The belated and half-hearted olive branch offered by Islamabad's weak-kneed political establishment has been unanimously rejected by Baloch nationalists.

In fact, the crisis of confidence between the Baloch and Islamabad is one of the major reasons for the strong reaction from Balochistan with regard to Islamabad's unattractive and impractical 'package'.

The Baloch people believe they have been repeatedly betrayed by the establishment, and there is no way to trust Islamabad's unilateral offer without firm internal and external guarantees.

For Islamabad to make any headway in this region it needs to do a lot more than just offer unconvincing promise-oriented packages. There are two major interrelated obstacles to permanent peace in Balochistan (1) the establishment in Islamabad believes that it has the sovereign right to confiscate Baloch natural wealth and (2) Baloch political parties are of the opinion, based on past experience, that Islamabad cannot be trusted anymore and the right of national self-determination is the only way out of the crisis.

To end this deadlock there is a need to revitalise the peace process following some basic steps (a) fast-track confidence-building measures, including an end to the oppressive regime in the province, demilitarisation, arrest and trial of 'culprits', an end to the practice of disappearances, the need to release and for heavy compensation for all missing persons, and a total halt to controversial development projects; (b) involving experienced mediators and facilitators to aid the peace process and monitor implementation and (c) guarantees, including international guarantees by reputable institutions.

Future guarantees must include the Baloch people's right to self-determination in case of any misadventure by the central government. There have been repeated packages, even during the Musharraf era; in fact all controversial and exploitative developments were termed 'packages'. The recent package holds no concrete assurances on Balochistan's political, economic and administrative future, including the Baloch people's right to self-rule and control over natural resources, which has been the central demand of the Baloch people.

The majority of issues in the package are either under consideration, or will be considered, or will be inquired into, or will be taken care of at some unspecified time in the future.

Sadly, the PPP-led committee is following the futile road taken by the dodgy parliamentary committee on Balochistan established during the Musharraf regime. The 2004 committee was an eyewash — the bulk of its members were irrelevant to the conflict and their presence complicated the peace and political processes.

The PPP-initiated process of reconciliation and conflict resolution should be exclusive. The peace process must be genuine, facilitated by international mediators so that peace talks can be held in depth and in a more trusted environment.

On the constitutional amendment part there should have been a more clear vision, a road map and timetable for Balochistan's demands, rather than using old-fashioned tactical language. The talk of constitutional amendments in the proposed 'package' is not very attractive for the Baloch masses, as existing constitutional guarantees with regard to fundamental rights and economic wellbeing have been repeatedly violated by the central government.

Contrary to the constitutional provisions, people have been subjugated, their basic needs ignored, and their human and citizens' rights violated. Even during the tenure of so-called democratic governments ordinary and unarmed political activists are being abducted on a daily basis.

As mentioned in the text of the package, the central government is just considering the deletion of the concurrent list.

Since political promises are repeatedly dishonoured in Pakistan, there is little hope to satisfy the aggrieved Baloch masses that Islamabad's 'considerations' with regard to political empowerment of the province will materialise. The promise with regard to the deletion or transfer of the concurrent legislative list is pending since 1973.

Political experts understand that Baloch demands can only be accommodated through principal restructuring of the constitution, going beyond the concurrent list towards asymmetric federalism, in which different constituent units possess different powers one or more units has considerably more autonomy than the other provinces.

It is frequently proposed as a solution to the dissatisfaction that arises when one or two constituent units feel that they have significantly different needs from the others as a result of ethnic, linguistic or cultural differences.

Fancy promises lacking the potential for action in the administrative part of the package will further complicate many issues which need quick resolution through sincere executive orders. The language, tone and implementation mechanism of administrative matters gives massive leverage to the central government and the concerned agencies to continue their ruthless policies and even justifies their actions under the cover of inquiry committees and commissions.

The PPP government — if it is powerful enough — has to come up with actions and decisions. There have been judicial inquiries, commissions and reports with regard to all the relevant issues. Even court orders exist while the provincial assembly's unanimous resolutions have been passed.

What is missing is the will to implement these orders.

The much talked about 'political amnesty' is in fact a very offensive, provocative term. Islamabad has accepted much of the blame for wrongdoing in the province and apologised for transgressions. Instead of issuing an amnesty, Islamabad needs to ask for amnesty from the oppressed Baloch masses for its unjustified actions.

Since the overall approach to the peace process is flawed, the monitoring and implementation mechanism described in the package does not match any standards. Monitoring and implementation constitute a most important and challenging part of any conflict's resolution. A Balochistan monitoring mission should have been set up, composed of representatives and monitors from the European Union and countries like Norway, which have vast experience in monitoring and implementing peace deals.

Monitoring is not about the implementation of certain decisions. It is a comprehensive mechanism and strategy to monitor and support the parties of the MoU with re-integration, assurance of human rights, new legislation and many other demanding political issues. Since the central government is a party to the conflict, it is impractical for it to unilaterally control the monitoring and mplementation mechanism.

The writer is a former senator.