The late afternoon sun gilded our white tea cups. We were talking about stories of National Importance. It’s what some journalists do to feel Nationally Important. I often nodded my head because I was thinking of things of Domestic Importance, rather than National Importance.

“Yes, and how about a story on Necta?” said my friend.

“Right, that is a story of National Importance,” I said, doing the nodding thing again.

If only I had a Blackberry, I could’ve surreptitiously Googled it under the sleek conference table. I did, later, in the comfort of my home, before the three o’clock load shedding schedule. It turns out my journalist friend was talking about the National Counter-Terrorism Authority or NCTA.

The gods of journalism could forgive me my lapse: one, the acronym sounds remarkably like nectar, which is hardly the stuff of counter-terrorism; and two, it doesn’t quite have the catchy ring of a Wapda or an Ogra. But that’s because it hasn’t settled in the national subconscious.

Consider this: for a year since it was meant to be set up, what has been done? NCTA head Tariq Pervez  has been appointed for a year. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani has said the authority will serve as a think tank on counter-terrorism, focusing “civilian, military, provincial and federal efforts.” There are even reports that it will finally come up with a strategy of National Importance within four months after consultations with stakeholders.

Only, after all this big talk, NCTA is finally going legal. The Interior Ministry is burning the midnight oil to finalise the draft for the establishment of the National Counter-Terrorism Authority. It will then be promulgated into an ordinance. What prompted this gargantuan effort?  (Ordinance, promulgation, draft…the ministry sounds quite serious about this.) Surely last week’s attacks in Lahore, Mansehra, and Swat can’t have been the matches to set the Interior Ministry afire?

The year that NCTA should’ve been more than an acronym - 2009 - there were 2,586 militancy-related incidents in which more than three thousand people died. If the steady rise in terrorist attacks, particularly since the Lal Masjid operation in 2007, wasn’t a clue that there needs to be a greater integrated effort to come up with a counter-terrorism strategy, then the moon is just a hole in the sky.

There are indications that bureaucratic foot-shuffling, funding issues, and power games are responsible for the delay in galvanizing the authority. That is not surprising, given that this is a country where terrorism and terrorist threats are objects of a tug of war between the Punjab governor and its chief minister.

And a quick glance at what has been done to counter terrorism is instructive even without explanation: drone strikes by the US (which the government publicly disapproves but tacitly allows); the capture of several Afghan Taliban leaders, among whom were members of the not-so-mythical Quetta Shura (whose existence the government publicly denied); an operation in Swat which was delayed because the government was prepared to accede to demands for Shariah rule; statements about the Indian support to insurgencies in Balochistan and militants in the tribal belt (about which the government has been unwilling or unable to broadcast the evidence).

That is not to say there have been no successes – operation Rah-e-Nijat, for example – but it has mostly been a reactionary effort rather than part of a grand strategic design.

This is what an operational National Counter-Terrorism Authority should be able to correct, and the delay is not forgivable. Terrorism is a threat of priority. Within months of President Barack Obama’s swearing in, his team put out the infamous Af-Pak strategy for a war not even close to the American borders. We live with this threat and its damp, dark fear spreads from cyberspace to crowded bazaars. The lack of a coherent, long-term counter-terrorism strategy is indeed a story of national importance, without the pretentious capitals.