GENERAL (retd) Musharraf seems to be very fond of affirming and reaffirming that Pakistan is not a banana republic. In Brussels, he made a direct reference to this matter. His circuit of other European capitals was also designed to repair the damage done by eight years of his military regime, and as The Times of London said, “It is hard to say that he did”. The irony is that under his rule the country has developed all the essential elements to qualify for the title. Let me explain.

This construct was first used by an American humourist, O. Henry (pen name of the American writer William Henry Porter), with reference to Honduras, with bananas representing foreign and corporate interests, and “republic” underlining dictatorship, throwing away to the background the question of viability or failure of the state. Gradually, the phrase became synonymous with several variations, all emphasising a common characteristic of an authoritarian regime, propensity to frequent coups, power and patronage with support from civil-military oligarchy, poor infrastructure in public goods such as basic education and health, and sharp inequalities of income.

One could add another factor for Pakistan, religious extremism, which may turn the country into Taliban style of hisba (hasba) republic, starting with kazi courts, to promote Taliban beliefs about virtues and vice.

The economic features which have evolved during the Musharraf regime are close to the basic framework of the model of banana republic, but I will examine this question at a later date. My objective here is to discuss the matter about the forthcoming national elections. These elections are being promised to be transparent, free and fair. This is what the retired general has been advising his European audiences.

What he has avoided to mention is the fact that these elections will be held under the shadow of his “Revocation of proclamation of emergency” order. This “Revocation” affirms that all actions taken by him under Emergency and the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) are valid and legal, and it also declares that the president may pass in future any order as he may deem fit. He has deemed it fit in his wisdom to appoint and establish the entire paraphernalia for the elections.

It is a well-established principle of democracy concerning elections that the machinery to conduct them is established in consultation with the contending parties. This pre-requisite has not been fulfilled. The situation, therefore, contains a significant element of rigging in the sense that the course of the elections and qualifications of the candidates have already been determined in accordance with his criteria.

He had faced some tough questions from the European audience. But they would have been even more critical of his position, had they touched upon this “Revocation” and reaffirmation of his PCO. In fact he has been quite ingenuous about this point. When asked in Davos, for example, concerning his relations with his prime minister, his answer clearly implied that the sharing of power between the two offices would be as given in the 1973 Constitution. In fact the powers he has derived from his “Revocation” have no provision in the 1973 Constitution. It may therefore be regarded as an unconstitutional action, carrying a “legal” status on his authority. This is another phenomenon which is a known variation of the model of banana republic.

It would be useful to refresh our perspective of how this situation has evolved. In 2002, General (retd.) Musharraf established the structure of government for a five year term, on the basis of his 17th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, and held the position of president of Pakistan simultaneously with that of chief of the army staff.

In 2007, the political climate had significantly turned against continuation of military rule in Pakistan. General Musharraf was due to retire as chief of the army staff in November 2007, but his term as President was to expire earlier. He wanted to be reelected as President concurrently with his army position which confronted him with a constitutional dilemma. He had a choice, to seek a political solution or to act at his own discretion.

He decided in favour of the latter option and the result was the Emergency and the PCO, enforced just for a few weeks to smoothen his transition from General Musharraf to General (retd.) Musharraf. The rest is well-known.

The general has forthwith put all the legal and constitutional hurdles out of the way. And his western benefactors continue to publicly advise him to hold free and fair elections. They scrupulously avoid the fact, behind their mantra, that the pre-requisites for holding elections have already been rolled according to his plan, though they have started to mention about need to remove 'some serious distortions' in the plans for elections. But on other matters silence continues, such as the house-arrest/confinement of some civil society activists and judges.

A glimpse of the real agenda that the General has decided to follow became apparent from his speeches he has made in his recent European excursion. It is obvious that according to his outlook Pakistanis are ill-disciplined and do not deserve democracy, that the “deposed” judges are inept and corrupt, and the media are undermining the military and the country. Here is then a one-dimensional perspective of a man who does not suffer enemies lightly.

How will he cope with the results of the polls is a difficult question to answer. The two main parties have decided to contest them because they hope to win in a free and fair election, and to bring the necessary changes in the political system by participating in the new parliament. How would the General react to the election results?

From March 2007, when he decided to target the chief justice of Pakistan, to the present, the general has invested so much in his gamble for the office of the president that he is not likely to let the achievement get frittered away. It is not difficult to assume that his wish would be to have the king's party win the majority of the seats. He probably has realised that this may not be a realistic expectation.

The other alternative suitable for him would be to have a docile parliament, with none of the political parties with enough strength to pull through on their own. Under these conditions, the general could use his divide and rule policy. And the banana republic would continue to flourish.

But there is a caveat. If at least one of the two main parties should have done better, in popular perception, then this docile parliament may become virtually inoperative due to public protests.

The other scenario for the general would be to a clear majority of PPP, followed by PML-N. In this case, he will try to manage the situation in the framework of the post-PCO devices available to him. There are reports about his contacts with Shehbaz Sharif, the brother Mr Nawaz Sharif. And there are contradictory rumours about the future of NRO, which may be relevant for Mr Asif Zardari. These rumours need to be placed, therefore, in the context of the possible power-sharing arrangement that the general would pursue. It seems safe to assume that he would like to establish his place in the new setup in the framework of the powers he has acquired from his “Revocation of proclamation of emergency” order, as mentioned above.

If he succeeds in maintaining this position, he will then try to preside over a façade of democracy, and carry on with his banana republic, with the “Revocation” powers as the “norm”, instead of 1973 Constitution. The judges not taking the oath to his rule will stay “deposed”. He will have the support of the civil-military oligarchy, and of his western allies, for his regime. He will face serious difficulty in meeting the challenge of rising terrorism in the country.

It will be an unstable scenario. Also, the repetition of 1999 and 2002 will face considerable opposition from lawyers and other active groups in the civil society. They would demand that supremacy of parliament be restored without further delay.

The only solution would be to return to the framework of the 1973 Constitution. It may not be the best document; it is the only workable constitution the country has had. Granted that Z.A. Bhutto performed some initial surgery on it, but the two military regimes have done irreparable damage to it.

General (retd) Musharraf, in the larger interests of the country, should endorse the 1973 Constitution, or resign. In his charm offensive during his week-long trip to Europe, he is reported to have said that he would leave power only when he has the “feeling” that people do not support him. I hope he gets the message from his “feeling” before too long.

The writer taught economics at Pakistani and Canadian universities before his retirement.

Email izzud-din.pal@videotron.ca