political calculations. The first can be attributed to misconstrued understanding of realities and the second to a distended ego.

Pakistan has a politically complementary relationship with China, as compared to China’s politically competitive relationship with India. However, Pakistan-China trade is a mere $10bn as compared to the $60bn China-India trade. Moreover, Chinese foreign investment amounts to about $2bn in Pakistan compared to about $40bn in India. Pakistan needs to keep in mind China’s economic interests vis-à-vis India when formulating expectations from its own relations with China.

The supposition that China is just waiting for an invitation from Pakistan to invest in the country is unfounded. An argument is made that with rising wages in China, companies there are seeking to move to lower wage locations and Pakistan is assumed to be one such location. The fact, however, is that Pakistan is suffering from a deteriorated physical infrastructure, severe power shortages, endemic law and order problems, and utterly poor skill levels. Resultantly, foreign manufacturers who have been in Pakistan for over four decades are exiting.

The Chinese trade and investment delegations that occasionally come to Pakistan comprise of commercial officers and businessmen. They come in search of profits and are not going to pour Chinese yuans into Pakistan merely for the sake of friendship, eloquent statements by the Chinese leadership and foreign ministry officials notwithstanding.

The Chinese are not prone to making unsound economic decisions to fit emotionally-driven foreign policy whims or to lose sight of their material interests in the cloud of geopolitical considerations. That is a more likely realm of Pakistani policymakers. If the Chinese had found the trade and investment climate in Pakistan to be profitable, their investment in Pakistan would not have been one-twentieth of that in India.

In the same context, the proposition for China to place part of its foreign exchange reserves with the State Bank of Pakistan is most unrealistic and betrays an exaggerated self-induced sense of importance in the Chinese geopolitical framework.

China, like any rational entity, should be expected to place its surplus funds where they are secure and accrue benefits to its economy. The Chinese cannot and should not be expected to place any part of their funds — merely in the name of friendship or even geopolitics — in a country that has a permanently unsustainable fiscal deficit, a ballooning trade deficit, and totters from time to time on the verge of default.

Just as the United States defined and continues to define its relationship with Pakistan in terms of its own interests, so do the Chinese. Pakistan cannot and should not expect China to compromise its political and economic interests for the sake of its geopolitical relationship with Pakistan, as perceived in Islamabad.

Let it not be forgotten that China did not bypass the IMF when Pakistan was in need of assistance during the 1998 post-nuclear-test economic crisis. And nearly three decades earlier, China stood aside as Indian troops overran erstwhile East Pakistan and dismembered the country. But then, Pakistan’s conduct had not left any space for any of its friends to come to the country’s aid.

The Chinese are good and loyal friends and their friendship has stood the test of time. But Pakistan should not test this friendship through grossly unrealistic expectations. Instead of seeking an alternative ‘protector’ Pakistan needs to rationally define its political economy benefit-cost parameters, put its house in order and learn to stand on its own feet.

Friends — and they include China as well as the US — can assist the country occasionally in times of difficulty. However, Pakistan should not expect one or the other country to engage in constant handholding and, at the same time, expect to be respected as a sovereign nation.

The writer was a member of the National Finance Commission and adviser for planning & development to the chief minister of Sindh.