The Pak-Afghan border in another time would be the stuff of fiction: drugs, arms, failed peace agreements, militants who hop back and forth across the border as freely as the wind blows, and then the innocent civilians caught in the quagmire of the century. Somewhere in between there is Pakistan, its role contentious even after being stuck in the muck for over eight years.

Given all this, there was no lack of fodder to ponder over during the afterhours of the US President Barack Obama’s State of the Union address last month, where he reaffirmed the pullout of the US security forces by the middle of this year.

In his address on January 24, 2011, Obama touted the progress made by the security forces: “In Afghanistan, our troops have taken Taliban strongholds and trained Afghan security forces … This year we will work with nearly 50 countries to begin a transition to an Afghan lead. And this July, we will begin to bring our troops home.”

In short, it meant that the US administration is adamant about sticking to the plan chalked out in 2009: a build-up of troops in 2010, a draw-down in 2011 and finally a withdrawal of most forces by 2013.

As in 2009, in 2011 as well, the US Afghan plan was received with scepticism for some similar and some different reasons. It was widely hailed as a long overdue measure, which will be the real test of sustainability of the progress made in the last decade in Afghanistan. Others criticised the pullout for being a hasty retreat from a country where governance and security remain mired in uncertainty.

In both instances, the lack of defining the role that Pakistan will play has been brought up numerous times.

Since 2002, it has been stressed that no plan is workable in Afghanistan without delineating the function of Pakistan and its military, the last holding more importance in the written word. A commentator in Washington Post [March 29, 2009] had gone so far as to write: “The saying is that most countries have militaries, while in Pakistan the military has a country. Right now the Pakistani armed forces are part of the problem.”

In the early months of 2011, the moot point is once again what Pakistan would do once the international security forces pull out or reduce their presence in significant numbers.

It is taken for granted that there will be a rebound of militancy in Afghanistan: local militants would consolidate and there could be an influx of militants from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata). In fact, in late December, a leaked Nato intelligence report hinted to a rise in militant activities due to increased alliances between militant organisations in the agencies come spring.

For the forces in Afghanistan, there are a limited number of ways of dealing with the impending surge. The international forces could bend and negotiate with the Taliban, something to which they have been averse. The ISAF’s agenda has been singular: lay down arms and come over to our side. However, the back of the militants has not been broken enough for them to lay their arms willingly, just yet.

The other option is an intensification of military action by the forces already in Afghanistan. Given that the US is in its drawn-down mode, the last is unlikely to happen from its end. It also becomes a distant possibility, or rather an act of stupidity, for the Afghans forces to engage and stretch themselves just as they are about to find their feet.

Hence, essentially, Pakistan is looked on as the messiah, and that it will crack down on the remaining haven in Fata. Indeed, for the last one year, the US has been persistently pressuring Pakistan’s army to go into North Waziristan, home to the al Qaeda linked Haqqanis, or else the US would not hesitate from furthering the drone attacks.

At a December briefing, White House administration officials were quoted as saying that they expected the “Pakistani military to finally enter North Waziristan in 2011, based on private assurances from the Pakistani government. But the real strategy appears to be for the United States to do most of the work itself — at least until the Pakistanis step up.”

On their part, Pakistan and its military have not buckled down. Both have repeatedly stated that the military needs to recover from the two counter-insurgency campaigns of 2009. Earlier this month, as the Pakistani military also did its own little draw-down from Swat, it remained hush about whether the troops would be redeployed to Fata. It also refused to divulge any details about its future anti-insurgency efforts.

As ever, a huge question mark hangs on its strategies even though Pakistan clearly does not lack options; it could build up troops along the tribal border and check movement of militants, it could enter into negotiations with the Taliban in North Waziristan and see if they will reduce their activities given that the ‘foreign’ presence in Afghanistan is being reduced, it could just sit back and let the US spend millions of dollars on drone attacks and do the dirty work, but then bear with the domestic lash-out.

Lastly, Pakistan could cede to US demands and enter North Waziristan. That is the toughest option for it requires garnering support within its military ranks as well as its citizens, for a fight to maintain stability not on its soil but on the wrong side of the Durand Line. After all as many officers ask, what benefit would it be to stretch the military resources out for a fight that does not benefit Pakistan more than Afghanistan?

Even as the possibilities are limited, it is imperative that Pakistan comes forward and makes its stance clear on the issue. There is no shying away even if it wants to break all ties. It has to let the world know where it stands and what to expect come July as the US forces depart.

Nadia Jajja is a journalist associated with a political monthly magazine.

The views expressed by this blogger and in the following reader comments do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Dawn Media Group.